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ABSTRACT 
This study examines the legal responsibilities of 
educators for the supervision and care of students, and 
the legal rights of teachers in the field of tenure. The 
overall purpose of the study is to identify, in these 
two areas, consistent principles of law relative to 
educational personnel. 
The writer examines the sources of law which define 
the responsibilities and rights of educators. The sources 
include relevant statutes, contractual agreements, and 
subordinate legislation in the form of school board by-
laws, rules and regulations. Much of Canadian law is 
unwritten so that legal principles have evolved through 
the common law. These principles are identified and 
illustrated by an examination of more than one hundred 
court cases. Pertinent Newfoundland legislation, some 
conipars.ti '\."e legislation, a.nd British and Canadian court 
cases form the basic source of the writer's data. 
Under the topic of Teacher Liability, the tort of 
negligence is defined and explained. The legal duties 
that educators, in their respective roles, owe to students 
are examined with specific reference to their supervisory 
duties on and off school premises, before and after 
school hours, and while transporting students. The duty 
owed to keep premises, facilities and equipment in a 
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sa~e condition is reviewed. The writer examines the 
de~ences to a charge o~ negligence and the measures that 
educators can take to protect themselves against such 
a charge or against the possible ensuing ~inancial con• 
sequences. Through an examination of the by-laws o~ 
Newfoundland school boards and the procedural methods 
of a selected number of schools, the writer attempts 
to comment on the adequacy o~ prevailing supervisory 
practices. 
Under the topic of Teacher Tenure, the writer 
reviews the procedures for acquiring tenure, the causes 
for dismissal, the procedures for dismissal and the 
procedural rights that accrue to teachers. 
As a result of his findings, the writer classifies 
a number of basic legal principles that apply to educators . 
generally across Canada. The most important implication 
1n 
to be done to make educators more aware of their legal 
rights and duties. He suggests some methods whereby this 
need might be satisfied. 
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GLOSSARY OF LEGAL TERMS 
Absolute: complete; unconditional; not relative or 
qualified. 
Action: a proceeding taken in a court of law. 
Appeal: an application by an appellant to a higher 
court to rectify an order of the court below. 
Bona fide: in good faith; without fraud or unfair dealing. 
Breach: a breaking; the violation of a duty. 
Causa causans: the immediate, effective or proximate 
cause of an occurrence. 
Causa sine qua non: something without which the occurrence 
would not have happened, but not its immediate 
or effective cause. 
Certiorari: an original writ whereby a case is removed 
from a tribunal or an inferior court to a 
superior c·ourt of' law so that 1 t might be quashed. 
Civil action: an action between citizens which has for 
its object .the recovery of private or civil 
rights, or compensation for their infraction. 
Contributory negligence: negligence of the plaintiff 
which, combined with the negligence of the 
derend~~t, was the proximate cause of the injury. 
Damage: ~~ injury to person, property or reputation 
caused by the negligence of another, or by 
accident. 
Damages: the amount claimed or allowed as compensation 
f'or injuries sustained through the negligence 
of' another. 
De facto: in fact. 
De iure, de lege: by right; legally. 
Equity: fairne ss. The system of jurisprudence which grew 
up in and was first used by the English Courts of 
Chancery to correct inequalities before the law. 
Ignorantia iuris non excusat: ignorance of the law is 
no excuse/defence. 
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In camera: a closed session; a judicial hearing that is 
not open to the public. 
In loco parentis: in place of a parent; the common law 
authority of a teacher. 
Inter alia: among other things. 
Licence: permission or authority to do something which 
would otherwise be illegal. 
Liquidated: £ixed; ascertainable. e.g. liquidated or 
special damages represent the amount ascertained 
to have been lost by the plaintiff, as for 
example, fees for medical expenses or the repair 
of a motor car. 
Mandamus: an original writ to direct an of£icial or an 
inferior court to carry out a duty imposed by 
law. 
Mandatory: compulsory; the result of a judicial command. 
Negligence: want of care; a railure to act or not act 
as would be reasonable. 
Plaintiff: one who brings an action. 
Prohibition: an original writ to prevent an official or 
an inferior court from acting improperly. 
Quash: to annul or discharge. 
Quasi: as if; almost. 
Res ipsa loquitur: the thing speaks for itself. In actions 
concern1ng negligence, the expression suggests 
that no further proof is needed once it is 
established that the mishap occurred; that is, 
it could not have happened if there had been no 
negligence. 
Respondeat superior: 'let the superior be responsible'; 
the responsibility of a master for tha negligent 
acts of his servants; vicarious liability. 
Statute: a law created by the legislative body of a 
country or province. 
Tenure: the mode of holding office; permanent position. 
Tort: injury or wrong leading to a civil action. 
xiv 
Ultra vires: to exceed the stated powers. 
Unliquidated: not rixed, e.g. unliquidated damages are 
assessed by the court in each case and take 
into account such matters as the plaintirr•s 
loss or earning power (whether by death or 
injury) and its erfects on his dependants, loss 
or expectation of marriage, and so forth. 
Vicarious liability: see Respondeat superior. 
Void: of no force or effect; cancelled, as ir it never 
existed. 
Volent~ non fit iniuria: 'injury is not done to a willing 
person'; that to which a man consents cannot be 




In The Legal Status or the Canadian Teacher, 
Sherburne G. McCurdy concluded his research by observing: 
One of the major problems confronting 
the student of the teacher's legal 
status in Canada is the lack or data 
and of research at the provincial 
level . ., 
The lack or data and or research in this rield is 
particularly pertinent to Newroundland, for, although 
the Province has its own legislature and judiciary, there 
is no law reporting agency. A rew cases involving education 
have been before the courts, but no reports of them exist. 
Such cases are, for the most part, only known to those 
who took part in them. 2 It is not possible, thererore, 
to refer to any direct legal precedent or judgements to 
discover how the law or the Province could be interpreted. 
No research peculiar to Newfoundland has been done. 
The legal status of teachers, pupils and school boards, 
respectively, has been researched across Canada by McCurdy, 
1 S.G.McCurdy, The Legal Status of the Canadian Teacher 
(Toronto: The Macmillan Co. or Canada Ltd., 1968),p.170. 
2 Interview with Robert Wells, Q.C., St. John's, New-
roundland, May 1975. 
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Bargen, 1 and Enns. 2 They make little rererence to New-
roundland, however, apart from stating, where pertinent, 
the law as enacted, for the very obvious reason that there 
is little else to report. 
It is possible to hypothesise many reasons for this 
lack of court action. Financial considerations might have 
prevented teachers and/or parents from seeking redress 
at law. It is probably true to say that many potential 
cases never reached the courts because of skilful 
negotiation and diplomacy beforehand. Settlement could 
have taken place in the office of the principal or the 
superintendent when action might have been brought by a 
parent; it could have taken place at the board level or 
through the offices of the Newfoundland Teachers• 
Association,3 when action might have been brought by 
a teacher or a school board. Undoubtedly, lawyers have 
helped to settle complaints out of court,4 as has the 
Department of Education through its officials. At the 
same time, a li~ited number of disputes have been settled 
by arbitration, some of which have been considered in 
the course of this study. 
1 P.F.Bargen,The Leal Status of the Canadian Public 
School Pupil Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 
1 961 ) • 
2 F.Enns~ The Le al Status of the Canadian School Board 
(Toronto: The Macmillan Co. of Canada Ltd., 19 3 • 
3 Interview with William O'Driscoll, Executive Secretary, 
Newfoundland Teachers' Association, St. John's, May 1975. 
4 Interview with Robert Wells, Q.C., St. John's, May 1975. 
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It is also possib~e to speculate that many cases 
were not brought before the courts because of ignorance 
of the law. How much of the 'skilful negotiation and 
dip lomacy' mentioned above has resulted in parents, 
students and educators being denied justice through 
the legal process? McCurdy writes: 
It is doubtful, however, if teachers 
generally realize the extent to which 
the legislation determines their rights, 
duties, powers, privileges and respons-
ibilities. Nor would many be aware of the 
interpretations given to this legislation 
by the courts. Perhaps even less would they 
realize the increasingly important influ-
ence that various administrative or quasi-
judicial bodies are having on their 
legal status.1 
The reasons for the dearth of legal cases in New-
foundland are outside the scope of this study, but surely 
it would be unreasonable to imagine that no cases have 
ever been brought because of the perfection of those 
involved in the educational process. Educators, being 
human, are fallible. It is the belief of the author that 
we are entering an era of much greater accountability, 
when teachers will be more publicly responsible for their 
actions and indeed lack of actions, and when they, at the 
same time, are going to seek a greater accountability to 
themselves as professionals. The influence of other 
provinces and countries is making itself felt in the 
communities and staffrooms of Newfoundland. It is essential, 
1 McCurdy, op.oit., p.). 
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therefore, as McCurdy has pointed out, that teachers, 
who, as a result or their profession, are the guardians 
or the youth for much of each year, should know their 
responsibilities and liabilities in the eyes or the law. 
It is also essential that they, as professionals, should 
know their rights, powers and privileges. McCurdy con-
cludes his book with the following: 
Steps should also be taken to make the 
membership of teacher organizations more 
aware of their rights and responsibilities 
as far as the law is concerned. Litigation 
is expensive, time~consuming, and often 
the source or long-term hostility between 
the disputing parties. There seems little 
doubt also that much needless litigation 
occurs as a result of ignorance of the 
law. Any contribution that te·achers and 
teacher organizations can make to dispel 
such ignorance, both among teachers and 
among the general public, is to be 
applauded. 1 
The teacher, therefore, to be a true professional 
must know the law to the best of his ability. Ignorantia 
iuris D2ll excusat2 is a legal maxim that applies to all 
citizens of legal age. 
This study examines teachers' responsibilities 
for the supervision and care of students and their 
rights in the field of tenure. 
1 McCurdy, op.cit., p.171. 
2 Ignorance or the law is no excuse/defence. 
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II~ STATEMENT OF THE MAIN PROBLEM 
In January 1975, The Supreme Court of British 
Columbia a· • .:arded over one ~'""ld a hal:r Million dollars 
($1~534,058~93) in damages to a student who~ as a result 
o:r an accident in his school's gymnasium, is now a complete 
quadriplegic. Both the school bcrard and the physical 
education teacher v.rere .found liable, but the suit against 
the school principal was dismissed_ 1 
In 1968, The Supreme Court o:r Saskatchewan ruled 
a school board liable :for one-hundred and eighty-three 
thousand and nine-h~~dred dollars ($183,900) in damages 
t0 a etuflAnt. injured in a school gYJI1nasium. 2 
In 1972, The Supreme Court o:f Canada awarded ten-
thousand, seven-hundred and sixteen dollars and sixty 
cents ($10 1 716.60) to a •1ea:f mute student injured in the 
workshop of a School for the Deaf operated by the Govern-
ment or Alberta. The teacher and the Crov.m were ~ound 
liable.3 
In all three cases it is interesting to note that a 
teacher v.ra s on duty a..1'1d present at the time of' the accidents. 
1Nhy 1 then,. "t-Tere the school authorities 'found liable? It 
1 Thor~ton v. Bc~rd or School Truste~a or Sc~ool Distr~ct 
#51 ( St ~ George) and Da ... ,i { Edamu!'"s. {B.C •. ) ( 1 97.5). Photo-
copy of judgement of An~rews~ J. 
2 McKay .and McKav v. Go,ra.n S~hoo1 Unit No. 29 a-Tld 1'-1olesky 
(S~~k.)(1968) b4 W . W~R. 301. 
~td MaDnlebeck (Alta.) 
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will be seen. in the rol~owing chapters, that the courts 
recognise that accidents do happen. It will be seen that 
the courts do not expect students to be supervised all 
the time. It will also be seen that school personnel are 
expected to exercise the same degree of care towards 
their pupils as would a 'reasonable and prudent father•. 
In a more detailed examination of the above and 
other cases. it will be seen that the mere presence of 
a teacher does not legally constitute supervision. Through 
an examination of other cases. it will be shown that the 
degree of supervision is sometimes considered adequate 
even when no teacher is present. The basic problem, 
therefore. has been to determine what supervision is in 
the eyes or the law. 
In 1974, The Alberta Supreme Court ruled that 
tenured teachers who had been dismissed without sufficient 
notice were entitled to one year's salary by way of 
damages and c osts. 1 
In 1973 1 the Ontario High Court held that the findings 
of a Board of Reference had to be set aside as officials 
of the board of education had been allowed to remain in 
the room while teachers were giving evidence. 2 
1 Michaels and Finn v. Red Deer College (Alta.)(1974) 
2 W.W.R. 416. 
2 and Lambton Education 
32 D.L.R. 
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ln 1971, The House of Lords ruled that a teacher's 
di sm~ssal wa s unjust because he had not been allowed to 
present his case to his employers prior to his dismissal. 1 
Of the seven most recent disputesp involving 
di smissal of teachers, that have been decided by boards 
_ of" ref"erence or arbitration in Newfoundland, five ·Here 
ruled in favour of the teachers rather than the school 
b oards. 
Obviously, there are decisions of the courts and of 
arbitration boards that find in favour of" school boards, 
but why are such cases as those referred to above lost 
by school boards'? no ·school boards act maliciously when 
t hey dismiss teachers or are they procedurally ·incompetent? 
In a later examination of the cases, it will be 
shown that the cause of the diclmissal is rarely the major 
source of contention. For the most part, decisions have 
gone against the school boards because they have rlismissed 
teachers arbitrarily , for causes outside those permitted 
by statute or contract and with no proof of" a detailed, 
documented evaluation of the teachers prior to dismissal , 
or becsuse of a failure of natura l justice which demands 
that the person to be dismissed be given a hearin g - auni 
alternrn partern - pr i or t o di s mis s a l. This is no t to s u ggest 
that sny of the t eachers involved in disputes d e served tc 
1 Mallo ch v . Ab erda en Corn ora t i on (U.K.)( 1971) Al l E . R. 
Vol .. 2 , 127 • 
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be dismissed, but it does illustrate that school boards 
will not be able to remove incompetent teachers unless 
they rully understand the procedures to be rollowed. For 
the most part, principals and superintendents are the 
personnel responsible ror the implementation of the pro-
cedures. The problem, therefore, has been to determine 
the causes for dismissal and the proper procedures to 
be rollowed. 
The cases rererred to above, some involving sub-
stantial rinancial awards, indicate that today a working 
knowledge of the principles of school law has become 
more important to school personnel than ever berore. In 
the introduction to this chapter it was shown that 
educational personnel in Newfoundland are handicapped 
by a lack of readily available and appropriate materials 
to guide them in the daily conduct or their work. This 
study has been an attempt to remedy this defect. 
The problem which the author has attempted to 
examine is two-rold, namely, what does the law state 
about the legal rights and responsibilities of teachers? 
and, how could that legislation be interpreted by the 
courts? These questions have been answered by the 
following procedures: 
1 . an identification of consistent principles 
of law relative to proressional educational 
personnel; 
2. a selection and analysis of cases in which 
the decisions rendered by the courts and by 
-9-
boards of arbitration have demonstrated 
the applicabili'ty of these principles; 
). the documentation of the statutes and 
other legislation relevant to the cases; 
4. the interpretation or the findings so 
that the application of the principles 
of law relevant to the cases might be 
clarified and made more functionally 
valuable to professional personnel in 
the field of education.1 
III. STATEMENT OF THE SUB-PROBLEMS 
As ignorance of the law is no derence, those 
involved with education need to know the law. They also 
need an understanding of what the law means, since often 
the legal terminology is couched in diffuse terms. For 
example, section 80.2(r) of~ Schools ,All (R.S.N.) 1970, 
states, "Every Principal in a school shall arrange for 
the regular supervision of pupils on the premises of his 
school." Such terminology as this illustrates the formal 
enactment, of which the principal might be aware. To 
protect himself, his staff and the school board against 
litigation, however, he needs to ask the questions, "What 
is meant by 'arrange'?", "What is meant by 'regular'?", 
and, "What is meant by 'premises'?" As no formal, speci.fic, 
enacted definitions are given for these terms, the 
diffuseness can be resolved by an examination of the basic 
1 This format was developed from that used by W.A. Grice 
in his work, "Legal Bases for Decision Making Relative 
to Professional School Personnel" (unpublished Doctoral 
dissertation, McNeese State University, 1974). 
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principles of law as determined by the decisions of the 
courts. 
At the same time, much can be done at the local 
level to define such terms more specifically. School 
boards, through their by-laws, can clarify the steps to 
be taken by themselves and their employees. Individual 
schools, through their regulations, can be more specific 
in order to meet their peculiar needs. 
Professor D.J. Mullan, speaking on The Modern Law 
of Tenure at Dalhousie University on March 1st. 1975, 
said: 
Our courts seem to hold that dismissal of 
tenured staff brings with it the obligation 
to follow the rules of natural justice ••• 
The lesson to be learnt is to avoid the 
courts at all costs and to concentrate 
on internal procedures. 
Both in the field of supervision and in the field 
of tenure, court actions can be avoided if procedures 
are established to protect the interests of those who, 
in the absence of the procedures, could become plaintiffs 
at law. 
The sub-problems of this study, therefore, were 
embedded in the following questions: 
1. Do school boards have policies and regulations 
which clarify the enacted legislation? 
2. Do schools have regulations specific to their 
own needs? 
). Do such policies and regulations appear to be 
adequate to protect the school boards and 
their employees from litigation? 
-11 ... 
CHAPTER II 
THE THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Before determining the rights and responsibilities 
of teachers, it is necessary first to define the sources 
of Newfoundland law. Enacted legislation pertinent to the 
supervision and care of students and to the tenure rights 
of teachers is stated and examined in later chapters. 
Relevant case law is also examined to infer how the law 
could be interpreted. 
Newfoundland law, and indeed Canadian law generally, 
is an offspring of British law and as such has two main 
sources, namely, written law and unwritten law. Written 
or enacted laws can most easily be classified as those 
laws that have been passed by the legislature in the form 
of A~ ts of Parliament, referred to as Statutes. Such laws 
can also be enacted, through delegated legislative 
authority, in the form of Orders-in-Council and local 
by- l aws. Unwritten laws evolved, through the common law, 
from usage and customs, conventions, case law and precedent. 
In the early days of the British judicial system, decisions 
at law tended to follow customs and usage. In time these 
customs became so accepted that they assumed the status 
-1~-
of conventions which we~e, in effect, more binding on 
the courts of the land. 
Certain customs became the accepted basis 
of proper conduct. These customs became 
crystallized into principles which in 
cases of controversy were enunciated by 
the courts ••• The courts then tended 
to rollow their earlier decisions and 
there came into being the doctrine of 1 
stare decisis, "let the decision stand". 
The areas or unwritten law which so evolved 
encompassed what are now known as Constitutional Law, 
The Law of Contract and The Law of Torts. At the same 
time, judges followed the decisions or higher courts in 
cases involving similar racts, so that the doctrine of 
precedent evolved. From such precedents, case law emerged 
as a source of law in its own right. Case law, however, 
is only binding on lower courts under the same juris-
diction. 
II. WRITTEN LAW 
1. Federal Legislation 
(a) ~British North America !£11 1867. 
The B.N.A. Act, in section 93, assigned to the 
provinces the exclusive right to make laws 
respecting education. Its sub-sections protected 
denominational minority rights against the 
encroachment of provincial legislatures. 
1 R.R.Hamilton and P.R.Mort, The Law and Public Education 
(Brooklyn: The Foundation Press, Inc., 19$9), p.J. 
-1 3-
(b) !g Act to Approve ~ Terms of Union 2£ Newfoundland 
with Canada- 1949. 1 
Section 17 states: 
In lieu of section 93 of the British North 
America Act, 1867, the following terms shall 
apply in respect of the province of 
Newfoundland, 
In and for the province of Newfoundland 
the Legislature shall have exclusive 
authority to make laws in relation to 
education, but the Legislature will not 
have authority to make laws prejudicially 
arfecting any right or privilege with 
respect to denominational schools, common 
(amalgamated) schools, or denominational 
colleges, that any class or classes of 
persons have by law in Newfoundland at 
the time of Union ••• 
The section continues by stating that all schools 
and colleges shall have a share of the public 
funds provided for education on a non-discriminatory 
basis. 2 
(c) ~ Criminal Code of Canada 
Section 63 of The Criminal Code confers on teachers 
the right to discipline students within the frame-
work of the law. 'The law' referred to in this 
context is the law of the province. 
~ B.N.A. !£1 1867, as interpreted by Th~ !£! 2£ 
Union 1949, and ~Criminal Code 2£ Canada are the only 
federal enactments relevant to this study. 
1 Hereinafter referred to as, The !£1 ££Union 1949. 
2 Ibid., section 17 (a) and (b). 
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2. Provincial Legislation 
(a) ~Schools !£1 1969, as amended 1970. 
Subject to the provision$ o~ The Act o~ Union, 
the main source o~ law enacted ~or education in 
the Province o~ New~oundland is that laid down in 
The Schools Act. 1 
For the purpose o~ this study, in the ~ield o~ 
supervision, the relevant sections are 12, 80 and 
81 . 
In the ~ield o~ tenure, the relevant sections o~ 
the Act are 75, 76, 77 and 78. These are only 
relevant, however, ~or actions taken prior to 
the signing o£ the ~irst Collective Agreement in 
1973. These sections were repealed in 1974. 2 
(b) The New~oundland Teachers' Association !£1 1957, 
as amended 1970.3 
Section 16 o~ this Act states: 
There shall be a committee to be called 
"The New~oundland Teachers' Association 
Disciplinary Committee" consisting o~ 
~ive members ••• 
Sub-section 13 states that the Disciplinary Committee 
may recommend to the Executive that it, among other 
1 All rererences to The Schools Act will be rrom the 
Revised Statutes o~ Newroundland 1970, Chapter 346, 
An Act Respecting the Operating or Schools and Colleges 
in the Province, short title, The Schools Act (R.S.N.) 
1970. - -
2 May 21 1974, Act No.28. 
3 Hereina~ter re~erred to as ~ N.T.A. A£1 (R.S.N.) 1970. 
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things, expel rro~ membership any member who has 
been guilty or unproressional conduct, negligence 
or misconduct or has been convicted or a criminal 
orrence by a court or competent jurisdiction. This 
section is relevant to tenure and is examined in 
a later chapter. 
). School Boards 
Legislative authority is assigned to school boards 
by the provincial legislature. Such authority is either 
mandatory or discretionary, but must not contravene the 
general or speciric terms or parliamentary enacted 
legislation. Mandatory authority indicates the express 
will or the legislature. Such duties are usually indicated 
by the obligatory 'shall', as in section 12 or The Schools 
!£1 (R.S.N.) 1970, which begins: 
Subject to this Act and the regulations, 
every School Board shall ••• 
Sub-section (s) or section 12 states: 
( ••• every School Board shall ••• ) subject 
to the approval of the Minister, make 
regulations, rules or by-laws. 
This sub-section aptly demonstrates the legislative 
power of school boards, while also showing that in many 
instances the approval of the Minister (of Education) is 
needed. 
Discretionary authority, on the other hand, indicates 
the powers of school boards which they may exercise if 
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they so wish, and are usually preraced by the operative 
word 'may'. Section 13 or !h! Schools !£1 (R.S.N.) 1970, 
commences: 
Every School Board may ••• 
It is of interest to note the The Schools Act 
designates mandatory duties only to business managers, 1 
superintendents, 2 princ1pals,3 teachers4 and pupils,5 
while the Minister of Education and School Boards, who 
are not actively involved in the field, have discretionary 
powers. This should suggest that the responsibilities, 
at least, or teachers would be clear cut. This study shows 
that they are not surriciently precise. 







(a) The Disciplinary Committee of the N.T.A. 
This Committee, already referred to, 6 as an off-
spring of the N.T.A. Act, has quasi-judicial 
authority as it can pass judgements. It takes as 
its guidelines the Code or Ethics of the N.T.A. 
(b) The Collective Agreement between the N.T.A., the 
Provincial Government and The Newfoundland Fed-
eration or School Boards, 1975. 
~ Schools ~ (R.S.N.) 1970, section 16. 
Ibid., section 1 9. 
Ibid., section 80. 
Ibid. I section 81 • 
Ibid. I section 82. 
SuEr a, pp.14-15. 
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This agreement. 1 .although binding on the signatories, 
is an agreement only and not an Act of Parliament. 
It, therefore, falls into the category of quasi-
judicial jurisdiction. It is a most important 
document, not only as it has superceded some of 
the sections of The Schools Act (R.S.N.) 1970,2 
but also because it is only the second collective 
agreement designed to protect the rights of 
Newfoundland teachers.3 
Article 33 allows for the grievance procedure, 
which can result in a hearing before an Arbitration 
Board, and Article 34.09 provides for the decision 
of the Arbitration Board to be binding on 'all 
parties bound by this Agreement'. 
Tenure is discussed by examining the relevant 
articles of ~ Collective Agreement 1975, especially 
Article 12 which covers Termination of Contracts. 
III. UNWRITTEN LAW 
Case 'law establishes precedent. As there are no 
reported cases, involving education, from the Newfoundland 
courts there is no provincial precedent to be followed. It 
is pertinent, however, to discuss briefly the role of case 
law and precedent as it applies to the Newfoundland 
1 Hereinafter referred to as The Collective Agreement 1975. 
2 Article 12 supercedes ss.75-79 of~ Schools !£1 (R.S.N.) 
1970. Supra, p.14 footnote 2. 
3 The first Collective Agreement was signed in 1973. 
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judiciary. 
Decisions of Newfoundland courts are adhered to by 
the lower courts of the province. Decisions of the New-
foundland Supreme Court are binding on all other courts 
of the province. Decisions of The Supreme Court of 
Canada, the highest court in the land and also the final 
court of appeal, are binding on all courts in Canada. 1 
Decisions reached by any other court, however high 
and in whatever country, are not binding on the New-
foundland judiciary. Judgements passed in other provinces, 
in Great Britain, and in other Commonwealth countries 
are often quoted and can have an influence on the court's 
decision, but an influence only. Decisions of the courts 
of the United States of America are rarely quoted and have 
little influence.2 
Findings of quasi-judicial bodies, however, as, 
for example, those of Disciplinary Committees or Arbit• 
ration Boards, are not binding on subsequent judgements, 
as such bodies are not courts of law. In fact, such 
cases are usually kept confidential, but the facts and 
decisions, if known, may have an influence on subsequent 
hearings.3 
1 For a more detailed examination of the roles of the 
courts see the following section, p.19 et seqq. 
2 Interview with Robert Wells, Q.C., May 1975. 
3 Idem. 
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IV. THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 
A teacher could find himself involved in a court 
action at any time during his career. If the case involved 
a charge of negligence, he would be the defendant. If he 
were suing his school board for wrongful dismissal or 
any other breach of contract, he would be the plaintiff. 
A brief explanation of the procedures involved in 
both instances follows. Although the procedures are 
similar in all Canadian provinces, they are not identical. 
The procedures explained herein are those that operate 
in Newfoundland. 
The section concludes with a brief explanation of 
the law reporting procedure. 
1. Liability 
(a) Trials 
If a student is injured in school or during 
school-related activities, he can bring an action in tort 
against those whom he considers liable for the injury. He 
will attempt to show that his injury was caused by their 
negligence. Frequently, the student will be too yo~~g to 
bring the action personally. A parent, a guardian or a 
close relative will join with him in the action as 'his 
next friend'. Occasionally, the adult will sue jointly 
with the student on the grounds that the injury has caused 
him (the adult) a direct financial burden. When the action 
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is brought, the amount o~ the damages being sought is 
stated in the writ. 
New~oundland has rive District Courts. 1 I£ the claim 
being made is ~or less than ten thousand dollars ($10,000), 
the case will be heard in a district court berore a 
judge. He hears the evidence, decides i£ negligence has 
been proven, and decides on the amount o£ the damages to 
be awarded. He also determines whether legal costs should 
be awarded to one or other o~ the parties. The judge, 
thererore, is sole arbiter of law and fact. 
I£ the claim being made is for more than ten 
thousand dollars ($10 1 000), the case has to be heard, in 
the first instance, in the Trial Division or The Supreme 
Court o£ Newroundland. I£, a£ter a preliminary perusal 
of the £acts, the judge decides that damages in excess 
or ten thousand dollars ($10,000) are not justified, he 
may . return the case to a district court. At the same time, 
the lawyers representing the parties, if they think the 
amount excessive, may ask £or the case to be returned to 
a district court. 
The role of the judge in The Supreme Court is 
similar to that of a district court judge. He is sole 
arbiter of law and fact. It is possible, however, for a 
1 District Courts are situated in St. John's East, St. 
John's Wast, Grand Falls, Humber and Trinity-Conception. 
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civil action in the Trial Division or The Supreme Court 
to be heard be£ore a jury, if one of the parties so 
requests. The judge has the right to refuse the request. 
Civil actions before judge and jury are extremely rare 
in Newroundland, possibly less than one per cent (1%) of 
the total. 1 If a jury is used, it decides, by examining 
the facts, if negligence has been proven. The judge guides 
them in the law and decides the amount of the damages 
and costs to be awarded. 
(b) Appeals 
An appeal £rom a district court or rrom the Trial 
Division of The Supreme Court is made to the Appeal 
Division of The Supreme Court o£ Newfoundland. Either 
party may appeal the decision of the trial court regarding 
liability or the amount o£ damages awarded or both. 
Appeals can only be on points of law. They are, 
therefore, heard by judges only. The appellant will attempt 
to show tha~ due to a misinterpretation of the law or of 
a failure to conduct the case within the rules or evidence, 
justice was not done in the court or first instance. The 
court of appeal will determine whether the appeal is 
justified. It may confirm the finding of the trial court, 
adjust it or overrule it. It may confirm the award of 
damages and costs already made or increase or decrease 
1 Interview with Robert Wells, Q.C., July 1975. 
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the amount. It is empowered, thererore, to substitute 
its own ruling ror that or the trial court. 
Either party to the action might decide to appeal 
further, in which case the appeal will be taken to The 
Supreme Court or Canada. The role of this final court or 
appeal is similar to any other appeal court. 
2. Tenure 
(a) Hearings 
Statutes and other contractual agreements, such 
as The Collective Agreement (Newfoundland) 1975, provide 
ror grievance procedures by which teachers may dispute 
actions t~{en against them by their employers. The rinal 
stage in a grievance procedure is a hearing berore a 
board of rererence or a board of arbitration. 
The powers or such boards are stated in the 
legislation which creates them. The boards have to interpret 
law and decide on fact. Either party in a dispute before 
a board of reference or arbitration, who considers that 
the board has misinterpreted the law or has exceeded its 
powers, may appeal to a court of law. Usually the writ 
that seeks the appeal will be one or certiorari - 'to make 
more certain or clear'. In effect, therefore, the court 
is being asked to clear up the doubt that exists and, 
if it finds the appeal justified, to quash the decision 
of the board. 
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(b) Appeals 
Appeals from tribunals, boards of rererence or 
boards or arbitration in Newfoundland are made to the 
Trial Division of The Supreme Court and are heard by a 
judge or that court. Appeals may be only on points of law. 
The court may confirm the finding of the board or quash 
it. If it quashes the ruling, the case must be sent back 
to the board which first heard it, with a direction of 
how the law has to be interpreted or of how the board 
must conduct itself. The court will not substitute its 
own finding for that or a board, as it acts in a super-
vi sory capacity only. 
Lord Justice Denning in E· v. Northumberland 
Compensation Appeal Tribunal (U.K.)(1952)1 summarised 
the role of the court as follows: 
There is rormidable argument against any 
intervention on the part or the (Court) 
at all. The statutory tribunals ••• are 
often made the judges of both fact and 
law, with no appeal to the ••. Court. If, 
then, the (Court) should interfere when 
a tribunal makes a mistake of law, the 
(Court) may well be said to be exceeding 
its own jurisdiction. It would be usurping 
to itselr an appellate jurisdiction which 
has not been given to it. The answer to 
this argument, however, is that the Court 
•.. has an inherent jurisdiction to 
control all inferior tribunals, not in 
an appellate capacity, but in a super-
visory capacity. This control extends 
not only to seeing that the inferior 
tribunals keep within their jurisdiction, 
1 1 All E.R. 122, at p.127. 
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but also to seeing that they observe 
the law. The control is exercised by 
means or a power to quash any deter-
mination by the tribunal which, on the 
race or it, orrends against the law. 
The (Court) does not substitute its 
own views ror those or the tribunal, 
as a court or appeal would do. It 
leaves it to the tribunal to hear 
the case again, and in a proper case 
may command it to do so. \Vhen the 
(Court) exercises its control over 
tribunals in this way, it is not 
usurping a jurisdiction which does 
not belong to it. It is only exer-
cising a jurisdiction which it has 
always had. 
Either party may appeal rrom the ruling of the 
court to the Appeal Division or The Supreme Court or 
Newroundland, and, i£ necessary, from there to The 
Supreme Court or Canada. The role of these courts is 
identical to that expounded by Lord Denning. 
3. The Power or The Courts 
Courts of law are bound by legislation, ir it 
exists. Statutory law, therefore, supercedes all other 
sources or law. Ir an article in a collective agreement 
or a regulation in the by-laws or a school board is 
contrary to the statutory enactment, courts are bound to 
follow the law as stated in the statute. 
I.f there is no speciric legislation to guide them, 
the courts rollow common law principles and precedent. 
Rulings or The Supreme Court or Canada apply to 
the whole or Canada, unless the ruling is contrary to 
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the speciric statutory enactments or individual provinces. 
Within the provinces, lower courts are bound by the rulings 
or the higher courts. In Britain~ appeals are made to 
The Court or Appeal and~ ir necessary, to The House or 
Lords, the highest court in the land. Courts in one country . 
are not bound by the statutes or precedents or other 
countries. 
Courts or law, thererore, interpret statutes and 
develop the common law. The development has sometimes 
been so extensive as to be called new law. J 
4. Law Reports 
Agencies repo.rt on a national and provincial scale. 
New.foundland and Prince Edward Island report conjointly. 
Law reports are records or the judgements handed 
down in a selection or cases. They act as a means or 
conveying to lawyers and students o.f the law the rulings 
of the courts. Accordingly, they form, .for the most part, 
the practical source by which interpretations or the courts 
and the development o.f legal principles may be discovered. 
They are, in er.fect, the means o.f discovering precedents. 
if 
All cases cited in this study are referenced. The 
names o.f the parties and the year in which the case was 
heard are indicated. The capital letters in the reference 
indicate the name o.f the law report in which the cas6 
may be found. Any number that might precede the capital 
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letters indicates the volume number or the law report. 
The rinal number in the rererence indicates the page of 
the law report on which the report of the case commences. 
A case that is cited in subsequent chapters on more 
than one occasion is Brost v. Tilley School District 
(1955} 15 W.W.R. 241 (C.A.}. Brost is the name of the 
person bringing the action, legally termed the plaintiff; 
Tilley School District is the derendant. Although the 
event which led to the court action might have occurred 
at any earlier time, the date 1955 indicates the year 
in which the case was heard. The report can be found in 
volume 15 of the Western Weekly Reports, and it begins 
on page 241. Occasionally, as in this case, rinal letters 
appear in brackets. These name the court in which the 
case was heard. In this instance C.A. indicates the Court 
or Appeal. 
To help the reader understand where the case was 
first heard, the author has inserted the abbreviated name 
of the province immediately before the date in all cases 
cited in this work. British cases are indicated by the 
letters U.K., while cases from the United States are shown 
by the letters U.S. An indication of the geographical 
location in not normally shown in law reports. Any reader, 
therefore, who quotes directly rrom this work, should, 
for greater accuracy, omit the abbreviated geographical 
notations. 
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Frequently, cases are rererenced by citing a number 
or law reports arter the names or the parties. This 
indicates, either that the case has been reported by more 
than one agency, or that the case has been appealed 
through the courts. In the latter situation, the rer-
erences indicate where the judgements or the various 
courts might be found as the case ascended through the 
appeal process. So in Gray et al. v. McGonegal and Trustees 
of Leeds and Lansdowne Front Township School Area (Ont.} 
(1949} 4 D.L.R. 344; (1950) 4 D.L.R. 395; (1952) . 2 S.C.R. 
274, the trial case was heard in 1949 and was reported 
in volume 4 or Dominion Law Reports, commencing at page 
344; the appeal, which was heard a year later in -1950, 
was reported in volume 4 or Dominion Law Reports, commencing 
at page 395; finally, the case was heard by The Supreme 
Court or Canada in 1952 and reported in volume 2 of the 
Supreme Court Reports, commencing at page 274. 
With only a few exceptions, the writer of this work 
cites only the reference to the judgement of the court 
in which the case was rinally heard. 
Arbitration cases are not reported. The details of 
such cases are taken from the transcripts. The cases 
referred to in this work have been given the names of 
colours as pseudonyms, the alphabetical sequence of 
colours corresponding to the chronological order in which 
the cases were heard. So~ Amber Case (1971) precedes 
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~Brown Case (1971) through to~ Violet Case (1975). 
V. SUMMARY 
The main sources of law are written and unwritten. 
Written law includes all enacted legislation, the principal 
Acts for this study being~ !£i of Union 1949, and~ 
Schools Act (R.S.N.) 1970. Written law also encompasses 
delegated authority which includes the mandatory and 
discretionary duties and powers of school boards and their 
employees. Other quasi-judicial jurisdictions include the 
Disciplinary Committee of the N.T.A. and the Boards of 
Arbitration establishable as a result of The Collective 
Agreement 1975. 
The Newfoundland judiciary is autonomous, bound 
only by decisions of The Supreme Court of Canada. 
This study primarily examines the duties that 
educators owe to students to protect them from injury. 
Such duties are outlined in various sections of The 
Schools Act (R.S.N.) 1970. 1 Tenure is examined through 
a scrutiny of the various sections of The Schools !£1 
(R.S.N.) 1970, 2 and the articles of The Collective 
Agreement 1975.3 ~hrough an examination of cases de-
cided in Canada, Britain and the Commonwealth, an attempt 
has been made to determine how t~e courts could interpret 
1 Supra, p.14. 
2 Ibid. 
3 Supra, pp.16-17. 
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the enacted legislationr An analysis or such cases has 
also helped to identiry consistent principles or law 
relative to professional educational personnel. 
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CHAPTER III 
THE RESEARCH DESIGN 
I. INTRODUCTION 
There are seven general determinants which influenced 
the structuring of the research design of the study: its 
purposes; the methodology; the definition of terms; the 
assumptions; the delimitations; the limitations; and the 
significance of the study. Each of the determinants is 
outlined in the following sections. 
II. THE RESEARCH PURPOSES 
The purposes of this study are contained in the 
statements of the problem and the sub-problems outlined 
in chapter I. To review, the study has attempted to 
determine what the law states regarding the duty of care 
that is owed to students by school boards, principals and 
teachers, and, by an examination of court cases, to 
determine how the courts could interpret the enacted 
legislation. The study has also attempted to determine 
whether school boards and/or individual schools in 
Newfoundland have regul~tions,further to the enacted 
legislation, for the protection of students. 
In the field of tenure, the pertinent legislation 
has been examined, and, by an analysis of relevant 
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decisions of the courts and or boards of arbitration, an 
attempt has been made to identify consistent principles 
or law relative to proressional pe~sonnel. 
The overall purpose of this study is to orfer to 
both professional and lay educators some guidelines 
which might protect them from unnecessary, expensive 
and time-consuming litigation. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
The methodology was that generally used in the 
documentary analysis type of descriptive research, _namely, 
gathering of data, analysis of data, and interpretation 
of findings in a readable form. 
1. Gathering of Data 
(a) Legislation 
The relevant statutes and agreements were examined. 
These included The British North America Act 1867, 
The Act of Union 1949, The Criminal Code of Canada, 
The Schools Act (R.S.N.) 1970, The Contributory 
Negligence Act (R.S.N.) 1970, The Limitation of 
Actions (Personal) and Guarantees Act (R.S.N.) 
1974, and The Collective Agreements 1973 and 1975. 
The Schools Acts, or the equivalent, of five 
other provinces were also examined for purposes 
of comparison and as sources for possible 
recommendations. 
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(b) School Board Regu~ations and By-Laws 
All school boards in the province were asked to 
provide either copies or their by-laws or extracts 
from their by-laws pertinent to the problem. 
(Appendix A). 
(c) Insurance 
A further questionnaire was sent to school boards 
to determine the extent of their insurance coverage. 
(Appendix F) • 
(d) Case Law 
Each provincial teachers' association was asked to 
provide case rererences, an outline or the facts 
and the judgements of all cases that have appeared 
before the courts or their province or The Supreme 
Court of Canada subsequent to 1968. (This date was 
chosen because, so far as could be determined, no 
pertinent research has been conducted in Canada 
since the publication or McCurdy'a book in 1968. 1 ) 
(Appendix B). 
The two major teacher unions in Britain, namely, 
The National Union or Teachers and The National 
Schoolmasters Association, were approached for 
similar information pertinent to Britain. (Appendix 
c) • 
Research by the author was conducted into the Law 
1 McCurdy, supra, p.1. 
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Reports available in the main library of Memorial 
University, and a three day visit was made to the 
Law Faculty Library of Dalhousie University. Use 
was also made of the law library in the St. John's 
Court House. 
(e) The N.T.A., on the writer's behalf, sought permission 
from teachers who had taken disputes to arbitration 
prior to The Collective Agreement 1973, to use the 
facts of their cases. Subject to the protection of 
anonymity, all the teachers involved gave their 
permission. The N.T.A. also approached the teachers 
and the school boards involved in two arbitration 
cases subsequent to The Collective Agreement 1973. 
Both teachers granted permission for the facts to 
be quoted. Both superintendents withheld their 
permission. (Appendix D). 
(f) The author read extensively from all available 
literature. 
(g) One high school principal and one elementary school 
principal from each school board in the province 
were asked to complete a questionnaire for the 
purpose of determining whether specific regulations 
existed in their own school policy handbooks for 
the supervision of .students. (Appendix E). 
(h) Interviews were held with representatives of the 
legal profession, the insurance profession and the 
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Newfoundland Teachers' Association. 
2. Analysis of Data 
When the data were collected they were analysed and 
divided into two main sections. All data relevant to 
teacher liability form two chapters in the study; the 
data relevant to teacher tenure form a third chapter. 
). Interpretation of Findings 
It is hoped that each chapter has been written in 
language comprehensible to the layman. It should be 
emphasised that the findings do no more than indicate 
what could happen in Newfoundland. 
The study concludes with a summation based on the 
findings of the research. 
IV. DEFINITION OF TERMS 
Because the layman knows little about the technical 
involvements of the law, it is hoped that this work is as 
straightforward as possible. It is necessary, however, to 
define briefly such terms as teacher, tenure, criminal 
and civil proceedings, contract, tort, negligence and 
vicarious liability. A more detailed explanation of some 
of the terms follows in subsequent chapters. 
Teacher 
~Schools~ (R.S.N.) 1970, defines teacher as: 
Section 2 (ff) "teacher means a person 
holding a certificate of grade as definerl 
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by paragraph (f) of this Section 2 and 
is deemed to include emergency supply 
but does not include a Superintendent 
or an Assistant District Superintendent. 
Section 2(f) states: 
"certificate of grade" includes a 
licence to teach issued under the 
authority of The Education (Teacher 
Training) Act, 1963, the Act No. 24 
of 1963 or The Education (Teacher 
Training) Act. 
It will be noted that superintendents and assistant 
superintendents are excluded from the definition of 
'teacher'. They are also excluded from the terms of The 
Collective Agreement 1975. They do not come within our 
terms of reference for liability or tenure purposes. 
Tenure 
Teacher tenure has been defined as: 
.•. a set of rights, conveyed and 
protected by law, whereby a teacher 
cannot be dismissed from his position 
except under procedures laid down by 
statute. 'Tenure teacher' means one 
who lawfully enjoys such rights, one 
who therefore can be said to possess 
'tenure statusr.1 
This definition encompasses the full meaning of 
-the term and aptly emphasises that a tenured teacher 
cannot be dismissed except by the statutory method so 
prescribed. In effect, therefore, in Newfoundland, a 
1 J.F. Swan, "Historical Survey of the Board of Reference 
in Alberta" (unpublished Master's thesis, University 
of Alberta, 1961), p.), cited by McCurdy, op.cit.,p.2). 
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qualified teacher, once he has acquired tenure according 
to the terms of his contract within the scope of ~ 
Collective Agreement 1975, 1 cannot be summarily dismissed 
outside the scope of~ Collective Agreernent. 2 
Criminal and Civil Proceedings 
Criminal proceedings are brought by the police or 
by an individual exercising his citizen's rights in a 
court of law against a defendant on a charge of committing 
a criminal act contrary to the law of the land. Such 
proceedings may be tried before a magistrate, a judge, 
or a judge and jury. A guilty verdict carries a sentence 
which can involve a warning, probation, a conditional 
discharge, a fine, or imprisonment, any of which may 
be suspended. The proceedings involve a prosecution on 
behalf of the state. 
Such proceedings are not pertinent to this study 
except that it must be borne in mind that, if a law has 
been broken and a civil injury has been suffered at the 
same time, criminal proceedings may be initiated while 
civil proceedings are also being pursued. 
Civil proceedings involve one party, the plaintiff, 
suing another, the defendant, at law for some injury or 
wrong. The proceedings are civil as they are brought 
1 The Collective Agreement 1975, Article 7. 
2 Ibid., Article 12. 
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between citizens and encompass actions that are not 
necessarily criminal in themselves. Breach of contract, 
most insurance cases, defamation, divorce and a whole 
realm of tort, fall within this category. One person or 
a group of persons use the law to put right a wrong 
perpetrated on them by another person or group of persons. 1 
In civil actions neither imprisonment, probation nor 
fines are the outcome. Usually the judgements involve an 
award of money (compensation or damages), a decree, a 
court order to prevent (injunction) or to quash (certiorari) 
or to stop (estoppel) some action, or a command to perform 
some act (mandamus). 
The legal actions examined in this study, in the 
realms of liability or tenure, are civil proceedings 
as, in both examples, one person is trying to correct, 
what he considers, a wrong perpetrated on him by another. 
Contract 
The Law of Contract has developed through the common 
law. Basically a contract is an agreement, enforceable at 
law, between two or more persons, to do or not do something. 
The agreement must be legal, so that the inclusion 
of any clause in a teacher's contract that was at variance 
with tl1e law of the land or of any other legislation that 
applied in the place where the teacher was resident, would 
make the contract illegal and therefore void. 
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The parties to tha contract must be competent, that 
is, neither drunk, insane nor minors at the time or the 
making or the agreement. The contract must also be between 
the parties to the agreement, unless they are orricially 
acting as agents or others who are the de lege principals 
to the contract. 
Although the initial requirements or the status or 
the parties, their competency, and the legality of the 
agreement must be met, the major elements of orfer, 
acceptance and consideration must be present to make a 
valid contract. 
An offer consists of any definite ind-
ication by one person to another that 
he is willing to enter into a contract 
with him on certain specified ter.ms. 1 
Acceptance consists of any act which 
signiries final consent of the offeree 
to the terms of the offer.2 
There are various legal implications to both offer 
and acceptance, but for the purposes of this study the 
definitions given above sufrice. 
Consideration is one of the complexities of English 
law. Mr. Justice Patteson defined it in these terms: 
Consideration means something which is 
of some value in the eye of the law, 
moving from the plaintirr. It may be 
1 J.F. Wilson, The Law of Contract (London: Sweet and 
Maxwell Ltd., 1957), p.14. 
2 Ibid., p.2). 
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of scm~ benefit to the plaintiff or 
2one detriment to the d9fendant.i 
A gratuito~s agreement does not con3titute a contrn~t~ 
s ince t~e law requires that the consideration must be of 
some value. An apple, one dollar or a thousand dolla~s 
are fof some value'. Consideration, therefore, ~ust be 
sufficient, but need not be adequate. 
The adequacy of the consideration is 
for the narties to consider at the 
time of making the agreement, not for 
the court ~hen it is sought to be 
en:rorced.2 
A teacher, therefore, Hho signs a contract and 
receives some form of payment, cannot later complain, at 
19.'.·!. 1"'1 o"\rmon+ r -- .,; - - -- -- -
Offer, acceptance and consideration are essential 
elements of a contract. A learned writer has described the 
common law position in th~ following way: 
Consideration, offer and acceptance 
are ~~ indivisible trinity, facets 
of one identical notion which is 
that of bargain~3 
A school board is a corporation and may sue and be 
sued in its own right.4 \fuen tenure is discussed in a 
later chapter, it Hill be noted that, in case of dispute~ 
1 Thomas v. Thomas (U.K.)(1842) 2 QcB. 851. 
2 Justice Blackburn in Bolton v. Maddt9n (U.K.)(1873) 9 Q.B.55. 
3 C.J. Eans on, "The Reform of Consideration~ 11 54 L.Q.R. 234~ 
4 
quoted by 'tillson, oo.cit. 1 p. 41. 
~Schools Act (R.S&N.) 1 970p section 32. 
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a teacher may bring an action against his school board, 
the body which engaged him under contract. 
Tort 
The Law or Torts has developed through the common 
law. Basically a tort is a 'wrong'. 
Tort is a term applied to a 
miscellaneous and more or less 
unconnected group or civil wrongs, 
other than breach or contract, ror 
which a court or law will arford a 
remedy in the rorm or an action 
for damages. The law or torts is 
concerned with the compensation 
or losses surrered by private 
individuals in their legally 
protected interests, through 
conduct or others which is 
regarded as socially unreasonable. 1 
Negligence 
For the purpose or this study, the tort of negligence 
is pertinent, since in actions ror railure to adequately 
supervise students so that injuries have occurred, 
negligence has to be shown. Negligence was defined by 
Justice Alderson in 1856 as follows: 
Negligence is the omission to do something 
which a reasonable man, guided upon those 
considerations that ordinarily regulate 
the conduct of human affairs, would do, 
or doing something which a prudent and 
reasonable man would not do.2 
1 W.L. Prosser, Handbook or the Law of Torts (2nd ed.; 
St. Paul, Minn.: West Publishing Co., 19SS), p.124. 
2 Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (U.K.)(1856) 11 Exch. 
784. 
Vicarious Liability 
It is an accepted legal maxim that a master is 
responsible for the acts of his servant, if such are 
performed in the furtherance of the servant's duty. If, 
under these circumstances, a servant commits a wrong 
(tort), the master can be held to be vicariously liable -
respondeat superior - literally, 'let the superior be 
responsible •. 
In the teaching profession, the school board, as 
the employer, can be held liable ror the negligent acts 
or its teachers. 
V. ASSUMPTIONS 
The assumptions underlying this study were: 
1. The cases examined would re-arrirm and 
clariry the basic principles of law; 
2. The cases, thererore, would provide a 
frame or reference ror interpreting 
their general implications for decision 
making on the part of professional 
school personnel and school boards; 
). The wording of pertinent enacted 
legislation in Newfoundland is vague; 
4. Little has been done at the local level 
to clarify the vagaries in the enacted 
legislation. 
VI. DELIMITATIONS 
Both of the topics examined in this study, namely, 
teacher liability and teacher tenure, fal.l into the cat-
egory of civil actions. The former is in that area of 
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the law known as torts, which give rise to common law 
actions for liquidated damages for ascertainable costs, 
and for unliquidated damages which are ascertained by the 
judge as an assessment for compensation for injury. The 
latter is in that area of the law known as contract which 
gives rise to common law actions for damages, which are 
usually specific, and for specific performance. Although 
it is possible for a person to be prosecuted for a 
criminal action and to be sued at civil law for the same 
offence, this study does not examine the realm of criminal 
law. 
Although the study makes special reference to 
Newfoundland, the basic principles of law, the analysis 
of cases which demonstrate the applicability of these 
principles, and the interpretations of the findings appl;y 
equally to the whole of Canada. Only an analysis of some 
of the statutes and agreements, namely, The Schools Act 
(R.S.N.) 1970, and The Collective Agreement (Nfld.) 1975, 
delimit the study to Newfoundland. 
All local arbitration cases examined are delimited 
in that pseudonyms are used instead of the names of the 
parties concerned. This is common practice to protect 
the character and· reputation of the parties involved. 




An obvious weakness in the study is the lack of 
reported court cases and the limited number of arbitration 
decisions that have been decided in Newfoundland. In fact. 
no interpretation of the relevant statutes has been made 
in the Newfoundland courts. while decisions of quasi-
judicial bodies, such as arbitration boards. a~e not 
binding on subsequent boards of reference. 
The Newfoundland judiciary is autonomous and not 
bound by the decisions of any other courts, except The 
Supreme Court of Canada. It is impossible, consequently, 
to state with any certainty what could be the findings 
of a Newfoundland court for any actions or non-actions 
by an individual or a group, unless a case, with identical ; 
facts and in breach of an identical legislative enactment, 
had been decided by The Supreme Court of Canada. The 
possibility of such an occurrence is extremely remote. The 
cases examined in this study, therefore. must be considered 
as illustrative only. They are intended to show how courts 
have identified what have come to be accepted as basic 
principles of law. The Newfoundland courts, however, must 
operate within the framework of these legal principles and. 
accordingly, some insight might be offered to professional 
educators and lay members of school boards of what could 
be potentially dangerous situations so that they, being 
warned. might ensure that adequate steps are taken to 
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avoid unnecessary litiggticn. 
Th~ cases examined, in the main body of the studys 
are limited to Canadian and Commonwealth decisions as 
they, although not binding, unless Supreme Court of' 
Canada decisions, do in.f'luence the Newf'oundland judiciary. 
Decisions f'rom courts of' the United States are only cited 
when they illustrate principles of law which apply in 
Canada but .f'or which there is a paucity o.f' Canadian cases. 
In view of' the above, readers of' this work are 
warned not to quote any inferences made as, 'The Law'. 
The law is that enacted in legislation, and, althoug~ 
there is a body o.f' the law known as case law, the inter-
pretations of the courts apply to the racts and the 
peculiarities or each individual case. A judge or the 
Manitoba Supreme Court exernpli.f'ied the situation when he 
stated in a 1959 case: 
The courts' realization or the necessity 
o£ developing a sense o£ responsibility 
has led to a changing attitude and a 
practical approach to the question or 
supervision by school authorities. While 
there is a duty to supervise certain 
activities, such duty bears some relation 
to the age or the pupils, the special 
circumst~~ces of each case and nart-
icularly the type of activity.1~ 
VIII. STGNIFICANCE OF THE STUDY 
Through an examination of the problems~ the purposes~ 
~~d some o f the assumptions, the significance of the study 
1 Schade v . Winniue~ School District No. 1 and Ducherme 
(Man.)(~159) 19 D.L.R. (2d) 299. 
can be summarised as f.'ollows: 
1. An acknowledgement by many educators of' the 
inadequacy of: their grounding in the law. 
2. A knowledge of the law would enhance the pro-
fessional stature of' all such prof'essional 
personnel. 
3. Professional personnel should become better 
qualified to avoid litigation. 
4. An absence of any similar study in Newf.'oundland. 
5. A growing awareness by citizens of their legal 
rights, enhanced by the publicity of such cases 
as the million and a half dollar award in 
British Columbia.1 
6. Subsequent to The Collective Agreement 1973, a 
growing awareness by Newf.'oundland teachers of' 
their rights to tenure. 
7. The absence of: court decisions and the paucity 
of' arbitration decisions in Newf'oundland. 
8. The author's own interest. His background in 
law and education has made him particularly 
aware of the problem. 
A brief comment needs to be made to justify the 
combination of' the two topics in the title, namely, 
liability and tenure. Primarily, the writer believes 
that the two topics are of: major importance to the legal 
status of' the teacher. In addition, the writer entertains 
a suspicion that~ at some time in the f'uture, principals 
and/or teachers, af.'ter being round liable in a court of' 
law for damages as a result of: negligent supervision, might 
be dismissed on the grounds of: incompetency or insub-
ordination - incompetency, in that through their negligence 
1 Thornton v. Board of: School Trustees (B.C.)(1975) 
supra, p.5. 
they al owed a student to be injured, and insubordination, 
in that they railed to carry out their supervisory duties 
as instructed. A teacher's dismissal, thererore, could 
be a direct result or his being found liable at law. 
The Supreme Court or Louisiana in 1953 did hold 
that a school board was justiried in dismissing as in-
competent a principal who had been charged in a district 
court ror administering excessive corporal punishment. 1 
The charge, in the district court, was a criminal action, 
while cases involving negligence are civil actions, so 
that no direct parallel can be claimed. But, the principal 
was dismissed as incompetent. rr a teacher fails to 
adequately supervise his students, so that injury results, 
is he not equally incompetent? 
Although the courts have distinguished between 
incompetency and errors or judgement, the writer justiries 
the combination or topics on the ground that they could 
be closel~ interrelated. 
1 Houeye v. St. Helena Parish School Board (U.S.)(1953) 
223 La. 966, 67 So. 2d. 553. 
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CHAPTER IV 
TEACHER LIABILITY - THE LEGAL FRA}ffiWORK 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The possibility of students being injured at school-
related activities is considerable. Some accidents are 
unavoidable; some are the result of faulty facilities or 
equipment; some are caused by the injured person's own 
carelessness; some are the result of the negligence of 
others. 
Cases decided in Britain and Canada, which will be 
examined in the course of this and the next chapter, 
illustrate the wide range of accidents that have resulted 
in litigation before the courts. Students have been 
injured in gymnasiums, on playgrounds, in laboratories, 
in workshops, in kitchens, in staffrooms, on buses, on 
trucks, in swimming pools, in dormitories, on roors~ in 
washrooms, and off school premises. Students have been 
injured through contact with a variety of inanimate 
objects, including, gunpowder, arrows, knives, stones, 
paper pellets, hockey sticks, golf balls, scissors, pens, 
glass windows, swing-doors, slippery floors, chemicals, 
fires, electric saws, icy steps, broken swings, vehicles, 
thorn bushes, cooking stoves, and oilcans. 
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The injuries suffered, in the cases reported, have 
varied in gravity, resulting in deat~ in extreme cases. 
Although minor injuries rarely have resulted in court 
action, possibly because t~ey have not warranted the 
necessary expenditure or time or money, their comparative 
triviality would not automatically constitute a bar to 
litigation. Any injury can lead to a tortious action. 
Salmond summarised the position neatly when he wrote, 
"Harm is the tort signature. "1 
The majority of disputes are settled out-of-court. 
This is especially true when liability is admitted or 
when an insurance settlement is adequate. 2 When liability 
is denied, however, or when the compensatory offer is 
unacceptable, court action can follow. This study will 
briefly consider financial settlements. The major portion 
of this chapter will be concerned with liability. 
Although any injury can lead to a tortious action, 
the courts will not .find de.fendants liable unless their 
negligence has been proven. This chapter, in cons-idering 
the roles of school boards, principals, teachers and 
students, will examine the tort or negligence and the 
principles of law that have evolved from it, with special 
rererence to the duty of care owed to children and to the 
liability of school boards for the negligent acts of their 
1 Salmond on Torts, ed. R.F.V. Heuston '14th ed.; London: 
Sweet and Maxwell, 1965), p. 15. 
2 Interview with Robert Wells, Q.C., May 1975. 
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employees. 
The duties and responsibilities o~ those involved 
in education can be round in enacted legislation and in 
common ·law. Enacted legislation, encompassing statutes 
and school board by-laws, can be mandatory or discretionary, 
derinitive or dirfuse. The common law, which is unwritten 
law and which has evolved through custom fu~d precedent, 
has established the standard or care demanded or educators. 
Both the statutory and the common law duty will be ex-
amined. 
II. NEGLIGENCE 
If a person is injured, and he believes the injury 
is not his or~ rault, he can bring an action in tort 
against the person or persons whom he considers res-
ponsible. Since the injured person will claim that the 
injury is due to the negligence or some other person or 
persons, the action will be for 'negligence'. Negligence 
was defined by Justice Alderson in 1856 in the English 
case of Blyth v. Birmingham Waterworks Co. (U.K.) 1 as 
follows: 
~e~ is the omission to do some-
·tblng-whiCh a reasonable man , guided 
upon those considerations that 
ordinarily regulate the conduct of 
human affairs, would do, or doing 
something which a prudent and 
reasonabl e man would not do. 
1 11 Exch. 784. 
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It will be noted that action and non-action can 
constitute negligence. 
Even ir an injury has been surrered, there are 
certain components that have to be met before a success-
ful action for negligence can be brought. Lord Wright, M 
recognised three components, namely, duty, breach and ~ 
damage, when he said: 
In strict legal analysis, negligence 
means more than heedless or careless 
conduct, whether in omission or 
commssion: it properly connotes the 
complex concept or duty, breach and 
damages thereby sufrered by the person 
to whom the duty was owing.1 
Salmond qualified these elements by stating that the 
damage must be a direct result of the breach of duty.2 
Prosser, however, classified causality itselr as a com-
ponent of negligence. He wrote that before a successrul 





A legal duty to conform to a standard of 
conduct :for the protection of others 
against unreasonable risks; 
A failure to conrorm to the standard; 
A reasonable close causal connection 
between the conduct and the resulting 
injury; 
Actual loss or damage resulting to the 
interests of another. 
Both the triple concept as stated by Lord Wright 
1 Lochgelly Iron ~nd Coal Co. v. K'Hullan (U.K.)(1934) 
A. C. 1 , at p. 25. 
2 Salmond, op.cit., p.298. 
3 Prosser, op.cit., p.165. 
. , 
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and Salmond, and the division o:f the essential elements 
as promulgated by Prosser, indicate clearly to the student 
o:f the tort o:f negligence that :for a successful action to 
be brought a legal duty governing the behaviour o:f the 
defendant must have been breached, and the plainti:f:f must 
have su:f:fered a loss or injury as a result o:f that breach~ 
Lord Goddard, Chie:f Justice o:f England, summarised the 
position as :follows: 
It is not :for every injury that a person 
may sustain in the course o:f everyd~y li:fe 
that he or she can recover compensation; it 
Cfu~ only be recovered i:f that injury is due 
to the :fault o:f someone who owes a duty to 
that person. 1 
III. LEGAL DUTY 
The legal duty owed by school personnel is derived 
from two sources. It may be created by statute or it may 
be the common law duty of care. For the most part the 
statutes state a duty; the common law not only 
how that duty should be carried out, but also. in the 
absence of a statutory duty, it imposes its own duty o:f 
care. 
1. Statutory Duty 
I:f school person~el have to 'conform to a st~~dard 
of conduct' to meet the legal duty imposed upon th~m, they 
must :first have the authority to so act. A school board, 
1 Bell v. Travco Hotels Ltd. (U.K.)(1953) 1 Q.B. 473, 
at p -4-78. 
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being a creature of statute, derives its authority rrom 
the statute that creates it. It has already been illust-
rated1 that this authority can be mandatory, introduced 
in the statutes by the operative word 'shall', or dis-
cretionary, introduced by 'may'. The mandatory authority 
can be illustrated by section 12 or The Schools Act (R.S.N.} 
1970, which states: 
••• every School Board shall ••• (n) provide 
fire escapes for all school buildings ••• 
The school board, thererore, has the authority to 
provide fire escapes, but the authority carries with it 
the absolute duty to provide the rire escapes. Or, put 
another way, the statute imposes on the school board the 
duty to provide fire escapes and the imposition or the 
duty automatically creates the authority needed to 
expedite the duty. If any student were injured because 
of the absence of a rire escape, the school board would 
be liable for breach or its legal duty. 
The discretionary authority of the school board 
may be illustrated by section 13 of _The Schools Act (R.S.N.) 
1970, which states: 
Every School Board may ••• (q) keep 
any school under its control open 
during the whole or any specified portion 
of the summer vacation. 
Once a school exercises its discretionary powers 
it cannot escape liability for any injurie s suffered 
1 Supra, pp.15-16. 
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merely because the duty was only a discretionary one. Ir 
a school board in Newroundland were to keep a school open 
during the summer vacation, the duty it would owe to the 
students would be no di£rerent £rom the duty owed during 
the normal school year. Ir, thererore. a student were 
injured while attending school during the summer vacation, 
as the result or the absence or a rire escape, the 
provision or which, as we have seen, is a mandatory duty, 
the school board could not claim that it owed no duty as 
it was only exercising its discretionary authority. This 
legal principle, established in many cases, is well 
illustrated by Shripton v. Hert~ordshire County Co~~cil 
(U.K. ) ( 1 911 ) : 1 
The House or Lords held that the local education 
authority was liable ror the injury to a child 
when she rell o~r a school conveyance. The 
education authority had a statutory duty to 
provide transportation ~or all children who 
lived two miles or more rrom the school. It had 
the discretionary authority to transport 
students who lived less than two miles rrom the 
school. As the injured child lived only one 
mile rrom the school, the education authority 
claimed that it had no duty tm.-rards her and 
she was using the conveyance only with its 
permission. Lord Loreburn, L.C. stated: 
I agree with the learned counsel ror 
the respondents that there was no duty 
or obligation whatsoever on the county 
council to provide ror the carriage or 
1 1 04 L • T • 1 45 . 
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this child, but if they did agree to do 
so, and did provide a vehicle, then it 
is clear to my mind that their duty was 
also to provide a reasonably safe mode 
o:f conveyance. 
The authority o:f principals and teachers is also 
.found in statute. In New.foundland, such authority is man-
datory and, therefore, imposes upon these personnel an 
absolute duty.1 As these personnel are employees o.f 
school boards, they also have authority delegated to them 
by school boards in the .form - o.f by-laws and regulations.2 
Such delegated authority is as binding on the personnel 
as statutory authority, provided it does not contravene 
any speci.fic statutory regulations. 
At times a distinction can be . drat·m between authority 
and the administrative role. Ward et al. v. Board o~ Blaine 





An eleven-year old grade six student was 
suspended by his principal until he cut his 
hair in con.formity with a resolution o.f the 
school board. An application by the boy and 
his mother to quash the suspension and the 
resolution was rejected by the Saskatchewan 
Court. It ruled that the school board had 
the statutory authority to pass the l"esolution 
and to suspend. The principal 1 s actions were 
purely ministerial, not judicial nor quasi-
judicial, and Here e.f.f~cting the school 
board's statutory ruling. 
SuEr a, p .16. 
Su12ra~ p .15. 
W.H.R. Vol.4 1 61 • 
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It could be argued that if the actions or school 
board employees. Hhen carrying out the orders of' the schovl 
boards 11 are no more than ministerial, then principals and 
teachers have no real authority themselves. They, ther~-
fore, act only by the grace of the school boards. Although 
there might be some truth in this argument, it must remain 
academic at this stage. The courts have ruled that 
principals and teachers will be liable for injuries 
suffered if they carry our these delegated duties neg-
ligently. At the same time, school boards, as employers, 
will be vicariously liable for the negligent acts of their 
employees. Vicarious liability is an important topic which 
will be examined· later in this chapter. 1 
2. The Common Law Duty 
The courts, in determining whether negligence 
exists, have asked whether the defendant, if his conduct 
had been that of a reasonable man, could have prevented 
the accident. The accident must have been the result o£ 
the way the defendant behaved. Negligence, therefore, is 
a conduct, not a state of mind. 2 The injury and the 
conduct are relative. The definition of' negligence given 
in Blyth v. Birmingl:.arn Haterworks Co.(U.K.)(1856)3 has 
been quoted in ma..Yiy cases. The problem to be resolved has 
1 In~ra,p.86 et seqq • 
.... 
~Salmond, oo.cit., p.268. 
3 Supra , p.49. 
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been the interpretation of the word 'reasonable'; and 
this difficulty has been especially relevant to the 
duties of teachers. 
Halsbury, 1 writing on the standard and degree of 
care ordinarily required, emphasises that there is an 
increase in the degree of care in relation to children. 
His section on this topic concludes with the single 
sentence, "The standard of care to be observed by a 
schoolmaster towards pupils in his care is that of a 
reasonable father." Hany judgements of the courts have 
quoted Lord Esher in Hilliams v. Eady (U.K.)(1893), 2 \-lho 
said: 
••• as to the law on the ·subject there 
can be no doubt; and it was correctly 
laid do1·m • • • that the schoolmaster was 
bound to take such care of his boys as 
a careful father would take of his boys, 
and there could not be a better definition 
of the duty of a schoolmaster. Then he was 
bound to take notice of the ordinary 
nature of young boys, their tendency to do 
mischievous acts, ffild their propensity to 
meddle with anything that came in their 
way. 
Just as the courts have recognised that coupled 
with the statutory duty imposed on educators is the legal 
authority to implement the duty~ so like\vise they have 
ruled that coupled with the common law duty to take care 
or students as would a careful and reasonable father, is 
1 Halsbury's La1.NS of England, ed. Viscount Hailsham, Vol. 
23, Section 836 (2d ed.; London: Butterworth & Co. 
(Publishers) Ltd., 1934). 
2 10 T.L.R. 42. 
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the authority needed to so act. This authority is found 
in the concept of the teacher being in loco parentis -
in place of the parent. As early as 1865, Chief Justice 
Cockburn could state:1 
Now, as to this, I have to tell you, 
that the authority of the schoolmaster 
is, vrhile it exists, the same as that 
of the parent. A parent, when he places 
his child with a schoolmaster, delegates 
to him all his own authority as rar as is 
necessary for the welfare of the child. 
The teacher, accordingly, during the execution of 
his pedagogical duties, acts 'in place pf the parent' and 
has the authority of the parent.* This authority permits 
the teacher to prohibit or to order the student to under-
take activities which, as a reasonable parent, concerned 
with the safety of children, he would prohibit or order 
his own children to undertake. And, if the teacher fails 
* Courts in Britain and Canada recognise the principle of 
in loco narentis and the authority that it confers ~n 
schoolteachers. It is of interest that the United States 
Supreme Court in the last decade has moved towards a 
recognition of students as 'persons' with all the rights 
accruing to citizens. ~Tinker Case exemplifies this 
position:2 
A school forbade the wearing of black armbands 
on school premises to protest Vietnam host-
ilities. Students sued the school authorities 
for damages and an injunction to stop the 
ruling. The Supreme Court held that, as there 
was no evidence to suggest that the students' 
actions were liable to create a disturbance or 
1 Fitzgerald v. Northcote (U.K.)(1865) 4 F. & F. 656. 
2 Inde end6nt Communit~ School 
9 S.Ct. 733. 
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to exercise this authority, so that injury is surrered by 
a student, he will be l~able ror a breach or the common 
law duty of care. Provided his actions are reasonable and 
not malicious, the teacher is similarly allowed to dis-
cipline students, as he would so discipline his own 
children. 
Although the common law duty or care is that of a 
'reasonable' man, and the duty or care owed by a teacher 
has to be that or a 'reasonable and prudent' rather, there 
disorder or disruption in the school, the school 
regulation was an unconstitutional denial of the 
students' right or expression or opinion. 
The Court's decision was by a majority only, those in 
the minority maintaining that the courts should not 
interrere with the authority or the schools. This seems 
to be the opinion or the British and Canadian courts, an 
opinion expressed by Mr. Justice Black, one or the 
minority judges in The Tinker Case. In a long dissenting 
judgement, he said: 
The Court's holding in this case ushers in 
what I deem to be an entirely new era in which 
the power to control pupils by the elected 
officials of state supported public schools 
in the United States is in ultimate errect 
transferred to the Supreme Court ••• I wish, 
therefore, wholly to disclaim any purpose on 
my part to hold that the Federal Constitution 
compels the teachers, parents, and elected 
school .officials to surrender control of the 
American public school system to public 
school students. 
The Tinker Case (1969) has been rererred to to illus-
trate that the authority derived from the principle in 
loco parentis is not universally sacrosanct, and to warn 
that, with the gro"Yring pressures or student mili tantism 
and the demands for students' rights in general, such a 
ruling as that brought down by the United States Supreme 
Court might in time be applied in our courts. On the 
other hand, the foreseeable consequences or such rulings 
could cause our courts to re-arfirm the principle in 
loco parentis with deliberate determination. 
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has to be some measure for determining the standard of 
care that a reasonable man would exercise. 
For many years negligence formed a part of the 
general area of torts, being an offshoot of the old action 
of 'trespass against the person'. As Salmond points out, 
however, negligence became recognised as a tort in itself 
in 1932: 1 
But the decision of the House of Lords in 
Donoghue v. Stevenson "treats negligence, 
where there is a duty to take care, as a 
specific tort in itself." 
It was in his judgement in Donoghue v. Stevenson 
that Lord Atkin formulated the principle which has come 
to be generally known as "the neighbour principle". He 
said: 2 
••• And yet the duty which is common to 
all the cases where liability is established 
must logically be based upon some element 
common to the cases where it is found to 
exist ••• There must be, and is, some 
general conception of relations giving rise 
to a duty of care, of ~hich the particular 
· cases found in the books are but instances • 
••• The liability for negligence ••• is no 
doubt based upon a general public sentiment 
or moral wrongdoing for which the offender 
mus t pay. But acts or omissions which any 
moral code would censure cannot in a practical 
world be treated so as to give a right to 
every person injured by them to demand 
relier. In this way rules of law arise which 
limit the range or complainants and the 
extent or their remedy. The rule that you 
love your neighbour becomes in law~ you 
1 Salmond, op.cit., p.268. The quotation cited by Salmond 
18 from Grant v. Australian Knitting Hills (U.K.)(1936) 
A.C. 85, at p.103, per Lord Wright,M.R. 
2 (U.K.)(1932) A.C. 562, at p.579. 
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must not injure your neighbour; and the 
lawyer's question, Who is my neighbour? 
receives a restricted reply. You must take 
reasonable care to avoid acts or omissions 
which you can reasonably foresee would be 
likely to injure your neighbour. Who, then, 
in law is my neighbour? The answer seems 
to be - persons who are so closely and 
directly affected by my act that I ought 
reasonably to have them in contemplation 
as being so affected when I am directing 
my mind to the acts or omissions which are 
called in question. 
Foresight now became a criterion of liability and 
it governed acts or omissions which a reasonable man knew 
or ought to have known could cause injury or harm. 
Educators, accordingly, must take reasonable care to 
avoid acts or omissions which they, bearing in mind their 
position ill loco parentis, could or ought to . reasonably 
~oresee would be likely to injure their students. The 
student is neighbour to the teacher, and the teacher must 
consider how his acts or omissions might affect the 
student. 
Before proceeding further, it is necessary to con-
solidate the legal principles so far resolved. This will 
-be done by putting some o:f the questions · that courts ask 
in determining liability and illustrating them with cases. 




Gard v. Dune~~ Board of School Trustees (B.C.)(1946): 1 
Hhile playin g :field hockey unsupervi s ed, but 
with the teacher's permi s sion, an eleven-year 
1 1 H.w.n. 305. 
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old boy lost the sight of' one eye when he 
was unintentionally hit with a hockey stick 
by another boy. It was shown that the players 
had received practically no instruction in 
the game. The trial judge f'ound the teacher 
negligent. On appeal, however, the British 
Columbia Supreme Court reversed the ruling. 
Robertson, J. said: 
It has been laid down that it is the 
duty of' a school board to take such 
care as a reasonably caref'ul parent 
would take of his boy, and the duty 
or their teacher is to take reasonable 
care to protect children under her 
charge from danger. No doubt the 
extent of' the supervision depends 
upon the age of' the pupils and what 
they are doing at the material time. , 
••• it is not the law, and never has 
been the law, that a schoolmaster 
must keep boys under supervision 
during every minute or their school 
lives. The duty should not be 
determined rrom the happening of' the 
extraordinary accident in this case, 
but froM the danger that was 
reasonably f'oreseeable before ~1e 
game .•• It seems to me that a 
'careful father' would not hesitate 
to allow his boy of eleven years of 
age to engage in a game of grass 
hockey without supervision. 
Although it could be argued that accidents in games 
of f'ield hockey ought to be foreseeable, especially as 
injuries in this sport are not uncommon, the court adopted 
the view that a reasonable father would allow his son to 
partake in the game unsupervised. To deny this premise 
would be to suggest that every game played by children 
should be supervised, and that, every time a group of 
stu~ents asked to borrow a rootball or a baseball bat 
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or any other item or sports equipment, a teacher should 
accompany them as supervisor. This would have a stifling 
e~fect on t h e natural exuberance o:f children and on their 
natural development as individuals. As children grow up 
and play games they do suffer injuries as the courts have 
recognised. Sellers, L.J. summed up the position when he 
said in the British Court ~:f Appeal: 
The judge applied the right standard when 
he said that it would be a disservice to 
the community i:f schools were required to 
exercise permanent or continuous super-
vision or normal games played by school-
boys.1 
Hudson v. Governors or Rotherham Grammar School 
(U.K. ) ( 1 9 38) : 2 
A ten-year old boy was injured when he slipped 
under a grass roller that he was pushing with 
two others. The teacher in charge had been 
absent for about :four minutes. The school 
authorities were round not liable. Hilbery, J. 
said in his summing up: 
Ir boys were kept in cotton wool some o:f 
them would choke themselves with it. They 
would manage to have accidents. \ve always 
did, members o:f the jury - we did not 
always have actions at law afterwards. You 
have to consider whether or not you would 
expect a headmaster to exercise such a 
degree o:f care that boys could never get 
into mischief. Has any reasonable parent 
yet succeeded in exercising such care as 
to prevent a boy getting into mischief, 
and, i:f he did, t-That sort o:f boys should 
we produce? 
1 Price v. Ca 8rnarvonshire County Council (U.K.)(1960) 
The Times, February 11. 
2 Yorkshire Post, March 24 and 25,1938, West Riding Assizes. 
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There is a difference between allowi ng students to 
partake of activities that are inherent to t~e nature of 
ch ildren and permitting involvement in activities that 
are fraught with danger. Any reasonable parent would 
a llow his offspring to join his or her friends in a team 
game; most reasonable parents would allow t h eir ten-year 
old children to push grass rollers. But, a reasonably 
prudent parent would not allow his child, who was a non-
swimmer or only an average swimmer, to swim in an area 
that had foreseeable risks, unless a competent adult, who 
was able to swim, was in attendance. These were the events 
in Moddejonge v. Huron County Board of EducRtion (Ont.) 
(1972) :1 
An Ontario court found the school board and 
its teacher liable for the negligent deaths 
by drowning o~ two students. T~e teacher, 
who allowed them to swim in an area that he 
knew was potentially dangerous, was unable 
to swim himself. The court ruled that a 
prudent father, in similar circumstances, 
would not h~ve allowed the swimming outing. 
(b) "Could the educator have reasonably .foreseen the 
danger?" 
Jeffery v. London County Council (U.K.)(1954): 2 
Wnen school closed at the end of the day, 
children under fiva years of age were super-
vised until they were collected by their 
1 2 O.R. 437. 
2 52 L.G.R. 521. 
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parents. Children over rive years or age were 
allowed to disperse into the playground to 
await their parents. These children knew the 
proqedure and if they were not collected 
within a minute or two they re-entered the 
school and reported to a teacher. On the 
day in question, a five-year old boy, whose 
mother was a little late, climbed nine feet 
on to the glass roar or a lavatory, supposedly 
to retrieve a toy motor car that had been 
throwTI there. He fell through the glass roof 
and died. His father sued the school auth-
orities alleging that the school ought to 
have had some person on supervisory duty 
until all the children left the premises. 
In finding for the school authorities Mr. 
Justice McNair said: 
The question whether the school 
authorities were at fault in this 
case can be decided by asking whether, 
on the facts here, · there should have 
been any reasonable anticipation, ir 
these childran were allowed to disperse 
on their own without supervision, tha·t 
they would meet this or some similar 
""'.,,~~ .; ..f" +-l"'o.~.,.. ... r~.....,~ ,....,,...._,~ ,.. .... ~".,...., .. ,..; ·.,...e..::a T~ 
.L...L\.A..l.. U ...&...1.. VL.l.~J NQ..L.V .L.J.'-.1'\J OU.}--''CI.l. V.L.U U• ..L.\.t 
being conceded that it is not, and never 
has been the law that every minute or 
time the children have to be under the 
actual eye or a master or mistress, it 
seems to me that school authorities, 
when they are considering the care or 
children, must strike some balance 
between tha meticulous supervision 
or children every moment of the - time 
when they are under their care, and 
the very desirable object or encour-
aging the sturdy independence or 
c~ildren as they grow up; and I think 
sturdy independence and the ability to 
get on without detailed supervision 
must start at quite an early age. 
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No-one would exp~ct a rive year old child to climb 
a nine foot drainpipe while awaiting his mother, and. 
although young children have a great prbpensity for 
adventure and an apparent disregard for danger, such an 
accident obviously was unf"oreseeable. In the following 
case , however, it was argued that a reasonable person 
ought to foresee that accidents can occur when young 
students play on swings. 
Brost v. Tilley School District (Alta.)(1955): 1 
A six-year old student was injured while being 
pushed on a swing. The Alberta Supreme Court 
found the school board and the principal 
liable. The accident was foreseeable, the 
degree of care demanded of them was to safe-
guard the small children, and, as it was their 
duty to provide supervision, they should have 
instructed the teachers to supervise the use 
of the swings and to direct the pupils with 
regard to their use. 
(c) "Would greater care have prevented the injury?" 
.The Brost v. Tilley Case above is a good example of" 
where graater care could have prevented the accident . The 
courts, however , have consistently ~ecognised that 
accidents do happen at school and that many of them 
happen on the spur o.f the moment and could not be prevented 
even by optimum care. So in Gard v . Du~Cfui Board of 
1 15 W.W.R. 241; 3 D.L.R. 159. This case is also cited as 
Brost v . Board o~ Trustees of Eastern Irrigation School 
Divislon No. 4L et al. 
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School Trustees (B.C.)(1946) 1 the boy would probably have 
still been hit by the l1ockey stick even if twenty teachers 
had been supervising. In Price v. Caernarvonshire County 
Council (U.K.)(1960) 2 the Court of Appeal ruled that even 
the best of supervision would not have prevented a bat 
flying accidentally out of a boy's hand and hitting 
another in the eye. 
In Newton v. Mayor and Corporation of West Ham (U.K.) 
(1963)3 the Court of Queen's Bench ruled that the 
education authority was not liable ror an injury sufrered 
by a pupil in the course of rough play in the playground 
merely because there was insufficient supervision to watch 
all parts of the playground all the time. 
This principle that 'children are children' is 
further illustrated by the Nova Scotian case of Adams v. 
Board of School Corr~issioners for Halifax (N.S.)(1951):4 
An eight-year old student was injured by a 
stone thrown by another boy at recess. The 
officially designated supervisor was occupied 
with another group of students. It was held 
that no amount of supervision or warning could 
prevent stone throwing, and, even if the sup-
ervisor had been present, the accident would 
probably still have happened. The learned judge 
concluded, "There vTas no duty of continuous 
supervision over the pupils in the school yard." 
1 Supra, pp.60-61. 
2 Supra, p.62. 
3 The Guardian, July 11, 1963. 
4 2 D.L.R. 816. 
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The following tragic case demonstrates that the 
severity of the injury will not influence the court. 
Clarke v. 1-fonmouthshire County Council (U.K.)(1954): 1 
During a. sudden scuffle in the playground at 
recess, a boy drew a sheath knife which acc-
idently struck a vulnerable part of the 
plaintiff's leg, which later had to be amp-
utated. A teacher was on duty and had passed 
through the playground twice during the recess. 
The trial judge ~ound for the plaintiff. The 
Court or Appeal overruled his judgement and 
found that there was no negligence. It was 
sho\n1 that lmives were not allowed at the 
school and that there was no evidence to 
suggest that the teachers knew of the presence 
of the sheath knife. Denning, L.J. said: 
Only reasonable supervision is 
required ••• The accident happened 
in a flash. There was jUst a scuffle 
between two boys trying to get a knife 
from a third boy. It was the sort of 
scuff.le which \-Toul.d pass unnotic .ed in 
a playground in the ordinary way. The 
incident would take place in the 
fraction of a second which the presence 
of prefects, or indeed of a master, 
would not have done anything to prevent 
at all. 
In this case, the plaintiff contended that the 
teachers ought to have k~own about the knife and to have 
guarded against its use. This is a most impractical 
argument. Students carry a variety or articles in their 
pockets or handbags, including knives, nail riles, 
1 52 L.G.R. 246. 
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scissors, matches and elastic bands. All such articles 
are potentially dangerous. Teachers do know that students 
carry such articles, but to suggest that they should know 
what each individual student carries would necessitate 
searching each student at the beginning of each school 
session, a practice too demea.l'ling to entertain seriously. 
(d) "Did the educator take reasonable precautions to 
avoid the danger?" "\•las the care exercised reas-
onable, bearing in mind the age, the number and 
the maturity of the students?" 
Reffell v. Surrey County Council (U.K.)(1964): 1 
A twelve-year old girl injured her hand when 
it went through the glass of a swing door. The 
defendants were held liable as ( i) they had. an 
absolute duty imposed upon them by statute 
under The Education Act 19~~, s.1 and the 
Standards for School Premises Regulations 1959 
to see that 'the sa.fety of' occupants shall be 
reasonably assured', and (ii) they were in 
breach law duty o.f care. 
of' the Queen's Bench said: 
Were the premises ••• with this one-
eighth inch glass in the cloak-room 
Veale, J. 
door, at a height or four feet, reason-
ably safe? I have no hesitation in 
saying they were not. This one-eighth 
irich glass in a cloak-room doo1 ... Has, in 
my view, asking for trouble ••• Not only, 
in my judgement, was the risk of accident 
a real risk, but it was both a foreseeable 
risk and one which was in fact foreseen. 
If it had not been foreseen there would 
not have been the policy of' replacing 
broken one-eighth glass with toughened 
glass. 
1 1 All E.R. 743. 
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In this case tha school authorities h11ew of' the 
danger and took no precaution3 to avoid it. To warn the 
student3 of' the thin glass and to caution them to take 
care would obviously not be suf'ficient super·.,..ision since 
the students would constfu~tly be using the cloak-room 
door. The only vTay the authorities could f'ul.f'il both 
their statutory and their common laH duty l-.rould be to 
replace all the thin glass with which the students could 
co~e in contact. Practical action, theref'ore, was demanded 
of the school authorities. 
The courta have recognised that there are circum-
stances \-Then little more ca.Yl be done than to vrarn the 
students of' the danger. The f'ollowing case. before the 
Hanitoba Court of' Appeal, illustrates this principle. 
Scha.de v. Winnipeg School District No.1 (nan.) (1959): 1 
A f'ourteen-year old boy was injured while play-
ing in the ~~authorised area of the schoolyard 
where building construction was going on. Thd 
students had been r0paatedly warned by the 
school authorities to keep away .from the area. 
At the noon racess. while chasing a .fly ball, 
the plaintiff' tripped over a stake and was 
injured. The Manitoba Court of Appeal held 
that neither the school authorities nor the 
contractor were liable. Neither by common 
lav.; nor by statutory regulations was a 
supervisory duty imposed upon the school 
authoritie3. The injury was due to the boy's 
1 28 W.W.R. 577; 19 D.L.R.(2d) 299 . 
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own negligence. Schultz., J.A. said in his 
judgement: 
~nile it must be recognized there is 
a duty on teachers to supervise certain 
school activities, a duty that or 
necessity bears some relation to the 
age or the pupils, the special circum-
stances of ea9h case and, in particular, 
the type or activity engaged in, never-
theless it must also be recognized that 
one of the most important aims or 
education is to develop a sense or res-
ponsibility on the part of pupils, 
personal responsibility for their 
individual actions, and a realization 
of the personal consequences of such 
actions. 
The school authorities., in this case, could foresee 
the dangers associated with the construction site 6 but 
they had done all that could be reasonably expected of 
them. The situation is analagous to the mother who con-
sistently wa~ns her young child not to touch the electric 
range . Apart from locking the child out of the kitchen or 
never herself leaving the range , there .is no further 
practical action she can take. 
It will be noted that various judgements, already 
cited, encourage the independence of children. The courts 
recognise that as students get older they need less super-
vision. Two cases, one from Saskatchewan and one from 
Ontario, will be cited to illustrate this point. 
Scrimage our v. Board of J.l.1anagemen t of Canadi 8..£"'1 
District of American Lutheran Chu~ch (Sask.)(1947): 1 
An eighteen-year old boarding school pupil was 
1 1 D.L.R., 677; 1 W.W.R. 120. 
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injured by a raulty light rixture wtile 
cli".11bing dotm from his bunk. It was held 
that the racilities were safe in themselves 
and not an unreasonable hazard. Also " •.• 
the duty of supervision diminishes as the 
child gro"YTS older a...lld in this case the 
student was a young m~~ nearly eighteen 
years of age." 
Butterworth et al. v. Collegiate Institute Board of 
Ottawa (Ont.)(1940): 1 
A fourteen-year old boy injured his elbow in 
the gymnasium. The teacher had left the class 
under the care of two senior boys. In dis-
missing the action, the court held that the 
senior boys were capable of supervising the 
was sciens et volens2 - lrno~ing and willing -
and that ourteen-year olds must exerc1se 
reasonable ~~d intelligent care for their 
own safety. 
Now that these four questions have been examined, 
the common law duty of care can be summarised as follows: 
Educational personnel, bearing in mind the 
characteristics of the students concerned 
and the peculiarities of the particular 
circumstances, must exercise the care that 
a reasonable and prudent parent would exercise 
to protect his children from dangers lmown 
and reasonably foreseeable. 
At the begi~~ing of this section it was stated that 
"the problem to be resol~ed has been the interpretat"on or 
., 
3 D.L.R" !'-'to., 
2 For a mo~e rletail~d examinqt1on or t~i~ maxim see page 177. 
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the word 'reasonable'. n1 A carerul examination or the 
cases already reviewed will show that there is no common 
denominator by which to measure reasonableness. What might 
be reasonable to one person, will be unreasonable to 
another. ~fuether the actions of derendants are reasonable 
or not must be decided by the facts of each case. Indeed, 
Mr. Justice Ritchie or The Supreme Court or Canada has 
stated: 
The duty of supervision which a school 
authority owes to its pupils while they 
are at play must of necessity vary from 
school to school and even from day to 
day, and it is, therefore, not possible 
to elicit from the de.cided cases any 
guiding principle for the exact 
measurement of the degree o~ care to 
which ~~y particular set of circumstances 
may give rise.2 
For many centuries there was a separate branch o~ 
the law known wh~se function was to remedy 
injustices or imperfection$ in the common la\-1. This was 
-only possi'ble be _, __ se the principles of' la'l:..J were unwritten .. -
Today equity and the common law work hand in hand ~~der 
the guiding principle that justice must be rair and 
equitable. It might be said that the British legal system 
and systems that are derived rrom it ar~ more concerned 
with justice than with exactness. For this reason, the 
attitude of the courts towards what is 'reasonable' can 
change with changing climates and conditions. A much-cited 
1 Sunra , pp.55-56. 
2 Hia , s and Hi pi?S v. J.C .. Hunt and Toronto Board of' 
Education Ont~)(1960) S.C.R. 174. 
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passage f'rom the judgemant of" Lord ::-1acmillan in Donoghue v. 
" Stevenson reads:' 
The grounds of action may be as various 
and manif"old as hum~~ err~~cy; and the 
conce?tion of" legal rBsponsibility may 
develop in adaptation to altering social 
conditions and standards. The criterion 
of judgement must adjust and adapt itself' 
to the changing circumstances of' lif"e. The 
categories of" negligence are never closed. 
Just as the courts recognise that social conditions 
change, so they recognise that the standard of" care 
needed to meet these changing conditions might need to be 
adapted. Our educational institutions have undergone 
change over the last f'if'ty years . Schools have become 
larger, catering, in some inst.ances, to tho 1sands of 
students in a single building; the curriculum has changed, 
with some programmes involving the use of" potentially 
dangerous materials and equipment; more students are 
transported by buses than ever bef'ore; teachers have 
become more specialised; and, a significant point, in the 
writer's opinion, the concept or discipline is undergoing 
f"undamental changes. These changes have created more 
complex organisations in 1-rhich the chance o:f serious 
injury has become increasingly more threatening. 
The courts have been well aware of t~e cha~ges in 
the schools ~~d, since the early sixties, they have 
demanded a higher duty o~ care than that expounded in 
1 Supra, p. 59. 
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Donoghu e v. Stevenson (U.K.)(1932). 1 It h as been illus~ 
trated that the standard of" care so expounded was to 
protect one's neighbour f"rom 'known and foreseeable 
accidents', to warn or dangers that were 'known or ought 
to have been lmo'h-n 1 • This is the duty of care o-v1ed to the 
class of persons known legally as 'invitees'. A simple 
explfu~ation of" 'invitee' is that he is one who receives 
permission f"rom the occupier to enter premises as a matter 
of" business and not as a matter of" grace. He enters, 
theref"ore, f"or the mutual advantage o~ the occupier and 
himsel£". 2 Formerly students were classed as i n vitees 
because they entered schools f"or the business of" education 
and for their o\~ and their teachers' advantage. 
But most students are not merely permitted, or 
invited, to come to school; they are required to do so. 
The courts, both in Britain and Canada, have begun to 
think of students as belonging to that class of persons 
sometimes known as 'obligatees' or 'compulsees'. The 
standard of care owed to such a class or persons is 
similar to that owed to 1 contPactees', - a standa rd of' 
care higher than that stated in Donoghue v. Stevenson. 
The duty o~ care owed to contractees was well stated in 
1870 in Francis v. Cockrell (U.K.): 3 
1 Suo r a, pp.59-60. 
2 Pro.fes s or H . Ch loros , Lectur e r in rrThe Latr: or T ort s ", 
Unive rsity Coll eg e or Wal e s, Aberystt~yth, 1958-59. 
3 5 Q.B .. 501. 
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·when one man engages .for pecuniary beneri t 
to provide another with a particular 
article adapted to a particular purpose, 
he enters into an implied contract that 
the article or thing will be reasonably 
.fit .for the purpose to wh~ch it is to 
be applied. This is a leading prin ciple 
o.f the law applicable at all times ~ith 
t h e exception o.f undiscoverable de.fects. 
This high er standard o.f care can be illustrated by 
the example o.f an hotel guest. \ihen a person registers 
into an hotel he expects not to be injured. There is an 
implied contract between him and the hotel o1.mer that he 
will not be injured, and, i.f he is hurt, the hotel man-
agement will be liable regardless of: whether it knew or 
ought to have knov-m that the injury might take place. The 
duty o.f the management is to see that the premises are as 
safe as reasonable care and skill can make them, and 
the only defence would be that the accident was caused 
by an undiscoverable de.fect - that is, a de.fect that 
reasonable care and skill could not have discove~ed. 
There is a subtle difference between behaving as a 
reasonable man and making things 'as sare as reasonable 
care ~~d skill can make them'. This is the standard or 
care that the courts seem to be demanding o~ educators. 
To claim that the education authorities have behaved as 
reasonable parents might no longer su~~ice. The authorities 
will have to show that everything in the school was as 
sa~e as could be expected. At the risk or repetition, one 
more example will be given to illustrate the dif":Cerence 
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between the standards of care. 
Ir a boy sat on a chair and it collapsed injuring 
him, the school authorities, when ~he courts classi~ied 
students as invitees, might escape liability if they could 
show that the chair had very recently been checked by the 
school carpenter. The injury~ in this instance, would not 
be foreseeable and they had taken precautions. The higher 
duty of care, however, would make them liable, as the 
student had the right to expect the chair to be reasonably 
safe to sit on. If the injury was caused by three boys 
sitting on the chair simultaneously~ the authorities 
would not be liable as reasonable care would not make a 
chair strong enough ror such a weight. 
Lamarche et al. v. Board or Trustees of the Roman 
Catholic Sen.arate Schools for the Village of 
L'Orignal (Ont.)(1956):1 
~fuile an eleven-year old boy was using a swing, 
other students upset it. The boy became 
partially paralysed and mentally impaired as 
a result of the accident. A supervisor vias 
present. It was shown that the swing had been 
upset previously. The defendants argued that 
the students were being properly supervised 
and that they had exercised their duty as 
'a reaso~able parent'. 
The Ontario court held that the student, being 
required to attend school~ was not an invitee, 
and if injured by neglect of a statutory duty 
1 33 o.~v.N. 686. 
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t-rhich required 'assiduous attention' to the 
care of' all apparatus, was entitled to recover 
from t h ose on whom the statute placed t he 
responsibility. The judge said: 
The duty or the board of' trustees 
is to see that the premises provided 
f'or the accommodation of' the school-
children are as saf'e as reasonable 
care and skill can make them. School-
children should not be exposed to 
unnecessary danger in the school, or 
while playing in the school yard. 
The Board or Trustees were f'ound liable f'or 
damages in excess of $30,000. 
In Lyes v. Hiddlesex County Council (U.K .. )(1962), 
Mr. Justice Edmund Davies of' the Queen's Bench stated:1 
(Counsel f'or the plaintif'f') ..... at 
one time said that the duty of' the 
defendants to the plaintiff was that 
of' invitor to invitee, and accordingly 
that they had to warn him of any 
unusual danger of which they knew or 
ought to have known. The duty, in my 
judgemen~, is higher than that. 
In Jaogues _v . Oxfordshire County Council and another 
(U . K.)(1968), a case involving an injury on a school bus , 
}~. Justice Waller said:2 
\'.'hat is the duty o:r the local authority 
in these circumstances? They owe a duty 
to see that the bus is reasonably safe 
and that includes a duty to see that it 
is reasonably saf'e :for the children who 
are going on the bus including the 
provision o:f supervision ir it is 
necessary. 
1 61 L.G.R .. 443. 
2 66 L.G.R. 440. (Oxford As sizes). 
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The principle that a schoolnaster is under a duty 
to exercise the same st~~dard of care over children as 
would be exercised by a good parent with a large .family. 1 
has also been :found to be inadequate in today's larger 
schools . ~1en a fifteen-year old boy lost the use of an 
eye arter being hit by a piece o.f elastic at recess~ Mr. 
Justice Geofrrey Lane said in Beaumont v. Surrey County 
Council (U.K.)(1968):2 
It is unrealistic_ if not unhelpful 
to say a standard of care owed by the 
headmaster or a school or nine hundred 
pupils is that o.f the reasonably careful 
~~d prudent .father towards h:s own 
children. 
The elastic which caused the injury t.ras o.f.f a 
trampoline. _The physical education teacher, who 
had been repairing the trampoline_ le.ft the 
elastic, rolled in a ball, at the bottom o.f a 
garbage can. The next day some boys .found the 
elastic a~d, while playing with it, hit the 
plaintiff in the eye. 
Under the duty of' care ovTed to an invitee, it could be 
argued that, as the teacher had deposited the elastic in 
the garbage can, expecting it to be removed at the end 
o.f the d~y, he had behaved as a reasonable person should. 
This is indeed what a care:ful .father _would probably have 
done. 
The court ruled, in view or the higher duty 
or care , that the student should not have 
1 .Tef'f'er;[ v. London County Council (U.K.)(19.54), supra, 
p.63, per r-1c1Jair, J. 
2 66 L.G.R. 580. (Q.E.D.) 
-79-
been exposed to such a d&."'1.ger and that t~1e 
authorities were liable. The possibility or 
the elastic being ~ound and used dangerously 
could have been foreseen. 
The derendants also claimed that as there 
were two teachers, four prefects, four 
subpre:fects and four monitors on duty, the 
supervision for the nine hundred pupils was 
adequate. The court ruled that there was an 
insufficient number of teachers on duty to 
measure up to the high standard of care 
demanded of' the school. Nr . Justice Geo:ff'rey 
Lane said: 
.•• it is a headmaster's duty, bearing 
in mind the known propensities of' boys 
and indeed girls between the ages of' 
eleven and seventeen or eighteen, to 
take all reasonable and proper steps 
to prevent ~~Y of' the pupils under his 
care :from su:ffering injury :from 
inanimate objects, ~rom the actions of' 
their :fellow pupils, or :from a com-
bination of' _the two. That is a high 
standard. 
Obviously t'\vo teachers :for nine hundred students do not 
constitute 'reasonable and proper steps'. 
The higher standard of' care seems . to place on 
educators the onus of' guarding against dangers that would 
appear unforeseeable to the reasonable man in ordinary 
circumstances. The ordinary standard of' cnre suggests that, 
i:f the educator really thought about the matter, he would 
roresee the danger. Salmond, writing on this duty, said: 
The wrongdoer may not desire or intend 
the cons equences but may yet be per~ectly 
conscious o~ tbe risk or it. He d oes not 
intentionally cause the harm, but he 
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intentionally and consciously exposes 
others to the risk of it. This has been 
described (by Eve, J.1) as rran attitude 
of' mental indif:ference to obvious risks".2 
Educators are probably willing to accept liability :for 
such 'mental indifference', and can admit that they might 
have prevented the injury Hith more care and .foresight. 
It is hard, however, to accept liability .for accidents 
which might not even be foreseeable, at least by a reason-
able man. Surely, a teacher is entitled to expect a 
garbage can to be emptied at night? I:f not, is a science 
teacher n~ver to deposit chemicals in a garbage container? 
Is a shop instructor never to thr6w away a broken hack-
saw bl-ade? Is a handicraf't teacher never to throv-r away a 
broken scissors? Are teachers never to place broken glass 
in garbage containers? Should evary piece of .furniture 
and equipment be checked daily? Hust all teachers supervise 
the playground at recess? v~~at is a 'reasonable' ratio o:f 
teachers to students? And, what about the 'encouragement 
of the sturdy independence of students' advocated in 
earlier cases? 
There obviously is no complete and perfect answer , 
except to warn that educational personnel, from th~ school 
board chairman to the classroom teacher, should question 
all their actions as to their possible consequences. No t 
all court decisions in the last decade have dem~~ded the 
1 Hudson v . Viney (U.K.)(1921) 1 Ch. 98, at p.104 . 
2 Salmond, op . cit., p.267. 
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higher duty or care. In Newfoundland fu~d many parts or 
Canada there are still small village schools where the 
duty expected or the teacher might be no more than that 
of a prudent father. Educational personnel are urged, 
ho1..rever, to be extremely cautious, to recognise and to 
plan ror changing conditions, and to realise that the law 
is not rinite and that events around them can often 
cause dirr~rent interpretations or the law. It was Plato 
l-lho said, rtHuman beings do not ever make laHs; it is the 
accidents and catastrophes or all kinds happening in every 
conceivable Y.Iay, that mal{e laws f:or us. n1 
IV. LOSS AND CAUSALITY 
Although a legal duty might have been breached, a 
charge or negligence will rail unless actual loss or 
damage has been suf.fered., a.Yld that loss or damage is a 
direct result o.f the breach.2 
1. Loss or Damage 
All the cases cited in this chapter involve some 
£orm of physical injury. These injuries have obviously 
caused pain and sur.fering to the plainti£.fs. Financial 
expenses# medical and/or legal, have also been incurred. 
If the injured person had been employed, a loss o£ salary 
might have resulted. All these physical and ~inancial 
1 Laws IV, 709. 
2 Prosser, supra, p.50. 
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inconveniences fall within the category of loss or damage. 
Accordingly, ir pain, suffering, injury, financial 
expenses or loss of earnings can be shown, this com-
ponent of the tort of negligence will be satisfied. 
A breach of a legal duty without the accompanying 
loss cannot lead to an action in negligence even to 
prevent an injury that might occur. A parent, who knows 
that a school board has a legal duty to provide fire 
escapes, cannot sue the school board in negligence in 
case her offspring is injured •. Ne ither can a parent sue 
a principal or a teacher :for negligently allowing pupils 
to swim unsupervised, unless an injury has been su:f:fered. 
For a successful action in negligence, the parents would 
:first have to wait for an accident to befall their 
children.1 
The reasoning :for this component in the tort o:f 
negligence is found in the definition o:f tort given by 
Salmond: 
We may de:fine a tort as a civil wrong 
:for which the remedy is a common law 
action :for unliquidated damages, and 
which is not exclusively the breach 
o:f a contract or the breach of a trust 
or other merely equitable obligation.2 
The remedy :for negligence, therefore, is unliquidated 
damages. Unliquidated damages are :financial awards that 
1 In the examples given in this paragraph, there would 
:fortunately be other legal avenues open to the parents. 
2 Salmond, op.cit., p.15. 
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are not pre-determined. They are awarded by the courts to 
"put back . (the plaintiff) into the position both in · terms 
of finance and health that he would have been had he not 
been so injured."1 The amount of the award will vary 
according to the degree of the suffering. If there is 
no loss~ no award CaQ be made, and an action for negligence 
will fail. 
2. Causalit:y,: 
If an injury is suffered, it must be shown that there 
was a reasonably close causal connection between it and 
the breach of the legal duty. The breach, therefore, must 
be the causa causans - the immediate, the effective or 
the proximate cause of the occurrence. 
Sweet v. Drummondviile-3;hool Trustees (Que.)(1947): 2 
The Quebec Supreme Court found the school trustees 
liable when a pupil fell from some steps which 
were not guarded by bannisters. The trustees had 
the duty of ensuring that the school premises 
were safe. The accident would not have happened 
i:f the breach o:f duty had not occurred. 
I:f it is claimed that a teacher has been negligent 
in per:forming his duties, the plainti:ff must show that, i:f 
he had been doing his duty, the accident would have been 
prevented. In Gard v. Duncan Board of School Trustees (B.C.),3 
1 Thornton v. Board o:f School Trustees o:f 
St.Geor e and David Edamura B.C. , per 
Andrews, J. , supra, p. • 
2 Que S.C. 444. 
3 (1946), supra, pp.60-61. 
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although the teacher might have been negligent in allowing 
the boys to play hockey unsupervised_ negligence was not 
proven as his pre~ence would not have prevented the injury. 
The onus o~ proving that the injury was a result or 
the breach or the legal duty falls on the plaintiff. 
Occasionally, the plea~ ipsa loquitur ~ the thing 
speaks ror itself - can be employed. This is used when 
the negligence is so obvious there is no need to prove 
it. It is a procedural device which saves the plaintiff 
the onus of proving the negligence, and can save the time 
or the court. The defendant_ however- might deny that the 
negligence is indisputable. The burden of proof then shifts 
to him, and if the plea ~ ipsa loquitur fails, the 
burden of proof shifts back to the plaintiff. 
Scott v. London and St. Katherine Docks (U.K.)(1865):1 
The injured party was a customs officer. It 
was held that the only way in which a bag of 
sugar could have .fallen on his head was f'rom 
a crane. It was, therefore, obviously the 
crane driver's fault. 
The breach must be a direct cause of the negligence 
and not merely one in a chain or causes. An action for 
negligence will fail if the breach of duty is causa sine 
qua ll2a - something without which the accident would not 
--
have happened, but not its immediate or effective cause. 
-----
1 3 H & C 596. 
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Ir a student were to cut his finger on a protruding nail 
in a classroom wall and, while being taken to hospital 
ror a tetanus injection~ he was ~urther injured in an 
accident, the school authorities would not be liable for 
the injuries sustained in the road accident. Although it 
could be argued that he would not have been involved in 
the road accident i~ it had not been for the injury 
surfered in the school, the school authorities could not 
have reasonably ~oreseen the road accident. The road 
accident was not a direct result or their negligence. 
Emergencies seem to constitute an exception to the 
causa sine qua~ rule. Lord Wright said in 1943, "To 
break the chain o~ causation there must be something 
outside the exigencies or ~mergency."1 
Moddejonge · v. Huron County Board or Education 
(Ont.)~1972):2 
Two girls drowned while being negligently allowed 
to swim in a dangerous area. The first girl G was 
a non-swimmer. The second girl M drowned while 
trying to rescue her. It was argued by the def-
endants that the second girl's death was not the 
teacher's fault. The Ontario court held that 
when a person, by his negligence, exposes anothe~ 
to danger, it is a foreseeable consequence that 
a third party will attempt to rescue the one in 
danger and the attempted rescue is part of the 
1 Oropesa (U.K.)(1943) 1 All E.R. 211. 
2 Supra, p.6). 
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chain of causation started by the negligent 
act. Pennell, J. said: 
The initial act that set the events in 
motion was the negligence of the def-
endant. One of the links of causation 
was that someone might thereby be 
exposed to danger and that someone 
else might react to the impulse to 
rescue. 
V. VICARIOUS LIABILITY 
It has been stated earlier that a school board 
can delegate its authority to it~ employees.1 The duty 
that accompanies the authority is also delegated. It might 
appear a sound argument to state that the delegation or 
the authority and the duty should free the school board 
from liability for accident, if the accident were a direct 
result of the negligent exercise or the authority by an 
employee. The legal principle in Britain and Canada, how-
ever, is that an employer is vicariously liable at law 
for the negligent acts or his servants, if such are 
performed in the furtherance of the servants' duties. The 
rationale for this principle, founded in the legal maxim 
respondeat superior - let the superior answer - is that 
no person should be allowed to sign away his responsibility. 
An employer, therefore, can delegate his authority, but he 
cannot abrogate it. On more practical grounds, the 
principle developed for social reasons, since the employer 
1 Supra, pp.15 and 54· 
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was usually rich enough to meet the cost of the damages, 
whereas the servant was not.* Devlin is cited by Salmond 
as writing: 
* 
••• the real wrongdoer hardly ever pays 
for the damage he does. He is usually 
not worth suing. The payer is either 1 his employer or an insurance company. 
In the United States, school boards have escaped 
liability for the negligent acts of teachers on the 
premise that school boards, being governmental 
institutions, are immune £rom civil actions~ Gauerke 
has written: 
As reasons to justify the theory (of governmental 
non-liability in tort) courts have said, (1) that 
school districts should not be charged with lia-
bility since they receive no advantage from operating 
schools; (2) that school districts have only those 
powers given them by the legislature and state 
school o££ices, not including permission to commit 
legal errors; (3) that school taxes are trust funds, 
not to be used to pay claims; (4) that school prop-
erty is exempt from attachment; .and (5) that the 
personal interest o£ private citizens must give 
way to the idea of public good.2 
The doctrine o£ governmental immunity prevails with 
strict application in most states. The financial 
burden or meeting an~ court award ror damages ialls 
directly on teachers and principals. Criticism of the 
doctrine has mounted in the last twenty years and 
some states have followed the example o£ the Illinois 
Supreme Court who overturned the doctrine in 1959 as 
'resting on a rotten £oundation•.3 
1 Devlin, Law and Morals (1961), Birmingham, p.18, cited 
by Salmond, op.cit., p.30. 
2 Warren E. Gauerke, School Law (New York: The Center for 
Applied Research, 1965), pp.B3-84. 
3 Molitor v. Kaneland Community Unit District #302 (U.S.) (1959) 163 N.E. 89. 
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Despite the ract that a teacher might not be worth 
suing, especially ir the award or damages is high, the 
p ractice seems to be to jointly sue the school board, the 
p rincipal and the teacher, on the premise that ir you do 
n ot recover rrom one, you might recover rrom the other. 
Even if there has been a breach of a legal duty 
d irectly resulting in an injury. there are still two pre-
requisites necessary berore a school board can be held 
vicariously liable ror the negligent acts or its employees. 
it must be shown that the relationship of master 
----
and servant existed; secondly, it must be established 
that the action or the servant was within the _scope of 
his employment~ - --
1. The Master-Servant Relationship 
In the nineteenth century the test of whether a 
person was a servant depended on whether the 'master' 
could tell him what to do and how to do it. This test 
still applies today in certain circumstances. 
Baldwin v. Lyons and Erin District High School 
Board (Ont.)(1961):2 
Three high school students were injured when a 
school bus was in collision with a train. The 
school board had no statutory obligation to 
1 Robert L. Lamb, _.L .... e~a-..l~_.L-:i .... a~b.;...;l.-.· -:-l_i __ t~~o~r__.s ... c..,.h.-.o~o-1--...B_o:-a~r;;....;,od_s~a-n;;;;.d.­
Teachers for School Accidents Ottawa: Canadian Teachers ' 
Federation, March 19S9), p.47. 
2 26 D.L.R. 437. 
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provide transportation, but had done so under 
its discretionary powers. Lyons was the owner 
or the buses and had a written contract with 
the school board. As the bus entered a crossing 
one student was standing in the door well 
although there was room ror him to sit. This 
was in breach of the statutory provisions of 
the Public Vehicle Act. Leitch, the driver, an 
employee of Lyons, was found guilty of neg-
ligence. It was argued that Leitch and Lyons 
were servants of the school board, thererore, 
respondeat superior. The school board, how-
ever, argued that it was not liable as it had 
no statutory obligation to provide transportation 
and Lyons was an independent contractor. The 
Ontario court found that, as the school board 
and the principal gave instructions to Lyons 
and his drivers, in the form of smoking and 
other regulations, Lyons was not an indep-
endent contractor. The school bo·ard and Lyons 
were found liable for $52,282. 
With the increase in specialised knowledge, such a 
test is not always practical. A school board might be 
able to tell its teachers what to do, but it is doubtful 
if it could tell them how to do it. Accordingly, the test 
today, in most cases, is whether the servant is within the 
organisation of the master. The 'organisation test' is 
satisfied if the master has the power to select or appoint 
the servant, if he pays the wages or remuneration. of the 
servant, and if he has the right to suspend .or -dismiss 
the servant. Principals and teachers obviously fall within 
this category. 
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An exception to this general rule involves the 
hiring of professional experts who would normally be 
outside the organisation. In Davis v. London County 
Council (U.K.)(1914), 1 it waa held that the education 
authority was not liable for the negligence of a medical 
officer hire.d under statutory authority to perform 
operations on children, provided nthey engage competent 
professional persons to perrorm it." It could, therefore, 
be presumed that school boards would not be liable for 
accidents caused by such professionals as electricians, 
carpenters and plumbers, hired to work in or on school 
premises. The test, in su~h circumstances, seems to hinge 
on the level of the 'professional expertise' of the person 
hired. 
Woodward v. Mayor of Hastings (U.K.)(1944): 2 
A cleaning lady, who was a sub-contractee, 
failed to clear frozen snow properly off school 
steps9 No sand or ashes had been placed on the 
frozen snow and no warning given of the danger. 
A child was injured. The Court of Appeal held 
that as the cleaning lady was entrusted with 
the performance or a duty incumbent upon the 
governors of the school, the governors were 
liable for her negligence, although she was 
not their immediate servant. Du Parcq, L.J. 
said: 
1 30 T.L.R. 275. 
2 2 All E.R. 565; (1945) K.B. 17. 
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It is idle to suggest that she was not 
authorised to brush snow from the steps. 
It was clearly part of her duty to do 
so, and no one in her position would 
have been likely to omit the task. 
Negligence having been established against 
her, it follows that the defendants are 
responsible for their agent's failure to 
take reasonable care for the safety of 
their invitee. It does not avail them to 
say that they did not know or the danger • 
••• The craft of the charwoman may have 
its mysteries but there is no esoteric 
quality in the nature of the work which 
the clearing of the snow-covered step 
demanded. 
The principle enunciated in this case suggests that 
school boards will not escape liability for acts or 
omissions of janitors. Many school boards hire janitors 
themselves; some school boards subcontract the janitorial 
duties to professional firms. In either instance, the 
precedent established in Woodward v. Mayor of Hastings 
would make the school boards liable as 'there is no 
esoteric quality in the nature of the work'. 
Occasionally j~,itora ara paid to do work outside 
their normal janitorial duties. Such work includes repairs 
in and around the school. It could be argued that on such 
occasions the janitors are independent contractors. I£, 
by his negligence, a janitor were to cause an accident in 
such circumstances, it is probable that the court would 
decide on the facts whether he was a 'competent professional 
person'. If he were doing electrical work and could show 
that he held a Journeyman's or Master's Certificate in 
electrical repairs, then he might be classed as an expert. 
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If he were self-taught~ however~ the school board would 
probably be liable. The issue is not clear and the alter-
natives are purely speculative on the writer's part. 
A mandatory duty imposed on school boards in New-
foundland~ under section 12(d) of~ Schools A£i (R.S.N.) 
1970. reads: 
••• (shall) provide safe drinking water, 
adequate sanitary facilities and proper 
lighting~ heat. ventilation and cleaning 
for the schools under its control. 
Students have suffered illnesses as a result of ·unclean 
and unhygienic drinking water. It would be interesting to 
discover whom the courts would hold liable if an injured 
student sued in negligence. Would the school board escape 
ltability because those who installed the water pipes were 
expert plumbers? Would it escape liability since the water 
supply is under the jurisdiction of a local authority? Or, 
would the school board be liable as the duty, being 
mandatory, is absolute? 
A discretionary power o£ school boards in New~ound­
land, under section 13(d) of~ Schools~ (R.S.N.) 1970, 
reads: 
••• (may) arrange with the Department of 
Health for the appointment of a qualified 
nurse to work in any school or schools 
under its control in its district. 
If a school board exercised this discretionary power~ and 
if a student suf~ered injury due to the negligence of the 
nurse, would the school board escape liability on the 
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grounds that she was an 'expert'? Would the Department o~ 
Health be liable? Or, would the courts rule that the 
nurse had joined the 'organisation' of the school board 
and therefore hold the school board vicariously liable? 
2. The Servant Acting Within The Scope Of His Employment 
An employer is vicariously liable for the negligent 
acts of his servants if those acts are performed within 
the scope of the servants~ employment. As a general rule, 
it can be said that acts which employees would normally do 
to fulf~l their roles will fall within the scope of their 
employment . In determining whether a master-servant rel-
ationship exists, the courts appear more interested in the 
acts of the servant rather than the consequences. As an 
example, a student would not normally be expected to 
injure himself when using chemicals, but it would be 
qui te natural for a science teacher to use chemicals in 
the exec~tion of his role. A school board, therefore, 
could not escape liability on the grounds that the way the 
teacher had allowed the student to handle ·the chemicals 
was outside the scope of his employment. 
Hall v. Thompson et al. (Ont.)(1952): 1 
A boy was injured in a wrestling contest 
which was part of the physical education 
training activities in the school. The 
Ontari o Court of Appeal held that a master-
1 4 D.L.R. 139. 
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servant relationship existed. The lesson was 
within the scope of the employment o~ the 
teacher. He was only doing his job. As he was 
supervising the class correctly, he was not 
negligent and therefore the school board was 
not liable either. It was argued by the 
plaintif~ that wrestling was inherently 
dangerous and therefore not part o~ the 
normal physical education activities. 
Treleaven, J. said: 
It may, of course. be true that in 
all games or contests o£ skill 
involving the testing and develop-
ment of physical strength, accidents 
will happen. but it does not follow. 
in my opinion. that they should 
therefore be classed as inherently 
dangerous. 
In this case. if the teacher had been found negligent. 
the school board would have been found liable - also. Indeed. 
once the court is satisfied that the teacher was acting_ 
within the scope of his employment. if the teacher is 
found negligent. there is little, if anything. the school 
board can do to escape liability. Salmond summarises the 
position as follows: 
Even the express prohibition of the wrong-
ful act is no defence to the master. if 
that act was merely a mode of doing what 
the servant was employed to do ••• The 
question is whether it was a wrongful 
mode of carrying out employment.1 
Only one case has been found to illustrate 'a wrong-
ful mode of carrying out employment'. 
1 Salmond. op.cit •• p.662. 
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Beauparlant et al. v. Board of Trustees of Separate 
School Section No.1 of AEpleby et al. {Ont.)(1955):1 
Teachers arranged an excursion for their students 
without the knowledge or permission of the school 
board. Sixty-six students were transported on a 
truck. The sides of the truck gave way and many 
students were thrown out and injured. The Ontario 
court held that the school board was not liable 
as the actions of the teachers were outside their 
official duties. 
(It is ironic that, in this case, the plaintiffs 
did not follow the general practice of suing the 
teachers, principal and school board jointly. They 
only sued the school board and, therefore, recovered 
nothing. If they had taken an action against the 
teachers they would probably have been successful.) 
Although this case might suggest that no field trips 
or excursions should be undertaken without the knowledge 
and permission of the school board, it is doubtful if 
principals and teachers are completely denied the right 
to make judgements. The courts would consider whether the 
outing fell within the scope o£ normal employment, that is, 
would it be educationally beneficial. In the Beauparlant 
Case the excursion was to attend a birthday concert in 
another school, the educational value of which is doubt-
ful. On the other hand, a visit to a museum, an art 
gallery or a local industry would probably be considered 
a good educational exercise. As in many prior illustrations, 
1 4 D.L.R. 558; O.W.N. 286. 
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each case would be considered on its merit. For the best 
protection, there£ore, school personnel are advised to 
seek the prior approval o~ their employers. 
If a teacher is judged to have acted within the 
scope o£ his employment, it is presupposed that he has 
the authority to so act. Such authority, vested in the 
role, might be derived ~rom statute or rrom the express 
rules, regulations or by-laws of his school board. The 
legislation does not cover all the specifics or the teach-
ing role; much has to be lert to the professional judge-
ment of the individual teacher. The courts have inter-
preted the scope of a teacher's authority quite liberally 
and, unless he has flagrantly or maliciously misused his 
power, school boards have not escaped vicarious liability. 
There are cases where, although the teacher might 
have overstepped his authority, school boards have been 
row,d liable becausa o~ thair tacit or ir.~licit approval. 
Walton v. Vancouver Board of School Trustees and 
Thomas (B.C.)(1924): 1 
The school board set a date ror the annual sports 
day of all its schools. Principals were authorised 
to plan the programmes for their own schools. 
Thomas arranged a shooting contest at his school. 
Walton lost an eye when a faulty gun exploded 
in his face. The school board claimed that the 
shooting contest was outside its powers and that 
1 2 D.L.R. 387; 34 B.C.R. 38. 
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Thomas had acted outside his authority. The 
British Columbia court held that the school 
board knew that shooting contests had been 
held ror several years. It was their duty 
either to stop them or to see that they were 
properly supervised. The school board was 
~ound liable for $2,000; the action against 
the principal was dismissed. 
Gray et al. v. McGonegal and Trustees o~ Leeds 
and Lansdowne Front Township School Area (Ont.) 
{1952): 1 
A boy was severely burnt when lighting a stove 
to heat soup. He was acting on the orders of his 
teacher. The teacher and the school board pleaded 
section 11 of the Public Authorities Protection 
~ (R.S.O.) 1937, which said that all actions in 
respect of any alleged neglect must be brought 
within six months £or any act done in pursuance 
or execution or intended execution of any 
statutory or other public duty. The school board 
had no statutory duty to provide hot lunches. It 
was only £ul£illing its public duty and, as mor~ 
than six months had passed since the accident, the 
action should: be dismissed. 
The Supreme Court of Canada, in upholding the 
decision of the Ontario court, ruled that section 
11 did not apply. The school board knew and 
encouraged the practice o~ serving hot lunches 
and had provided money for the purpose. The 
injuries were, therefore, due to the teacher's 
act of negligence within the course o£ her 
employment, so she and the school board were 
liable. The act which resulted in the injury 
1 2 s.c.R. 274. 
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was not one in the course o~ exercising any direct 
public purpose for the children; it was an author-
ised act in a private aspect. Damages were assessed 
at $8.ooo. 
It should not be presupposed that a school board 
will escape liability merely because the court diamisses 
an action against its employee who was acting within the 
scope of his employment. There have been cases where the 
school board and the principal have been found liable, 
but the case against the teacher dismissed; there have 
been cases where th~ school board and the teacher have 
been found liable, but the case against the principal 
dismissed; there have been cases where the school board 
has been ~ound liable alone. This might appear illogica~ 
to the lay reader, but the rationale for such decisions 
depends on the duty or care imposed upon the various 
parties. 
Brost v. Tilley School District (Alta.)(1955):i 
A six-year old student was injured when being 
pushed on a swing. The supervising teacher was 
not present. The Alberta Supreme Court held that 
the teacher was not liable. She had not been 
instructed to supervise the swings nor placed 
under a responsibility to direct the pupils 
with regard to their use. The duty to provide 
the supervision rested on the principal and the 
school board who were · round liable. 
1 Supra, p.65. For a more detailed examination or this 
very important case see infra, p.122. 
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Thornton v. Board o~ School Trustees o~ School 
District #57 (St.George) and David Edamura (B.C.) 
(1975) : 1 
A student was injured in ·the gymnasium due to 
the negligent supervision of the teacher. The 
school board and the teacher were round liable 
ror damages totalling $1.534,058.93. The case 
against the principal was dismissed. Andrews, J. 
said: 
There is no suggestion or evidence that 
leads to any causal connection between 
the accident in question and any acts 
or omissions on the part o~ the principal. 
Ir, in this case, the principal, as ag_ent of' the 
school board• had exercised the correct standard of' care 
in organising the supervisory duties of' his staff', it 
might be asked why the school board was :round liable •. It 
was because the teacher was not an employee of the 
principal; he was an employee of the school board and 
the injury was a direct result of his conduct while 
acting within the scope of' his employment. The school 
board• accordingly, was vicariously liable. 
McKay and McKay v. Govan School Unit No.29 -and 
Molesky (Sask.)(1967):2 
The in~ant plaintirf' was injured in a fall o~f 
parallel bars. The supervising teacher was 
present. A~ter a lengthy legal dialogue the 
action against the teacher was withdrawn. The 
school board was held liable for $183,900. 
1 Supra, p.5. For more detail see infra, p.142. 
2 Supra, p ~5. 
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In this case the teacher was protected by legislation. 
Section 242 or~ School !£1 (R.S.S.) 1966, states: 
Where the board, the principal or the 
teacher approves or sponsors activities 
during the school hours or at other times, 
the teacher responsible ~or the conduct 
o~ the pupils shall not be liable ~or 
damage caused by pupils to property or 
~or personal ·injury su£~ered by pupils 
during such activities. 
Similar, but not i .dentical, legislation applies in. 
some other Canadian provinces. In British Columbia, school 
boards and their employees are exempt ~rom liability ~or 
injuries sustained, i~ they were acting under the authority 
o~ the Public Schools !21 or o~ any regulation, rule or 
order made under the Act, 1 or i~ the injuries were a result 
o~ the operation o~ school patrols. 2 In Prince Edward 
Island, no civil action may be brought against a teacher 
for 'improper treatment' o~ a pupil, unless the complaint 
has first been lodged with the superintendent and then 
the school board.3 
When such legislation as this exists, the teacher 
is protected. It does not prevent an action being brought 
against the teacher, but it does mean that the action 
would probably be dismissed. If an action is brought, the 
teacher may be con~ronted by legal expenses. Also, not 
all provinces have legislation designed to protect school 
1 R.S.B.C. 1960, section 104(3). 
2 Ibid., section 105. 
3 School~ (P.E.I.) 1971, section 47. 
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boards and/or their employees £rom legal suits. Teachers. 
there£ore, may £ind themselves con£ronted with considerable 
expenses in the £orm o£ damages and/or legal costs. It 
is necessary to consider brie£ly the £inancial implic-
ations to teachers o£ court actions. 
VI. FINANCIAL I}WLICATIONS 
In The McKay Case (1967), 1 the action against the 
teacher was dismissed. In a letter to the Saskatchewan . 
Teachers' Federation a £irm o£ solicitors wrote: 
Since damages as well as costs in the McKay 
and Molesky case were over $200,000, the 
legal costs are accordingly tremendously 
high. In e££ect we suggest that i~ the 
Teachers' Federation was not looking a£ter 
the interests o~ the teacher. the costs 
in itsel~ may well be prohibitive to any 
teacher to £ight such a law suit because 
even if the teacher is released pursuant 
to the above mentioned authorities £rom 
legal liability, the e£rorts that his 
solicitors will have to put into this 
case are well beyond what the teacher 
will ever recover in · legal costs ~rom 
his opposing sides, even i~ he wins.2 
Without the protection o£ the Teachers' Federation the 
teacher, although the case against him was dismissed, 
could have incurred considerable expense. 
In cases o£ negligence, a teacher might £ind finan-
cial demands being made upon him in the £orm o£ (1) legal 
1 Supra, p.99. 
2 Letter £rom Francis, Gauley, Dierker and Dahlem, 
Barristers and Solicitors , February 22, 1965, cited by 
T.E. Giles, Educational Administration in Canada (Calgary: 
Detselig Enterprises, 1974), p.77. 
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costs and expenses, (2) damages, and (3) indemnity. 
1. Legal Costs and Expenses ~ 
Most disputes do not reach the courts. In such 
circumstances, the actions are either dropped or settle-
ment is made out or eourt. On these oeeasions, the~ 
decisions are usually made in lawyers' o~~ices. A teacher 
involved in such a dispute, will have lawyer's · ~ees to 
pay. 
I:f a dispute reaches the courts, the teacher can be 
~ound liable or not liable. I~ he is ~ound liable, not 
only will he have his own costs to pay, but o~ten he will 
have to bear all or a portion o~ the plainti~:f's costs. 
r~ he is :found not liable, he may be able to recover all 
or some o:f his costs :from the plainti~:f. 
2 .· ·.Damages 
I:f a settlement is reached out o:f court or i~ a 
court awards damages, · the teacher will be liable ~or the 
payment adjudged against his negligence. When a school 
board and a principal and a teacher are sued jointly, the 
court will proportion the damages severally or jointly 
among those ~ound liable. 
Protection 
Rarely do teachers today £ind themselves personally 
responsible ~or costs and/or damages. They are · usually 
protected by insurance policies or by statutory 
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indemni~ication. 
(a) Insurance protection. 
In most provinces, teachers will be represented by 
teachers' associations. The general practice is ~or the 
teachers' association to carry liability insurance on 
behalr o£ its members. The terms o~ such policies vary 
according to the needs o~ the ind vidual provinces. 
In 1975, The Newroundland Teachers' Association 
-
---
purchased a million dollar policy to protect its members. 
This policy is tailor-made to meet local needs. Under its 
clauses, it will pay all damages and expenses incurred by 
a teacher up ion - dollars, whether the teacher 
is liable or not. Coverage also includes all legal 
expenses - incurred out o~ court.1 
School boards are also protected by insurance 
coverage which, in most provinces, is mandatory. Section 
12 o£ ~Schools !£l (ReSeN~) 1970~ ~eeds: 
••• every School Board shall ••• (k) insure 
and keep insured all its buildings and equipment 
(1) (as amended 1974) eff'ect insurance 
indemnifying it against liability in respect 
of any claim for damages or personal injury. 
Many schools carry general aceident insurance on 
theirpupils. In some instances the schools or the school 
boards meet the policy payments; in other instances the 
1 For information regarding the insurance policy held by 
the N.T.A. I am grateful to Len Stirling, Vice President, 
Johnsons Insurance Ltd., St. John's, Newfoundland. 
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pupils contribute themselves.1 
Some teachers carry their own insurance. This is 
a wise precaution i~ they consider the protection o~£ered 
b y their association is inadequate. 
(b ) Indemnification. 
Section 104(5) of Tbe Public Schools~ (R.S.B.C.) 
1960, r eads: 
The Board o£ Trustees may, by an a~£irmative 
vote o£ not less than two-thirds o£ all its 
members, pay any sum required for the 
protection, defence, or indemnification or 
a trustee, an o£ficer or employee of the 
school district where an action or pro-
secution is brought against him in connection 
with the performance of his school district 
duties ••• 
In Thornton v. Board of School Trustees o~ School 
District #57 (St.George) and David Edamura (B.C.)(1975),2 
the school trustees and the teacher, Edamura, were found 
liable £or $1,534,058.93. The school trustees, despite the 
fact that its insurance coverage was only for one million 
dollars , exercised its discretionary power under section 
104(5). Edamura, thererore, has to pay nothing. 
Such legislation as this is not common. It is indeed 
mo st commendable of school boards to indemnify their 
employees, but as more use is made of liability insurance, 
the need for such action will be minimum. 
1 For more in£ormation on school boar d and school 
insurance coverage, see pp.186,189-190. 
2 Supra , p.S. 
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). Indemnity 
A third area where a teacher might rind ~inancial 
demands being made upon him is ror indemnity. In the 
context or this section, 'indemnity' means to pay com-
pensation ror a wrong - more specirically, to compensate 
the school board ror charg~s laid against it because 
o~ the teacher's~eg~gence. 
It has been shown that an employer is vicariously 
liable ~or the negligent acts or his servants ir such 
acts are per.formed within the scope or their employment. 
Coupled with the principle o.f vicarious liability, are 
three duties that the servant ow&s to the employer. 
(a) The servant has a duty to exercise reasonable care. 
(b) The servant has a duty to indemniry the master at 
common law. (c) Usually, the servant has a statutory duty 
to provide indemnity or compensation. 
(a) Reasonable care. 
A leading case is Lister v. Romford Cold Storage Co. 
(U.K.) (1957) :1 
A truck driver, through negligent driving, 
caused injuries to his 'mate•, who happened 
to be his .father. His rather success.fully 
sued the company. The company then sued the 
driver, claiming that, as a joint-tort.feasor, 
it was entitled to contributions .from him and 
damages .for a breach o.f an implied term in 
1 2 W.L.R. 
-106-
his contract to drive carefully. The House 
or Lords held that the driver was under an 
obligation or care when driving and that the 
company was entitled to recover. 
(b) Indemnity at common law. 
Salmond has written: 
It seems clear on principle that in 
all cases of vicarious liability the 
person held vicariously liable for the 
tort of another must have a right o~ 
indemnity as against that other. Thus 
a master who has paid ror the negligence 
of his servant can doubtless sue that 
servant ror indemnity.1 
Accordingly, if a school board is held vicariously 
liable and it can show that the teacher did not exercise 
reasonable care in the execution of his duty, it will be 
entitled to recover contributions from the teacher. 
(c) A statutory duty to provide indemnity. 
This duty is illustrated by section 3 of The Con-
tributory Negligence Act (R.S.N.) 1970, which reads: 
(Underlining mine.) 
Where damage or loss has been caused by 
the fault of two or more persons, the court 
shall determine the degree in which each was 
at fault, and where two or more persons are 
found at fault they shall be jointly and 
severally liable to the person suffering 
damage or loss, but as between themselves, 
in the absence of any contract express or 
implied, they shall be liable to make 
contributions to and indemnify each other 
in the degree in which they are respectively 
found to have been at fault. 
1 Salmond, op.cit., p.685. 
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School boards in Newroundland, thererore, have 
statutory right to seek contributions rrom negligent 
employees. 
Protection 
Fortunately for teachers, insurance policies are 
often constructed to cover them for indemnity contrib-
utions. The policy held by the N.T.A. on behalf of its 
members would pay the teacher's contribution. In case or 
dispute between the teacher and the school board over 
such contribution, the insurance company would also derend 
-------the teacher, meet all costs and expenses, and pay any 
award made against him. 
VII. SUID~RY 
Before educational personnel can be sued ror neg-
ligence, it must be shown that they have breached a legal 
duty and that the injury sufrered was a direct result of 
the breach. They have a legal duty imposed upon them by 
enacted legislation, which states what their duty is, and 
by the common law, which determines how they should have 
carried out their duty, and, in the absence or a statutory 
duty, imposes its own duty of care. The legal duty con-
rers on educators the aut hority needed to fulril the duty. 
Enacted legislation can convey mandatory or discretionary 
duties. If mandatory, the duty is absolute; if the dis-
cretionary duty is assumed, it becomes as binding as a 
mandatory duty. 
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The common law duty o~ care is to take reasonable 
precautions to protect students, as would a reasonable 
and prudent ~ather, l ~rom dangers known and ~oreseeable. 
The standard o~ care demanded will vary according to the 
particular circumstances, including the age, the number 
and the maturity o~ the students. 
As social conditions change and schools become larger 
and more complex, the courts tend to demand a higher 
standard o~ care, similar to that owed to contractees. 
School personnel are expected to keep their students as 
~ree ~rom injury as reasonable care and skill would warrant. 
Students have the right to expect not to be . injured. 
Principals and teachers · are employees o~ their 
school boards. School boards will be held vicariously 
liable ~or the negligent acts o~ all their employees if 
such acts are per~ormed within the scope o~ their normal 
employment. Provided employees have not f"lagrantly oi· 
maliciously abused their authority, the courts interpret 
1 the scope of" normal employment' quite liberally. School 
boards have been held liable for acts which would normally 
be outside the scope of" employment, when it has been shown 
that they have implicitly or explicitly condoned or 
encouraged them. Employees do not escape liability for 
their negligent acts merely because school boards are 
held to be vicariously liable. 
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Employees have. to meet expenses and to pay damages 
£or ·injuries su~fered. They may be liable to pay con-
tributions to their employers £or awards made against 
them. In some provinces, employees may £ind statutory 
protection £rom the financial payments resulting £rom 
litigation. Most insurance policies provide the coverage 
necessary to meet legal costs and expenses, to pay awards 
made by the courts, and to indemni~y school boards. 
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CHAPTER V 
TEACHER LIABILITY - THE SCHOOL SETTING 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In chapter IV. it was shown that school personnel 
will be liable ~or accidents which occur as a result or 
their negligence. They have a duty or care towards students 
to ensure that accidents do not take place. The duty they 
owe can be ~ound in statute and in the common law. 
Robert L. Lamb, in his dissertation, concluded that: 
Most actions ror negligence arise because: 
(1) School boards are negligent in not 
providing sare racilities and equipment. 
(2) School boards are negligent in not 
providing supervision comparable· to that 
provided by a 'care~ul rather' through 
its agents or servants.1 
A third area or importance involves transportation. 
In this chapter the statutory duties imposed upon 
educators in these three areas will be examined. The legal 
principles that have evolved through the common law with 
regard to these statutory duties will be illustrated by 
court cases. The de~ences to a charge or negligence will 
be explained and illustrated by rererence to relevant court 
1 Lamb, op.cit., p.29. 
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decisions. Finally, some precautionary measures that 
school personnel can take to protect themselves rrom 
litigation and ~rom the ~inancial consequences o~ litig-
ation will be reviewed. 
II. THE DUTY TO EXERCISE SUPERVISION 
There can be little doubt that the supervision or 
students ~orms an integral part of the duties o~ educational 
personnel. There can also be little doubt that the practical 
supervision o~ students can be exercised only by those 
who are employed in the schools. School boards might have 
a responsibility ror seeing that supervision takes place~ 
but school board members cannot supervise the students 
personally. The duties o~ educational personnel in a 
school district. thererore, vary according to the status 
o~ the individuals concerned. 
An educator will be liable ror any injuries su~~ered . 
as a result o~ his ~ailure to ~ulril his supervisory duty 
as a 'reasonable and prudent parent'. Be~ore he can rulril 
this duty, however, it must be imposed upon him - that is, 
he must be put in a position of authority to supervise 
students. The common law states a duty; the statutes, school 
boards' by-laws and schools' handbooks state a duty. But, 
it would appear to be a valid assumption that, if the 
educator is not put in a position whe~e he has a duty 
to supervise, then there can be no breach of the duty. No 
-112-
man can be liable for a breach or something he never 
had. I~ the supervision o~ students ~orms an integral 
part o~ the duties o~ educational personnel, and i~ the 
personnel can only be liable £or a breach o~ a duty that 
has been imposed upon them, it is necessary to determine 
how the supervisory duties are de~ined. 
1. The School Board 
The duty imposed upon school boards by statute is. 
o~ necessity, di~ruse. Section 12 o~ ~Schools !£i {R.S.N.) 
1970, states: 
Every School Board shall ••• (t) with 
r•spect to every school operated by it, 
cause surricient classrooms or other rooms 
at the school to be made available under 
proper supervision (i) £or the use or 
students at least ri~teen minutes before 
the commencement o~ each school session, 
{ii) ror the use or students during lunch 
hour, where it is necessary ror students to 
take their lunch at the school, and (iii) ror 
the use of students who travel from the 
school to their homes by bus or other vehicle 
until the arrival or the bus or vehicle, 
even though the school session has been 
concluded. 
Although the duty to provide classrooms and the 
· specificity of times when supervision must take place are 
fairly explicit, the use or the term 'proper supervision• 
is vague. What is 'proper' must be relative to the peculiar 
needs of the individual school districts and individual 
schools within the districts. The statute, therefore, does 
little more than tell the school boards that they have the 
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responsibility or seeing that supervision is provided. To 
assist them to carry out their duty, the statutes give 
them the opportunity to make by-laws and regulations. 
School boards in British Columbia must "delegate 
those speciric and general administrative duties which 
require delegation to one or more than one employee or 
the Board,"1 and may "make by-laws .•• relative to ••• any 
matter over which power or authority is ••• vested 
exclusively in the Board."2 Section 13 of' The Schools 
!£1 (R.S.N.) 1970, states: 
Every School Board may ·~· (o) subject to 
the approval or the Minister, make regul-
ations, rules and by-laws ••• (ii) providing 
f'or all things necessary f'or or incidental 
to the carrying out or its objects and the 
exercise and perf'ormance of' its powers and 
duties. 
School boards, theref'ore, may make by-laws to help 
them carr out their duties. By exercising this discret-
ionary power, school boards can specif'y in more detail 
the duties of' those who are more closely involved with 
the students. But, if' school boards f'ail to exercise 
this power, then they can only rely on the statutory 
duties imposed upon principals and teachers to ensure 
that erf'ective supervision is carried out. Unf'ort~~ately~ 
the duties that the statutes impose upon these school 
1 R.S.B.C. section 97(c). 
2 Ibid., section 98(a). 
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personnel are o£ten equally di£~use. 
2. The Principal 
The principal has the responsibility o~ organising 
the supervision o£ students in his school. The Ontario 
legislation reads:1 
Section 14(2) A principal shall ••• (d) 
subject to the approval o£ the Board, 
appoint one or more o£ the teachers ~or 
supervision duty at any time during the 
period beginning one-hal£ hour berore 
classes begin £or the day and ending 
£ifteen minutes arter classes end £or 
the day when the school building and 
the playgrounds are open to the pupils 
and classes are not in session, and 
arrange £or the supervision o£ any 
other school activity authorized by 
the Board. 
Section 80(2) or~ Schools !£1 (R.S.N.) 1970. 
states: 
Every principal in a school shall ••• 
(r) arrange for the regular supervision 
of pupils on the premises of his school. 
In 'arranging' for the supervision of students, 
the principal obviously has to appoint teachers to the 
role. This duty is mandatory and, if a principal fails 
to fulfil it, he will be liable for ~~Y accident that 
might occur due to his negligence. I£ he does arrange 
£or the supervision or students and i£ the supervision 
is considered adequate in the eyes or the law, the 
1 School Administration Act (R.S.O.) 1970, Regulation 191. 
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principal will escape liability. In Thornton v. Board o~ 
School Trustees o~ School District #57 (St.George) and 
David Edamura (1975)1 the principal was held not liable. 
He had delegated supervisory duties and "there was no 
suggestion nor evidence that led to any causal connection 
between the accident in question and any acts or omissions 
on his part. rr 
The principal appoints teachers to classrooms ror 
speci~ic periods or time. Although a teacher is appointed 
to instruct a particular class ror a particular period o£ 
time, he is obviously responsible ~or the supervision or 
the students in the classroom ~or the duration or the lesson. 
The principal, there~ore, £ulrils part or his legal duty 
every time he constructs a school timetable. 
The principal is also responsible £or arranging ror 
the supervision o£ students outside the classroom. The 
statutes make school personnel responsible ror the sa£ety 
or students on school premises. They also state the length 
or time vrhen students must be supervised be.fore school 
opens and a.fter school closes. In Ne1.-1.foundland this duty 
is .firteen minutes be.fore the commencement o.f each school 
session and until the last bus or vehicle has arrived at 
the conclusion o.f the school session. Principals should 
not assume that their responsibility ends when the last 
1 Supra, p. 5. 
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vehicle arrives. They will be responsible 'as reasonable 
parents' for any students allowed to remain in the school. 
The duty ends only when all the students are sa~ely orr 
the premises. 
School boards, .in their by-laws, sometimes indicate 
longer times when teachers have to report to or ·leave 
school. The by-laws or some NewfoUndland school boards 
state that teachers must remain thirty minutes arter 
school has been dismissed. 1 Such regulations assist the 
principal as they ensure that teachers are on the school 
premises after the closure o£ school even ir the last 
vehicle has arrived. Supervisory duties can be allocated 
during this time. Unless the school has its own regulations 
to detain teachers after the time detailed by statute or 
by the local school board by-laws, the principal should 
ensure that all pupils have vacated the school premises 
within the time limit. He may, of course, supervise the 
remaining students himself, or use the services or a 
volunteer teacher. 
I.f an injury is su:f.fered in a school, the p-rincipal, 
to escape liability, will have to show that he has .ful.filled 
his legal duty or arranging .for and appointing teachers 
to supervision. He .will also have to show that the 
1 An example o.f such regulations are found in Article 8 o.f 
the By-laws or Bonavista-Trinity-Placentia Integrated Board. 
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s upervision was adequate. The adequacy o~ the supervision 
will depend not only on the circumstances surrounding the 
accident and on the age, number and maturity or the students, 
but also upon the instructions that the teachers had received 
regarding their supervisory role. The question of adequacy 
is most important and will be examined after the statutory 
duty of teachers has been determined. 
3. The Teacher 
For the most part, the statutes examined do not place 
a direct supervisory duty on teachers. The statutes are 
more concerned with their roles as disciplinarians. 
The Ontario legislation states: 1 
Section 22(1) It is the duty of a teacher 
••• (d) to maintain proper order and 
discipline in his classroom and while on 
duty in the school and on the playground · 
under direction. 
The legislation of Prince Edward Island reads: 2 
Section 36 Every teacher ••• (b) shall 
maintain proper order and discipline on 
the school property. 
Section 81 of:~ Schools. .~ (R.S.N.) 1970, states: 
Every teacher in a school shall ••• 
(d) maintain proper order and discipline 
in carrying out his duties. 
Although it might be argued that good discipline 
can be an errective deterrent against accidents, and that 
1 School Administration Act (R.S.O.) 1970, Regulation 191. 
2 School ~, 1971. 
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discipline and supervision are complementary to each other, 
it is contended that the statutory clauses cited above do 
not place a legal duty on teachers to take reasonable 
precautions to prevent accidents. · Statutory duties imposed 
on principals orten use the words 'supervision o~ students'. 
No such terminology occurs in the clauses cited above. A 
teacher might prevent a student running down the corridor, 
which is a disciplinary ~unction, and by such action he 
might prevent an accident, but is his prime concern ror 
the sarety or the students or ror keeping order and control 
in the school? The dirrerence can be illustrated by the 
School !£i or Prince Edward Island. Whereas section 36(b) 
is concerned with 'proper order and discipline', section 
36(c) states: 
(Every teacher) ••• shall have a care to the 
health and com~ort or those ror whom he is 
responsible. 
It has already been shown that negligence involves 
a breach or a legal duty to 'protect' others against un-
reasonable risks. 1 It has already been shown that the 
duty or a teacher is to take 'care' or his students as a 
reasonable and carerul parent. 2 'Protection' and 'care' 
are very dir~erent £rom keeping 'order and discipline'. 
Accordingly, it is contended -t-hat-when st tut~ onl 
a disciplinary duty on teachers, they will not be liable 
1 Supra, p .50. 
2 Supra, p .56. 
~ 
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~or injuries sur~ered_ unless the injuries were a direct 
result or a breach or that duty. And, i~ a teacher were 
sued ~or an injury which was caused by his failure to care 
~or the students as 'a reasonable parent'- he could claim 
that nowhere was there a direct duty of supervision imposed 
upon him. 
A direct duty can be imposed upon teachers_ however, 
by the regulations of their school boards or of their own 
schools. A principal is responsible for arranging super-
vision, so that whenever he appoints a teacher to that 
role, the duty is delegated with the appointment. This 
duty is as binding as a statutory du~y, for when a teacher 
acce~ n appointment with a school board, he enters into 
agreement to carry out the duties that 
accompany his appointment, whether those duties are · 
detailed in statutes or in the by-laws of his school board 
or in the regulations of the school to which he is appointed. 
The contractual status of teachers was well illustrated in 
Winnipeg School Division No.1 v. Winnipeg Teachers' Assoc-
iation No.1 of Manitoba Teachers' Society and Manitoba 
Teachers' Society (Man.)(1973): 1 
During collective bargaining negotiations, the 
Teachers' Association ordered its members to 
'work to· rule'. As part of the order, teachers 
withheld their supervisory duties at the noon 
1 4 W. W. R. 623. (C. A.) 
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hour. At a considerable cost the School Division 
was compelled to hire others to supervise the 
noon hour. The question was whether the teachers 
were under a duty, arising from a contractual 
obligation, to provide noon-hour supervision, 
or whether this was a voluntary activity. The 
code of rules and regulations of the Division, 
under Duties of Principals, read: 
••• shall include, 1. the assignment 
and supervision of teachers ••• 6. the 
organisation of the supervision of 
pupil activities in school buildings 
and on school grounds. He shall make 
provision for the supervision of the 
school during the noon recess. 
Under Duties of Teachers, Section 3.4 read: 
Teachers shall carry out the-ir duties 
in accordance with the regulations of 
the Department of Education and of the 
school system under the direction of 
the principal. 
Section 13 read: 
Under the direction of the principal, 
it shall be the duty of the teachers 
of each school to maintain regular 
supervision of the playground. 
The Manitoba Court of Appeal held that the teachers 
were under a contractual obligation to provide noon-
hour supervision and, therefore, they were liable 
in damages, both at common law and by statute, for 
a breach of a binding agreement. They had to meet 
the expense or the additional supervisory personnel. 
The statutes often make provision for the imposition 
of direct duties on school personnel. Section 152 of the 
Public Schools A£1 (R.S.B.C.) 1960, states: 
-121-
Every teacher ••• shall ••• (a) per~orm 
such teaching and other educational 
services as may be required or assigned 
by a Board or the Department. 
Section 81 o~ ~Schools !£1 (R.S.N.) 1970, states: 
Every teacher in a school shall ••• 
(v) per~orm such other duties as are 
prescribed in the regulations, rules 
or by-laws o~ his School Board. 
Regulations ~rom three school boards in New~oundland 
are illustrative o~ this point. 
The Labrador West Integrated: 
IV Duties o~ Teachers. Every teacher shall ••• 
(c) Carry out such duties as may ~rom time to 
time be delegated by the Principal, including, 
without limitation: the patroling o~ corridors 
and inspection o~ washrooms to ensure the good 
behaviour o~ students and the protection o~ 
school property; and supervise children 
boarding school buses. 
Avalon North Integrated: 
Supervision by Staff: ••• to seek maximum 
e~ficiency and safety. 
1. Supervisory duties shall be co-operatively 
arranged by the administration and sta~r of 
each school. 2. The teacher-pupil ratia ~or 
supervision of activities shall be left to 
the discretion of the staff and administration 
of each school ••• 4. ~fhenever students are 
engaged in any school activity they shall be 
supervised by a teacher or teachers. 
Roman Catholic School Board for St. John's:1 
3.04 Supervision of Pupils on School Premises. 
'Premises of the school' include, of course, 
all building areas in addition to classrooms, 
and the outside play or other ar6as used by 
pupils for recess or assembly prior to entering 
school. 
1 . Pupils shall at no time be in a classroom, 
1 Port aux Port Roman Catholic School Board has an identical 
regulation. 
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laboratory, gymnasium etc. without a teacher. 
2. \Yhen pupils are moving ••• adequate super-
vision should be provided at strategic points, 
e.g. stairways, which can be extremely danger-
ous ~or young children moving in groups. 
3. During recess, at least one teacher per 
reasonable play area should supervise the 
activity o~ the children. 
4. The Adequacy o~ Supervision 
A care£ul examination o~ the regulations quoted will 
show that some are concerned with the sa:rety aspect o£ 
supervision, which is the common law duty o£ care, others 
are more concerned with the disciplinary aspect o~ super-
vision. In an important and illuminating case, the 
Supreme Court o~ Alberta made a distinction between these 
aspects. This case also supports the contention propounded 
by the writer in the previous section that when statutory 
duties are related to discipline they do not impose a 
supervisory duty on teachers. 1 
Brost v. Tilley School District (Alberta) (1955): 2 
A six-year old girl, who was being pushed on a 
swing during recess, ~ell o£~ and \-ras injured. 
The teacher on supervisory duty was not present. 
On appeal, it was held that the Board o~ Trustees 
and the Principal were liable. The teacher was 
held not liable. The court ~ound that the Trustees 
and the Principal had ~ailed to exercise the degree 
or care that the law required o£ the m to sa£eguard 
the small pupils. The accident was £oreseeable, but 
1 Supra, p • 11 8 • 
2 15 W.W.R. 241. See also supra, pp.6S and 98. 
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the teacher had not been instructed to supervise 
the use o~ the swings, nor placed under a 
responsibility to direct the pupils with regard 
to their use. The duty to provide the supervision 
rested on the Principal and the School Board. Such. 
supervision must be on a planned, organised basis. 
The local handbook o~ the School Board was more 
concerned with supervision ~or discipline r .ather 
than with supervision ror sarety.1 The Board and 
the Principal were round liable ~or damages or 
$1,000 and $160.25 respectively. 
This case emphasises the onus that is placed on 
school principals. They must delegate supervisory duties 
on a planned, organised basis 1-1i th instructions to watch 
ror potential danger areas around the school. The teacher 
must know what he has to do when he is on supervisory 
duty. One criterion or 'adequate' supervision, therefore, 
seems to be that the duties must be speci~ied. A supervisory 
schedule which ·merely lists names and times will be 
inadequate. Instructions to 'keep the students orderly 
and quiet' and to 'stop t~em damaging the school' will be 
inadequate. Princi~~, accordingly, are advised to 
construct written instructions, detailing the duties to be 
-
perrormed by teachers when on supervision. The Roman 
Catholic School Board ror St. Jorill 1 s, under its regulation 
3.04 "Supervision or Pupils on School Premise s !' states: "It 
is assumed that ••• most principals have established a 
1 u d l. . . n er 1n1ng m1ne. 
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schedule to ensure adequate supervision or pupils and that 
all starr members are rully aware or their particular 
responsibilities in this regard." 
An assumption made at the beginning of this section 
was that ir a teacher has not been appointed to supervise 
or ir he does not know what his supervisory duty is, he 
cannot be held liable for a breach of the duty. A failure 
to advise teachers thus will make principals liable for 
any injuries sufrered, as was the case in Brost v. Tillev 
School -District. School boards will also be liable under 
the principle of respondeat superior. The onus on the 
school boar~ therefore, is to see that supervision is 
provided; the onus on the principal is to arrange the 
super,rision; the onus on the teacher is to car~ry out the 
supervision. Once the teacher knows the scope or his 
supervisory role, he must perrorm it 'as a reasonable and 
prudent parent', taking care to avoid accidents that he 
knows or ought to know might _occur. 
The second criterion or the adequacy of supervision 
seems to be the ratio of teachers to students. 
Higgs and Higss v. J.C.Hunt and Toronto Board or 
Education (Ontario) ( 1 960): 1 
During recess a fifteen-year old student was 
picked up by another and dropp·ed on ice. Four 
1 s.c.R. 174. 
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teachers were on duty, but they did not see 
the accident. When a teacher went to the boy 
he rerused help. He was ordered into line and 
re-entered the school, although he was limping. 
It was later discovered that he had a displaced 
hip-bone. The trial judge round that (a) there 
was an insur~icient number or teachers on duty 
ror the wintry conditions and the number fuid 
ages or the students, and (b) the negligence 
had aggravated the injury. The Ontario Court 
or Appeal concurred and awarded $10,000 damages 
to the boy and $510 to his mother. 
The Supreme Court or Canada reversed rinding (a), 
but con£irmed ~inding (b). The court stated that 
the weather was not unusual and continued, " ••• 
it is not the duty or school authorities to keep 
pupils under supervision every moment while they 
are in attendance at school." As the Public 
Schools Act, section 108(g) imposed a duty on 
every teacher 'to give assiduous attention to 
the health and comrort or the pupils', making 
the boy walk in line did not constitute 'assiduous 
attention', which was a statutory duty, despite 
his rerusal or aid. The award or damages was 
thererore unchanged. Mr. Justice Ritchie 
commented on the dirriculty or determining the 
duty of" care: 
The duty or supervision which a school 
authority owes to its pupils while they 
are at play must or necessity vary f"rom 
school to school and even rrom day to 
day, and it is, thererore, not possible 
to elicit rrom the decided cases any 
guiding principle ror the exact measure-
ment of" the degree or care to which any 
particular set or circumstances may 
give rise. 
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Although it is not possible to determine an exact 
measurement o~ the degree or care which must be provided, 
the courts ask whether supervision could reasonably be 
expected, and whether the supervision was su~~iciently 
reasonable to prevent foreseeable hazards. The Supreme 
Court or Canada in The Hig~s Case1 ~ound that the weather· 
was not unusual and, thererore, rour teachers were 
adequate. This ruling suggests that ir the weather had 
been unusual more teachers might have been needed as the 
chance or injury could have been greater. In a small 
school with ~ew students and with a compact playground 
area, one teacher might be adequate. In a large school, 
however, with many students, with much. floor space and 
with a large playground area, one teacher would not be 
adequate. Also, the younger _the students, the greater the 
need ror supervision. A possible guideline would be that 
all the areas or the school should be overviewed at 
regular intervals. In a large school, during a fifteen 
minute recess, one teacher could hardly patrol the whole 
building and the adjoining grounds. The adequacy or the 
ratio or teachers to students, therefore, must be relative 
to the size of the school, the number or the students and 
the age or the students. Too much supervision is better 
than too little, as too little could be interpreted as no 
supervision. 
1 Suura, p.124. 
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It is also necessary to bear in mind the high duty 
or care owed to contractees. In Beaumont v. Surrey County 
Council (1968) 1 it was held that two teachers assisted by 
twelve student prerects were inadequate ror nine hundred 
students. Although senior students have been held to be 
adequate ror the supervision or some activities. 2 the 
duty owed generally seems to suggest that the adequacy 
or the supervision will depend upon the number or respon-
sible adults on duty. Grice summarised the position as 
rollows: 
The principle in loco parentis is not 
taken to imply that school personnel 
are required to guarantee that no child 
under its care and supervision at school 
will be injured. It does mean that the 
natural parent may legally assume that 
during the time the child is absent rrom 
home under the state's compulsory school 
attendance statute he is in a sare place, 
that his interests and welrare are watched 
over by responsible adults, and that he 
will be returned sarely home when his 
educational pur~uits ror the day have 
been completed.j 
Many cases already cited illustrate that the courts 
will not hold school personnel responsible ror all 
accidents. Liability depends on whether supervision or 
better supervision could have ·prevented the accident, 
1 Supra, p.78. 
2 Butterworth et al. v. Collegiate Institute Board or 
Ottawa (1940), supra.p.71; Jacques v. Ox~ordshire County 
Council (1968), inrra, p.167. 
3 W.A.Grice, "Legal Bases for Decision Making Relative to 
Professional School Personnel" (unpublished Doctoral 
Dissertation, McNeese State University, Louisiana, 1974), 
pp. 103-104. 
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whether the danger was ~oreseeable, and, under the higher 
duty o~ care, whether the student had the right to expect 
not to be injured in the circumstances which caused the 
injury. Supervision, there~ore, does not have to be 
continuous to be adequate. 
Ricketts v. Erith Boroug~ Council (U.K.) (1943): 1 
A six-year old pupil went through the school gate 
to a shop where he purchased a bow and arrow. On 
his return, he shot the arrow in the playground 
and hit the plaintiff in the eye. A teacher 
would from time to time go into the playground 
to see that all was well. It was held that it 
was not incumbent on the Council to have a 
teacher continuously present. The supervision 
was adequate. 
5. Supervision Be~ore and A~ter School 
The statutes state the times t~at teachers have to 
be present in school. In Newfoundland, as has been shown, 2 
supervision has to be provided_ ~ifteen ~inutes before 
school opens and continue until the last bus or vehicle 
has arrived at the end or each session. The by-laws of 
school boards can extend these times; some h ave clauses 
t~at enable the school doors to be opened earlier than 
that stated by statute. Article 9 or Cape Freels Integrated 
School Board By-Laws reads: 
1 2 A.E.R. 629. 
2 Supra, p.112. 
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The doors or the school shall be open 
at least rirteen minutes berore classes 
begin at all times and, in cases or 
inclement weather, a teacher in each 
school building may decide to open 
them earlier in order to provide 
shelter ror those who arrive early. 
Pupils rrom out or town who arrive by 
bus shall be admitted upon arrival. 
The courts have held that school personnel will not 
normally be liable ror accidents that occur outside school 
hours. School hours are those during which supervision 
has to be provided, either as a result or a statutory 
obligation or as a result or a local regulation. When 
local regulations are enrorced,which extend the hours 
beyond those stated in the statutes, teachers charged 
wit~ negligence will not be able to claim that they 
are only responsible ror the times stated in the statute&. 
Educators in the Cape Freels District, thererore, will be 
liable ror the sarety or all bus students rrom the moment 
they arrive at the school, and any teacher who opens the 
~chool doors early because or inclement weather will like-
wise be responsible ror the sarety or the students. It 
could be argued that, ir a teacher opens the doors early, 
he is perrorming a voluntary activity and is, thererore, 
under no legal duty. But, the assumption or a discretionary 
power carries with it the same obligation as that or a 
mandatory duty. 1 
1 Supra, pp.52-53. 
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If a teacher arrives late for school when he should 
be on supervisory duty, he will not only be liable for 
any injury that might be suffered as a result of his 
negligence, but also will be in breach of his contractual 
obligation.1 The duty to supervise students during 
the regulatory times before classes actually begin is 
especially important for teachers in one and two-roomed 
schools. In larger schools, a teacher who arrives late can 
be replaced; in the smaller schools the teacher is 
irreplaceable. 
If an accident occurs outside the hours within 
which the duty to supervise is stated, school personnel 
will usually escape liability. 
Scoffield v. Public School Board of North York (On~.): 2 
A student was injured while tobogganing on school 
property at 8.45 a.m. The Ontario court held that 
the school board was not liable as the student 
had failed to show that the slide was dangerous 
in itself, and the teachers had no responsibility 
of supervision at 8.45 a.m. 
Students injured on school grounds berore and after 
school hours are considered to have the legal status of 
licensees, if their presence on the grounds is tolerated.) 
The duty owed to such persons is not as high as tl1at owed 
1 The contractual status of teachers was illustr ated in 
the Winnipeg Teachers' Case, supra, p.119. 
2 (1942) O.W.N. 458. 
3 For a more detailed explanation of licensees see infra, 
pp.156-157. 
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to contractees. In Britain, prior to the Occupiers' Liability 
Act 1958, the duty wa~ merely to warn them of dangers . 
--------
known, as compared to the duty to invitees, which called 
for protection from dangers which were known or ought to 
have been known. Foreseeability, therefore, was not a 
criterion or the duty owed to licensees. Since 1958, the 
duty owed to licensees is similar to that owed to invitees. 
A 1920 case illustrates the duty that was owed to licensees 
when foreseeability was not a criterion. 
Edmondson v. Moose Jaw School Trustees (Sask.) (1920): 1 
A~ter school hours an eight year-old boy, who 
was blind in one eye, was hit by a raulty cross-
bar, while watching his brother practicing high 
jump. He ·lost the sight o~ his good eye in the 
accident. The trial court found the school board 
liable, and awarded damages of $7,200. On appeal~ 
it was held that the boy was a licensee, not an 
invitee, as the injury occurred after school 
hours. The duty was to warn him of known 
dangers. The ract that the crossbar would hit 
him in the eye was not known. The award of the 
trial court was quashed. 
It is not always easy to prove that a danger ought to 
be recognised, as was shown in Ward v. Hertfordshire 
County Council (U.K.) (1970): 2 
Children were unsupervised before school opened 
until 8.55 a.m. The playground had a flint wall. 
1 3 W.W.R. 979; 55 D.L.R. 563 (C. of A.) 
2 1 All E.R. 535. 
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~~ile running to the wall, a child cut 
his head. It was held by the British 
Court of Appeal that (1) the fact that 
accidents had previously occurred in 
play did not prove the wall to be 
dangerous, especially as no complaints 
had been made before, and (2) as the 
accident occurred in the ordinary course 
of play, the lack of supervision was 
irrelevant as it was impossible to 
supervise children so that they never 
fall down and hurt themselves. 
The duty of care owed to students during school 
hours is absolute and if principals and teachers 'bend 
the regulations' they must be prepared to accept the 
consequences. This principle was well illustrated in a 
leading British case that went, on appeal, to the House 
of Lords. 
Barnes v. Hampshire County Council (U.K.) (1969): 1 
A five-year old pupil was let out of school five 
minutes early on the last day of term. His mother 
normally met-him when school closed at 3.30 p.m. 
The child was knocked over and injured on a main 
road, 250 yards from the school gates. The mother 
arrived at 3.31 p.m. The child suffered partial 
paralysis or the left arm and foot. 
The House of Lords found the s~hool negligent, 
and awarded damages in excess of ten thousand 
pounds. In the circumstances five minutes was 
not a negligible one. Teachers were ordered not 
1 3 A.E.R. 746. 
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to release the students until 3.30 p.m. Lord 
Pearson said: 
Although a premature release would 
very seldom cause an accident, it 
roreseeably could, and in this 
case it did cause the accident to 
the plaintirr. 
In this case, foreseeability was relevant, so that, 
although the student was released from school, because 
the release was early, he still had the status of an 
invitee. This raises some pertinent questions for New-
foundland schools. It is not uncommon to release students 
early on the last day or the school term. It is not 
uncommon to release students early during inclement weather. 
When such occasions arise it would be most adviseable for 
school personnel to make every effort to inform parents 
that the students are being released, especially the 
parents who normally collect their young children. It is 
uncertain whom the courts would hold liable ir a student 
was lost under such circumstances in a violent blizzard: 
P~sumaply principals are expected to use their judgement 
to get students home before they become stranded at schools. 
But, parents have the right to expect their children not 
to be exposed to danger when they would normally be under 
the care of their teachers. S9hool boards and/or individual 
schools must develop systems of advising parents when 
schools will close early. 11any schools have such procedures, 
as is illustrated by the Handbook or Gander Collegiate. 
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This states that on stormy days announcements regarding 
closing and reopening will be made on all local radio 
stations. Such a syste~ should be adequate ir parents are 
made fully aware or the practice. 
6. Supervision Off School Premises 
The duty of care owed to students who are off school 
premises because they are being taken on a school excursion 
or because they have been allowed to leave unsupervised 
during school hours, will be different from that owed to 
students who have left the premises because the school 
session is over. 
(a) School excursions 
There is no doubt that, while on school excursions, 
students are awed the same degree of care as they should 
receive while in~the school. Any educational activity 
outside the school is considered as an extension or the 
classroom. Accordingly, the duty owed is that or a prudent 
rather. In Moddejonge et al. v. Huron County Board of 
Education et al {Ont.) {1972); it was held that the duty 
of care owed by a teacher who was supervising a swimming 
party was that or a careful and prudent father and he, 
like such a father, should have guarded against the 
foreseeable risks. 
1 Supra, p .6). 
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Some school boards have constructed speci~ic 
regulat ion s ror the sarety or students on such occasions. 
The Roman Catholic School Board ror St. John's has such 
a regulation: 
3.06 Field Trips. The obligation of the school 
towards the sa~ety and welrare or children is 
j u st as great on these trips as it is in 
regular classroom activities •.• (2) It is 
s uggested that for primary children especially 
one adult supervisor should be provided ror 
every twelve children .•• (6) •.• Where axes, 
knives and/or other similar instruments or 
tools are required for curriculum purposes, 
they are to be used by the teachers or 
responsible students. Extreme caution is 
urged. (7) A First-Aid Kit should be taken 
along. 
In New Brunswick a statutory clause reads: 
The local school arranging the extra-
curricular trip must provide supervision 
a t the minimum rate or one supervisor · 
ror every twenty students being conveyed. 1 
A school excursion takes the students outside the 
known environment or their school and classroom. They might 
c ome into contact with dangers that are completely 
unrores eeable when the excursion is planned. The duty 
owed t o them is high and, thererore, steps must be taken 
t o ensure that the supervision is adequate bearing in 
mind no t only the age, the number and the maturity or 
the students, but a lso t h e circumstances surroundin g the 
excursi on . 
1 Regula tions under the School s Act (R.S.N.B.) 1974, s e ction 
166( 3). 
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It is a common misapprehension among educators and 
parents that a signed parental note giving permission ror 
the student to take part on the excursion will excuse 
the school authorities £rom liability ror any injuries. 
Although such a practice is worthwhile, as it indicates 
care, planning and concern by the school authorities, it 
has no legal ro~dation. The basic premise is that no 
parent can sign away his child's right to legal protection. 
In Moddejonge et al. v. Huron County Board or Education 
et al. (Ont.) {1972), 1 the school personnel did not escape 
liability although the parents or all the students had 
given written permission ror the rield trip and had even 
paid a registration ree or $7.00. 
(b) During school hours 
There is strong indication that school personnel 
will be liable ror accidents that occur as a result or 
students being out or school during school hours due to 
the negligence or the school personnel. In Barnes v. 
Hampshire County Council (U.K.) (1969), 2 the injury was 
surrered orr the school premises, but it was due to the 
negligence or the teacher who allowed the student to leave 
early. 
Carmarthenshire County Council v. Lewis (U.K.) (1955):3 
A rour-year old toddler escaped rrom an inrants' 
1 Supra, p.63. 
2 Supra, p.1)2. 
3 A.C. 549 1 (House or Lords). 
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school on to the highway and caused the death . 
of' the respondent's husband~ a tr.uck driver, 
who had swerved to avoid the child and collided 
with a tree. Although Romer L.J. said in the 
Court of' Appeal that "almost superhuma..~ vision" 
would have been required to f'oresee such an 
accident, the House of' Lords f'ound the school 
authorities liable. 
This important case emphasises that the duty of' 
school authorities to care f'or students in their charge 
during school hours is extremely high. Salmond also 
points out that the case illustrates the need f'or a 
prudent schoolteacher to take precautions 'against his 
boys causing injury to persons unconnected with the 
schoo1.• 1 The child was not injured, but the school 
authorities were liable because the death of' the truck 
driver was a direct result of' their negligent supervision 
of' the child. 
Parents have a right to expect their children to 
be under the care of' the school authorities during school 
hours. Occasionally, students leave the school early at 
the request of' their parents. Occasionally, they are sent 
of'f' the premises on errands f'or teachers. \~~en the f'ormer 
occurs, it is assumed that the school authorities would 
not be liable if' an injury was suff'ered, as the parent 
had requested and knew of the early departure. In the 
1 Salmond, op.cit., p.)09. 
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latter situation, how9ver~ school personnel s~o1ld be 
cautious. The age and maturity of the stude ts must be 
considered. It is doubtful, for example, ir a prudent 
parent would send a primary student on an errand through 
heavy trarfic. Indeed, since teachers must protect students 
from potential dangers, it is recommended that~ ir a 
primary student has to leave the school during school 
hours, unaccompanied by a responsible adultb the principal 
or teacher should send, ir possible, an older student 
to accompany the younger student. 
The circumstfu~ces of the errand have also to be 
considered. It is very probable that the courts would 
treasurer of the student co~~cil to the local bfu~k to 
deposit money or to send the members o~ an economics 
class to a store to survs~ current prices would be vary 
different from sending a student to a store to buy a 
bar of chocolate for his teacher. 
(c) Outsid~ school hours 
In 1929~ Chief Justice of Appeal MacDonald, of the 
British Columbia Court of Appeal, said: 
I have been unable to rind any case~ and 
we have been re~erred to none, which would 
impose upon the school board the duty or 
prote0ting the plaintiff from injury on 
the highway after he left the school prernises. 1 
1 Patters0n v. North Vancouv~~ School Trustee3 (B C.) 
(1929) 3 D.L.R. 33 (C.A.) . 
; -
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This view was supported six years later by another 
British Columbia case. 
Ritchie v. Gale and Vancouver Board of School 
Trustees {B.C.) (1935): 1 
A fourteen-year old boy, while catching a ball~ 
walked backwards out of the school entrance 
into the street. He was injured by a car. The 
trial judge found the driver of the car and 
the school board liable. On appeal~ however, 
the British Columbia Supreme Court held that 
the school board was not liable '~ecause 
land outside or school property was beyond 
·the board's jurisdiction." 
No cases have been round that would make school 
p ersonnel liable for injuries surrered off. the school 
p remises outside of school hours. 
7. Classroom Supervision 
\men a principal schedules teachers for classroom 
i nstruction he fulfils part of his statutory duty of 
' arranging for the regular supervision of students'. 
Within the classroom setting~ the teacher has to fulfil 
t he common law duty of caring for the safety of the 
s tudents as 'a prudent and reasonable parent' • . The teacher 
h as t o protect the students from dangers that could 
r easonably b e foreseeable. If he is using equipment that 
1 1 D .L.R. )62. 
h e Y~ows is dangerou s , he mu st take even greater care. Bu t. 
if the t e acher h as done all that could re a sonably b e 
expected and has instructed. the students on he~ to conduct 
-- themselv es , the cou rts have ruled that he does not have 
to interfere with h is normal instructiona l procedure. 
Butt v. Cambridgeshire and Isle of El~ County 
Council (U.K.)(1969): 1 
The plaintiff, a child of nine y e ars or age, 
accidentally lost an eye as a result of her 
class-mate waving about in the air a pair or 
poin ed scissors with which she was supposed 
to be cutting out some paper illustrations. It 
was held that the teacher was not under a duty 
o~ care to require all work to cease in the 
class, while she gave individual attention 
to a particular child. 
Crouch v. Essex County Council (U.K.){1966): 2 
A fifteen-year old boy in a chemistry class or 
twenty-five students was struck in the face by 
a strong solution of caustic soda being squirted 
at him through a pipette by anothe r p upil. It was 
held that neither the teacher nor the school 
authorities were liable. The standard of 
discipline maintained was sufficient from ·t he 
safety point of view, e v en if it di d no t 
suc c eed in p u tting do,NTI all impe~tinence and 
high spirits. 
Although the duty or c are owed by a t e acher is tha t 
1 119 New L.Je 1118 ~ 
2 64 L.G.R ~ 240. 
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o~ a prudent and rea&enable parent, there are indications 
that the degree o~ care has to be greater ir the teacher 
claims or possesses special skill. The special skill 
demands special care. The concept applies equally to those 
outside the teaching proression. The attitudes or the 
courts are so important that they need to be examined 
in detail in two cases, both decided in 1975. 
Dewey v. Rothwell and Associates {1975): 1 
A patient_ anticipating an epileptic rit, was 
placed on a table by a nurse, who lert her ~or 
about sixty seconds, during which time the 
patient :fell or:f the table and broke her arm 
severely. It was shown that the general an4 
recommended practice was never to leave alone 
someone undergoing an epileptic :fit. The nurse 
was :found negligent and damages were assessed 
at $7,500. Cullen J., in his judgement, said: 
I think we can apply to nurses as well 
as to doctors the quotation :from the 
judgement o~ Crits and Crits v. Sylvester 
et al. {1956) S.C.R. 991, 'Every medical 
practitioner must bring to his task a 
reasonable degree of skill and knowledge 
and must exercise a reasonable degree or 
care ••• and if he holds himself out as 
a specialist, a higher degree o:f skill 
is required of him than o:f one who does 
not possess to be so qualiried by 
special training or ability.' The test 
laid down by The Supreme Court or 
Canada as quoted by Riley J. in 
Challand v. Bell (1959) 18 D.L.R. (2d) 
1S4. is as :follows: (1) The surgeon 
undertakes that he possesses the skill, 
knowledge and judgement of the average. 
(2) In judging the average, regard must 
1 49 D.L.R. (3d) 82. 
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be had to the special group to whic h 
he belongs ••• (3) Ir the decision 
was the result or exercising that 
average standard, there is no 
liability for an error of judgement. 
This case raises some valid questions for teachers. 
(1) Is the duty or care demanded of physical education 
teachers, industrial arts teachers, science teachers, 
home economic teachers, teachers in special schools, and 
others with special training, greater than that demanded 
of academic classroom teachers? Or, (2) do all teachers 
possess special knowledge? (3) What is the average standard 
of care exercised by each special group? (4) Are our 
teachers up to 'the average'? {5) If the standards of 
care are not up to'the average', can teachers claim error 
or judgement as a defence? If a case is taken to court, 
questions (3) and (4) are often answered by calling expert 
witnesses, as was done in Thornton v. Board of School 
Trustees of School District #57 (St.George) and David 
Edamura (B.C.) (1975). 1 This case dealt extensively with 
question (1). 
Edamura, the p hysical education instructor, 
offered his class of fifteen-year olds the 
choice of floor hockey, weight-lifting or 
gymnastics. Gary Thornton and six others 
chose gymnastics. The floor hockey group 
used the gymnasium floor, the weight-
lifters and the gymnasts used the stage. 
1 Sup r a, p.5. 
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Edamura sat at a desk on the stage angled 
in such a way that he could see the floor 
hockey and, by looking right and slightly 
over his right shoulder behind him, he 
could see the gymnasts. He busied himselr 
filling out students' reports. The gymnasts, 
finding the space on the stage inadequate 
ror their run up to vault a box horse, with 
Edamura's approval, moved the box horse to 
jump orr it on to the spring board so as 
to do somersaults on to foam chunks. The 
court found the foam chunks inadequate and 
the exercise ' . . . more in the nature or a 
circus stunt.' One boy, attempting a double 
somersault, hurt his wrist. Edamura examined 
it and sent him to put it under a cold tap. 
It was later discovered that he had broken 
his wrist. The judge said, "Accordingly, in 
my opinion, the 'configuration' should have 
been recognised by any reasonable physical 
education teacher as one .fraught with danger." 
Edamura provided some extra matting around the 
.foam chunks and returned to his desk. Within 
minutes Gary Thornton jumped, landed completely 
o.ff the foam mats, broke his neck, and is now 
a complete quadriplegic. No 'spotters' were 
provided to catch the gymnasts. The judge said: 
The specific duty or a person, such 
as Edamura, with his training, skills 
and knowledge, can be .found in 28 
Halsbury 3d Ed. p.19, '17 ••• the 
practice of a profession, art or 
calling which, rrom its nature, 
demands some special skill, ability, 
or e xperience carries with it a 
duty to exercise, to a reasonable 
extent, the amount o£ skill, ability 
and experience which it demands.' 
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He continued by quoting· Lord Wright M.R. in 
Wray v. Essex County Council (1936) 3 All E.R. 
97~ who said: 
But in every_ case (where) ••• there 
has been a breach or duty. it is 
necessary to consider whether there 
is something which the schoolmaster 
ought to have anticipated, something 
reasonably foreseeable and something, 
therefore, which, because it is 
foreseeable~ the master ought to 
have guarded against. 
Edamura, after the first boy's injury, ought 
to have anticipated the danger. The learned 
judge found both Edamura and the school board, 
as his employer, negligent. The case against 
the principal was dismissed. The judge said, 
"Gary is, in essence, just a living head, 
attached to a metabolic machine that provides 
nutrition for his head.'' In assessing damages, 
he held that the plaintirf should be 'put 
back into the position in terms of finance 
and health that he would have been had he 
not been so injured'. He assessed damages 
at $1,534,058.93!(This case is being appealed 
to The Supreme Court of Canada.) 
This case illustrates that teachers, who possess 
some special training or skill~ must exercise the care 
1 The damages were assessed as follows: 
1. Special damages for expenses to date 
2. Cost of future basic needs - 49 years 
li:fe expectancy 
). Loss of earning potential @ $850 per 
mens em 
4. Compensation of pain and loss of 








for which their training has prepared the~ if they use 
their ability to place students in a position which 
teachers,without the special training, would be unable to 
sa:fely control. 
Since the duty of care expounded in Donoghue v. 
Stevenson (1932) 1 is to protect students from injuries 
that are known or ought to be known, principals and 
teachers must be pragmatic and ask themselves such 
questions as, "\mat could be the result of my leaving 
the classroom?" "What could be the result of" my giving 
out scissors to this class?n "\fuat could be the result 
of my allowing these students into the laboratory on 
their own?" "What could be the result of my allowing 
the girls to cook the hamburgers today?" "What could 
be the result of my allowing these students to continue 
on the trampoline on their own while I have a cup of" 
co.ffee?rr And finally, teachers must ask themselves the 
question, "Is the duty o.f care expected of me greater 
than the normal because of" my special skill or training 
and the type of activity in which my students engage?" 
III. SCHOOL PREMISES, FACILITIES AND EQUIPrillNT 
The statutes usually provide an absolute duty on 
school authorities to maintain and keep in a state of 
repair school premises, f"acilities and equipment. In 
1 Supra, p .59. 
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British Columbia, each school board is responsible •ror 
the custody or all school property ••• and to provide ror 
its sare-keeping 1 • 1 In New Brunswick, each school board 
'shall arrange ror adequate maintenance or buildings and 
equipment', 2 and it is the duty or each teacher 'subject 
to the arrangements or the school board, to see that the 
school is kept in proper order with respect to cleanliness, 
neatness, heating and ventilation'.3 In Ontario, each 
principal 'shall inspect the school premises regularly 
and report promptly to the secretary or the board ••• any 
repairs required'.4 In addition, it is the duty or a 
principal: 
••• to give assiduous attention to the 
health and comrort or the pupils, to the 
cleanliness, temperature and ventilation 
or the schoolhouse, to the care or all 
maps, apparatus and other school 
property, to the preservation or shade 
trees and the orderly arrangement and 
neat appearance or the playgrounds.~ 
The Education Act in Britain states: 
••• it shall be the duty or a local 
education authority to secure that the 
premises or every school maintained by 
them conrorm to the standards prescribed 
ror schools or the gescription to which 
the school belongs. 
1 R.S.B.C. 1960, section 177(g). 
2 R.S.N.B. 1974, section 18{4). 
3 Ibid., section 29{j). 
4 R.s.o. 1970, section 14 (2)(b)(i). 
5 Ibid., section 21 (2)(i). 
6 1944, section 10(2). 
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The Newro~Ddland legislation places a similar duty 
on school boards, principals and teachers. The Schools 
Act (R.S.N.} 1970, states: 
Section 12 ••• every School Board shall 
(a) provide, rurnish and keep in good 
order and condition schools designed 
ror the teaching or elementary and 
secondary grades, ••• (k) insure and 
keep insured all its buildings and 
equipment, ••. (n) provide £ire 
escapes £or all school buildings 
satisractory to and in accordance 
with all provisions o~ law, provincial, 
municipal or otherwise applicable 
thereunto. 
Section 80 (2) Every principal in a school 
shall ••• (c) report in writing to his 
School Board the need o£ apparatus, 
materials, repair and ruel. 
Section 81 Every teacher in a school shall 
••• (e) see that the premises and other 
property or the school are, as rar as 
possible, preserved rrom damage and 
injury. 
It is clear r.rom the examples cited that school 
authorities are responsible ror ensuring the safety or the 
premises or their schools and anything provided in the 
schools ror the education or students. The personnel in 
the schools are responsible £or reporting to the school 
authorities the need ror repairs. Occasionally, school 
boards emphasise this duty in their regulations. The Roman 
Catholic School Board ror St. John's has the rollowing 
regulation: 
The principal and janitor should make 
rrequent inspections of the school to 
determine the relative sarety or the 
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building •.. And potential hazardous 
conditions should be reported in writing 
to the Board. 
Some school boards in Newfoundland place the respons-
ibility for maintenance on local school committees. 1 When 
such a provision exists~ principals and teachers should 
not assume that their responsibilities in this area cease. 
Their duties~ stated in The Schools Act, are absolute 
- -
and cannot be avoided. 
The common law stresses that the condition or 
anything made available for the use of others must be 
reasonably safe. This general duty is expressed in 
Shripton v. Hertfordshire County Council (U.K.) (1911 ). 2 
The judgement of the House of Lords read as follows: 
A person who provides anything for the 
use of another is bound to provide a 
thing reasonably safe for the purpose 
for which it .is intended~ even though 
the person using it uses it only by the 
permission or consent of the person 
providing it and has no legal claim to 
the use or it. 
It has already been shown that school authorities 
have been round liable ror injuries caused by faulty 
swings~3 by thin glass in a swing door,4 by ice on a 
1 As illustrated by Burin Peninsula Integrated School 
Board~ By-Law 11(a). 
2 1 04 L • T • 1 45 · 
3 Lamarche et al. v . Board or Trustees ror L'Orignal, supra,p .76. 
4 Reffell v. Surrey County Council (1964), supra, p.68. 
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school step,1 and by the lack or bannisters on a stair-
case.2 On these occasions the school authorities had a 
statutory duty to provide sare facilities and equipment 
and were also liable for a breach or their common law 
duty to ensure that the facilities and equipment were 
reasonably sare for the purpose ror which they were 
intended. For similar reasons a raulty teeter-totter 
led to the liability of a school board in Alberta. 
Schultz v. Grasswold School Trustees (Alta.) (1930):3 
A child was injured playing on a teeter-
totter in the school playground. The 
school board had a statutory duty to 
keep all school property in order. It 
was held that the injury was due to 
the disrepair of the teeter-totter, 
coupled with its raulty construction. 
The school board, being negligent, was 
liable in damages. 
The learned judge pointed out in Lamarche et al. v. 
Board of Trustees of the Roman Catholic Separate Schools 
for the Village or L'Orignal (1956),4 that schoolchildren 
should not be exposed to unnecessary danger in tbe school, 
or while playing in the playground. The following case 
1 Woodward v. 11ayor of' Hastings ( 1 944), supra, p. 90. 
2 Sweet v. Drummondville School Trustees (1947), supra, p.83. 
3 3 D.L.R. 600. 
4 Supra,p.76. 
illustrates the extent to which school authorities 
have to go to keep school premises sare. 
Pook v. Ernesttown School Trustees (Ont.) {1944):1 
A rourteen-year old student injured his 
leg in the playground during a recreation 
period. The ground had been littered with 
stones and brickbats ror some time. Under 
sections 89 and 103 or the Public School 
Act, the school authorities were under 
a duty to keep the school property in 
repair and to give assiduous attention 
to the health and comrort or the pupils. 
It was held that the defendants were 
negligent in this duty which was a 
direct cause or the injury. The student 
was lawfully and properly playing in 
the schoolground. 
The duty to protect students rrom injury in the 
playground poses a real problem in Newfoundland. Very 
few schools have paved playgrounds and such inanimate 
objects as stones are commonplace in most . No principsl 
could be expected to arrange for his teachers and pupils 
to regularly pick up all the stones and gravel. They 
are not in a position to change the natural str ucture 
of Newfoundland playgrounds. Beasonable care, however, 
can ensure that no foreign objec·ts, such as broken 
bottles and rusty drink cans, are allowed to remain on 
the premises. 
1 4 D.L.R. 268. 
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Many injuries are caused in schools by contact with 
glass. The important case o:f Lyes v. Niddlesex County 
Council (U.K.) (1962) 1 illustrates the high duty o:f care 
that is owed: 
The plainti:f:f injured his hand when it went 
through the glass pane of' a swing door. It 
was shown that there was a statutory duty 
to 'secure that the premises of' every 
school ••• con:form to the . standards 
prescribed'. It was stated that the common 
law duty o:f a schoolmaster to his pupils 
is that or a prudent parent" bound to take 
notice of boys and their tendency to do 
mischievous acts, not in the context of' 
the home, but in the circumstances o:f 
school li:fe, and extends not only to how 
the pupils conduct themselves, but also 
to the state and condition o:f the school 
premises. The glass was one-eighth o:f an 
inch thick. For a school~ this was 
dangerously thin. }~. Justice Edmund 
Davies said, "The bigger the pane; the 
greater the need .f'or tough glass." The 
school authorities were :found liable. 
When students are handling equipment or other 
objects, "the greater the danger, the higher is the 
standard of' the diligence which the law enacts."2 The 
amount o:f care owed to the students depends, to a great 
1 61 L.G.R. 443 (Q.B.D.). 
2 Sullivan v. Creed (1904) I.R. 317, per Gibson, J. 
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extent, on whether the object they are handling is 
inherently dangerous or potentially dangerous. The 
di~:ference between these categories was defined by Lord 
Wright M.R. in Wray v. Essex County Council (U.K.) (1936): 1 
A teacher sent a thirteen-year old student 
to the handicraft room with an oil-can 
with a six-inch spout. In the corridor, 
t\1-rel ve-year old \Vray 1 who was 'trotting' 
ahead or his classmates going :from one 
classroom to another, collided with the 
thirteen-year old and the spout or the 
oil-can hit him in the eye. The Court o:f 
Appeal held that the teacher was not 
negligent :for not telling the boy how 
to carry the oil-can, as no reasonable 
man could :foresee such an accident. 
Also, the oil-can was not an inherently 
dangerous thing. Lord Wright said: 
1,fuen you are dealing \vi th a 
dangerous thing you are dealing 
with something which, i:f le:ft, 
may at any moment and under 
modern circumstances cause 
damage .•• Things like a naked 
swo~d or a hatchet or a loaded 
gun or an explosive are clearly 
inherently dangerous - that is 
to say, they cannot be handled 
without a serious risk. On the 
other hand, you have things in 
ordinary use which are only 
wh at is called 'potentially 
dangerous'; that is to say, i:f 
there is negligence or i:f there 
is some mischance or misadventure 
then the thing may be a source 
or danger; but that source o:f 
danger is something which is not 
1 3 All E.R. 97, (C. o:f A.). 
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essential to their ordinary 
character; it merely depends on 
the concurrence or certain 
circumstances - in particular, 
generally, negligence on the 
part o£ someone. I £eel, I am 
bound to say with no doubt at 
all, that this oil-can does not 
come within the category o£ 
inherently dangerous articles. 
Since the oil-can was judged to be outside the 
category or inherently dangerous articles, the teacher 
only had to show that he was not negligent in allowing 
the student to carry it. In Beaumont v. Surrey County 
Council (1968),1 the elastic orr the trampoline could 
not be classed as inherently dangerous, but the school 
authorities were round liable because they, by their 
negligence, allowed it to be used in a dangerous manner 
resulting in an accident which could be £oreseeable. 
Machines in workshops are inherently dangerous 
objects and strict precautions must · be taken to ensure 
that sa£ety regulations are enrorced and that students 
are instructed care£ully in their use. 
Butt v. Inner London Education Authority {U.K.) (1968):2 
A seventeen-year old student injured his 
ringers in a machine at a School o£ Arts 
and Crarts. There was no guard on the 
machine as in £actories. The Court o£ 
Appeal held that the Education Authority 
1 Supra, p.78. 
2 66 L.G.R. 379. 
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had a duty to provide ror the sarety 
or the pupils even though a college or 
rurther education is not a factory and 
does not come under the provisions or 
the Factories Act. 
What things are dangerous, however, is a question 
or degree, depending on the nature or the thing and the 
age or the pupils. Mr. Justice Cave, in Williams v. 
Eady (1893)] said, nTo leave a knire about where a child 
or four could get at it would amount to negligence, but 
it would not ir boys o£ eighteen had access to it." In 
this case, it was found to be dangerous to leave phosphorus 
lying about in a laboratory. In another case, it was held 
that it was not dangerous ror children in a primary class 
to · be playing with toy soldiers. 2 The courts have found 
school authorities negligent, however, when they allowed 
young children to play with rireworks without supervision.3 
Charlesworth summarised the position as follows: 
It would seem that the teat is: Is 
the thing one of a class which 
children of that age are, in the 
ordinary course o£ things, not 
allowed to use without supervision?4 
A recent Canadian decision suggests that if the 
students have some special characteristics higher care 
1 Supra, p.56. 
2 Chilvers v. London County Council (1916) 32 T.L.R. 363. 
3 King v. Ford (1816) 1 Stark N.P. 421. 
4 Charlesworth, op.cit., p. 301. 
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s r..ould be taken. 
Dziwenka et al. v. The Queen and Mapplebeck (AltaJ(1972): 1 
An eighteen-year old deaf mute in the Alberta 
School ~or the Deaf injured his hand when using 
a power saw. The teacher was competent and had 
shown the student how to use the saw. At the 
time of the accident~ the teacher was helping 
another group, but keeping a general eye on 
the remainder of the class. Although the 
student was held to have contributed to his 
injury by his own negligence, the teacher 
and the Crown were found liable for $10~716. 
The Appellate Division of Alberta reversed 
this decision, but The Supreme Court of 
Canada upheld the ruling of the trial judge. · 
This decision might appear hard and in complete contradiction 
to the principle expounded in Butt v. Cambridgeshire and 
Isle of Ely County Council (U.K.) (1969)~ 2 but it does 
further support the theory that a higher duty of care is 
owed to pupils than that expounded in Donoghue v. Stevenson.3 
Students, being obligatees, have a right to be protected 
and not to expect to be injured. Critics of The Dziwenka 
Case would be justified, however, in asking how, in view 
of the finding of" the court, any teacher, un.der similar 
circumstances, could, in the future, ever expect to 
supervise more than one machine at a time'? 
1 W.W.R. (Vol.1) 350. 
2 Supra, p .140. 
3 Supra, p .59. 
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School authorities have a duty to see that school 
premises, racilities and equipment are sare ror the purpose 
ror which they are intended. The duty they owe to people 
using the premises and equipment, however, varies, 
depending upon the legal status or the user. The duty 
expounded in this section so rar has been that owed to 
students lawrully on the premises. A similar duty is owed 
to employees or school boards. Principals, teachers, 
other proressional starr, non-proressional starr and other 
employees lawrully on the premises have a right to be 
protected rrom injury, and, subject to any contributory 
negligence on their part, they can recover compensation 
for any injury caused by the derective state or the 
school premises or equipment, even ir they knew or the 
defect. In 1920, a teacher was held entitled to recover 
damages ror injuries he surrered when a derective heating 
pipe exploded. The school authorities knew or the derect 
and were in breach or their statutory duty. 1 
Arter they have been dismissed rrom school, students 
do not enjoy the status or obligatees, and the duty owed 
to them depends upon whether they are classed as licensees 
or trespassers. 
A simple derinition 
someone who visits premises ror social, as compared ~ith 
1 Abbott v. Isham (1920) 90 L.J.K.B. 309. 
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business, reasons. His presence is or no advantage to the 
occupier, but it is tolerated by him. So in Edmondson v. 
Moose Jaw School Trustees (1920), 1 t:he Saskatchewan 
Court or Appeal classed a student, who was injured 
arter school while watching his brother practicing high 
jump, as a licensee. He was there ror his own pleasure, 
not as part or his educational activity, and his presence 
was tolerated by the supervisors. Today the duty owed to 
licensees is that expounded in Donoghue v. Stevenson. 2 
They must be protected from dangers that are known or 
reasonably foreseeable. 
A trespasser is someone who visits premises against 
-
the express wishes of the occupier. A very slight duty or 
-
care is owed to trespassers generally. Occupiers or 
premises, however, must not set deliberate, dangerous 
traps, and they have a duty to give warning or any 
dangers on their land which they know might injure 
trespassers. 
Robert Addie & Sons v. Dumbreck (U.K.) (1929):3 
Colliery officers warned children before 
setting in motion an endless wire cable. 
They had repeatedly warned children not 
to trespass on the land, but to no avail. 
One or the children was killed when being 
drawn into the haulage machinery. The House 
1 Supra, p • 1 31 • 
2 Supra, p.59. 
3 A.C. 358. 
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or Lords held that the derendants were 
not liable as they had rulrilled their 
duty to give 'adequate warning'. 
Storms v. Winnipeg School District No.1 (Man.)(1964): 1 
During school holidays, a young boy was 
playing on school grounds with the tacit 
permission or the school authorities. He 
had been expressly rorbidden, however, 
to play on a fire escape. He was injured 
on the rire escape. The Manitoba Court 
or Appeal held that he was a trespasser 
on the rire escape and he could not 
recover damages. 
~1en, however, an occupier habitually and knowingly 
allows children to trespass on his property, they assume 
the status or licensees and are owed the duty of care 
normally granted to such persons. 
Lynch et al. v. Brewers' Warehousing Co.,Ltd. (1974): 2 
A young girl was injured whil·e playing on 
premises she was occasionally ordered to 
leave. As the occupier knew she regularly 
played there, it was held that he owed her 
the duty or care or a licensee. He had a 
duty to act with reasonable care to avoid 
injury to children. Killeen, Co.Ct.J., 
quoted Lord Denning M.R. as rollows: 
The true principle is this: In 
the ordinary way the duty to use 
reasonable care extends to all 
persons lawfully on the land, but 
1 41 D.L.R. (2d) 216. 
2 44 D.L.R. 677. 
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it does not extend to trespassers, 
.:for the simple reason that he cannot 
ordinarily be expected to foresee the 
presence of a trespasser. But the 
circumstances may be such that he 
ought to foresee even the presence of 
a trespasser; and then the duty of 
care extends to the trespasser also. 
It is virtually impossible, and would probably be 
undiplomatic, to keep students off school grounds after 
school hours and during school holidays. As their ·presence 
is tolerated, school authorities have a duty to see that 
the grounds are :free of' dangerous hazards and to Harn 
those who use the grounds of any dangers of which they 
know. 
IV. TRANSPORTATION 
Students may be transported in school buses, in 
taxis, or in private cars. These three areas will be 
examined. 
'i • School Buses 
If students are injured while travelling on school 
buses, they have a legal right to recover compensation 
for their injuries. The cases examined indicate that the 
main disputes before the courts have been to determine 
whether they should recover from their school boards or 
from the owners of the buses. This area of dispute can 
be illustrated best by distinguishing between the mand-
atory ru~d discretionary duties of school boards. 
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(a) Mandatory duties 
\1hen the statutes place a mandatory duty on school 
boards to transport students, usually those who live 
outside a certain radius of the school, there is also a 
duty to provide safe transportation - a duty that can be 
implied through the common law or stated in statute. 
~EUse mandatory duties are absolute, school boards, 
who are placed under such a duty, will not escape liability 
for inJur~es surfered by students on school transportation, 
once negligence has been established. 
Cochrane v. Elgin Consolidated School District 
( Man • ) ( 1 9 34) : 1 
The plaintiff broke his arm when the horse-
drawn van on a sleigh in which he was travel-
ling to school overturned. It was shown that 
the sleigh was old, it was too narrow and 
easily upset, and the horses were going too 
fast for the conditions of the road. The 
negligence of the owner was e ·stablished, but, 
as the statute placed a mandatory duty on the 
school board to provide transportation, the 
liability was the school board's. The owner 
was not an independent contractor. 
Because the owner was not an independent contractor, 
a master-servant relationship existed. It was shown in 
chapter IV,2 that Hhen a master-servant relationship exists, 
1 2 W. \-1. R. 409. 
2 Supra, pp.105-107. 
-161-
the servant is under a duty to perrorm his duties with 
reasonable care and, ir by a railure to exercise reasonable 
care, he is round to be negligent, he is also under a 
duty to indemniry the master ror his negligence. This 
principle was illustrated in Sleeman v. Foothills School 
Division (Alta:)(1946): 1 
A child was injured when the school bus in 
which he was travelling collided with a 
rarm truck. Both drivers were round negligent, 
and damages ror $5,539 were assessed equally 
against both drivers, the school board and 
the rarmer who owned the truck. The school 
board was round liable as it had a statutory 
duty to provide transportation. The driver 
or the bus was not, in ract, liable ror his 
act, but as he was negligent, it was held 
that the school boa~d was entitled to 
receive compensation rrom him ror any sums 
it was liable to pay. As he had proressed 
to have the skill needed ror the job, he 
should have perrormed it with reasonable 
care. 
(b) Discretionary duties 
rr the transportation or students is lert to the 
discretion or school boards, then they are under no legal 
obligation to provide transportation. Once they take up 
their option, however, they are under the same duty of care 
1 1 W • W. R • 1 45 . 
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as if the dutywere a mandatory one. This principle was 
illustrated when the facts and judgement or Shripton v. 
Hertfordshire County Council (U.K.) (1911) were cited. 1 
The judgement of Lord Loreburn, L.C., is quoted again as 
it summarises the principle well: 
I agree with the learned counsel for 
the respondents that there was no duty 
or obligation whatsoever on the county 
council to ·provide for the carriage of 
this child, but if they did agree to do 
so, and did provide a vehicle, then it 
is clear to my mind that their duty was 
also to provide a reasonably safe mode 
or conveyance. 
The Ontario case or Baldwin v. Lyons and Erin 




The school board, since it was not under 
a statutory obligation to provide trans-
portation, but had done so under its 
discretionary powers, argued that the 
bus owner was an independent contractor 
and, therefore, liable alone for the 
injuries suffered. The court, however, 
found that, because the school board 
and the principal o~ten gave instructions 
to the bus contractor and his drivers 
regarding smoking and other regulations, 
he was not an independent contractor, 
but a servant of the school board. 
Liability was placed on the school 
board and the contractor. 
Supra, p. 53. 
Supra, p .88. 
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~~en vicarious liability was examined in chapter 
IV1 it was shown that a master-servant relationship exists 
i.f the 'master' can tell the servant what to do, or if" the 
'master' can hire, pay and dismiss him. In The Baldwin 
Case, it was shown that the bus contractor received 
orders .from the · school board. A master-servant relation-
ship, therefore, existed. Such a relationship seems to 
exist in all contracts between school boards and bus 
contractors. The school boards oogage the contractors, 
they pay them and, i.f the contractor is in .breach o.f his 
contract, they can terminate the contract. Within the 
terms o.f the contract, the school boards determine the 
number o.f buses that will operate, the routes to be taken, 
the schedule to be f"ollowed and even the number of 
occasions that the buses will run in a school year. It 
is doubtful, there.fore, i.f a school board could ever 
escape liability .for an injury su.f:fered by a student due 
to the negligence of" the driver, unless the contractor or 
hia- driver was acting flagrantly outside the scope o.f 
his contract. 
School boards in New:foundland do not have a mandatory 
'<:.-. ------- -duty to provide bus transportation. Section 3 o.f The 
Schools Act (Transportation of Pupils) Regulations, 1975, 
reads: 
1 Supra~ pp. 88-89. 
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••• the Minister may from monies voted 
for the purpose of education in schools 
allocate to a school board each year 
.•. • (a) .•. ninety-five per cent of the 
cost to a school board of the transportation 
to and from a school of a pupil who resides 
more than one mile from that school 
There is in Newfoundland, accordingly, what could 
be called a double discretionary power. First, a school 
board has to decide that it wishes to provide transportation 
for pupils who live more than a mile from a school and 
then make application for funds to the Minister; secondly, 
the Minister has the discretionary power to award the funds 
or refuse them. Once the funds are awarded and the buses 
provided, the duty on the school board is to take all 
reasonable care to protect the students, as if they were 
fulfilling a mandatory duty. This is the common law 
duty, but school boards in Newfoundland also have a 
statutory duty for the mechanical safety of school buses. 
Section 12 of~ Sch~ Act (R.S.N.) 1970, states: 
Every School Board shall ••• (m) where 
arrangements are made by it for the 
transportation of pupils, ensure that 
all vehicles engaged in carrying 
children to and from schools are in 
good mechanical condition and have 
adequate liability insurance. 
The safety of the buses is further ensured by the 
statutory duty imposed on all bus owners to have their 
vehicles examined by an impartial and competent mechanic 
in April, August and December of each year. 1 
1 Section 26.2 of The Highway Traffic (~) Regulations, 
1970, as amended 1973. 
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There is no legislation to prohibit a school board 
f'r om transporting students in buses f'or which .funding 
has been rerused or rrom transporting students who live 
within one mile or the school. In such circumstances a 
similar duty of' care will be owed to the students. 
The cases examined in this section have illustrated 
the basis of' liability when vehicles have been involved 
in accidents. A duty is also owed to protect students who 
travel in school buses .from injuries resulting .from 
occurrences other than road accidents. There are o.ften 
rules which regulate the conduct or students on school 
buses~ School boards and school principals occasionally 
enf'orce their own regulations. Since a school bus is, 
.for all intents and purposes, an extension o.f the school, 
who is responsible for the supervision of' the students 
while they are on the vehicle? 
In New Brunswick, bus drivers have a statutory 
responsibility .for the supervision or students. Section 
152 of the Schools Act (R.S.N.B.) 1974, reads: 
(1) Every driver (a) shall be responsible 
for the care o.f school pupils while they 
are in a vehicle under his care; ••• (c) 
shall report to the principal any mis-
conduct ••• 
The responsibility for the loading and unloading of students, 
however, falls on the sch ool personnel. Section 154 o.f the 
Scho~ ~ (R.S.N.B.) 1974, reads: 
(1) The loading or unloading o.f a vehicle 
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at a school shall be under the personal 
supervision of the principal or a staff 
member designated by him to act on his 
behalf· ( 2) A plan for loading and un-
loading on school grounds shall be 
prepared by the principal. (3) No d~iver 
shall back a vehicle on the school grounds 
when children are present except under 
supervision of the principal or a staff 
member designated. 
No such duty is imposed by statute in New.foundland .. 
The Department o.f Education, however, has constructed a 
contract which it recommends for use by school boards 
and bus contractors. Twenty-.five of the twenty-six school 
boards who replied to a questionnaire (Appendix F) 
indicated that they use the recommended contract. Clause 
1(n) reads: 
(The contractor covenants) •.• to take 
all necessary precautions .for the sa.fety 
of' passengers entering, alighting .from 
and being transported in any bus in the 
use of' the transportation service. 
Occasionally the by-laws of school boards vest 
authority in the drivers. Article 8(d) of the By-Laws of 
Notre Dame Integrated School Board states, "The bus driver 
shall be vested with complete authority by the Board for 
supervision of' behaviour on his bus." The Humber-St.Barbe 
Roman Catholic School Board, under its regulation 'Pupil 
Behaviour on Buses', authorises the driver to report 
disciplinary problems to the principal who may take 
appropriate action. \fuen the sa.fety of the bus and its 
passengers is endangered, the driver may put older children 
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orr the bus, but !'even in such cases their sarety and 
well-being must be taken into consideration." 
Bus drivers, accordingly, seem to be responsible 
ror the supervision of students on school buses. This 
does not excuse school boards rrom responsibility, for 
since the driver is a 'servant' or the bus contractor and 
the bus contractor is a 'servant' or the school board, the 
school board can be vicariously liable ror the negligent 
acts or drivers. 
Placing the responsibility for the supervision of 
students on bus drivers, appears to the writer to be an 
unsatisractory po~ition. Their prime responsibility 
should be to drive their buses safely. They should not 
have to distract their attention rrom the road to supervise 
students on their buses. Such actions can only impede 
the efrectiveness of their prime responsibility. It would, 
however, be quite impractical ror a teacher to travel on 
each school bus. The only alternative would appear to be 
to use senior students, where possible, as prerects. 
Jacgues v. Oxfordshire County Council (U.K.) (1968): 1 
A fourteen-year old boy was hit in the eye 
by a paper or lead pellet. There were rorty-
two students on the bus under the supervision 
of two prefects. It was held that, bearing in 
mind the duty to make reasonable provision for 
1 66 L.G.R. 440. 
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the sarety of schoolchildren, and that the 
standard or care is that or a reasonably 
prudent parent applying his mind to school 
life where there is a greater risk or sky-
larking, it was not negligent to leave the 
supervision of secondary school children 
in the hands of prefects. Waller, J. said: 
~mat is the duty or the local 
authority in these circumstances? 
They owe a duty to see that the 
bus is reasonably safe and that 
includes a duty to see - that it is 
reasonably safe for the children 
who are going on the bus including 
the provision of supervision if it 
is necessary ••• So I come to the 
conclusion that ••• it was perfectly 
reasonable on the part of the local 
education _authority to leave the 
supervision or the bus to ••• 
senior children appointed as bus 
prefects. 
The prime concern or schools and school boards should 
be for the safety of students. The appointment of bus 
prefects might prevent dangerous sky-larking on school 
buses and should make the bus drivers' task easier. It 
would also indicate that school personnel had taken 
steps to arrange for the supervision of the students. 
2. Taxis 
There are occasions when students have to be sent 
home by taxi or when a taxi has to be hired to take a 
group or studenta to a school event. On such occasions, 
it would appear that the taxi ow~ers are considered as 
independent contractors and that school authorities 
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would escape liability ror any injuries caused by the 
negligence or the taxi drivers. Only one case could be 
found to illustrate this principle: 
Finbow v. Domino (Man.) (1957-8): 1 
Arrangements were made betwee~ the Association 
ror Retarded Children in Winnipeg and a taxi 
company to transport certain children to and 
from school. Finbow, an eight-year old pupil, 
with the mental age of three and a half, was 
being taken home in the taxi accompanied by 
a teacher as supervisor. The boy was allowed 
to get out of the taxi at his home and to cross 
the street himself. He was struck by a truck 
and had a leg ~~putated. It was held that the 
two drivers and the companies they worked for 
were negligent. The Association, however, was 
found not liable. It had discharged its obligation 
by selecting a licenced and competent taxi 
company; it had arranged for a teacher to 
accompany the children; it had made the taxi 
company aware of its general and special 
responsibilities; its relationship to the 
taxi company was as an independent contractor. 
It is unclear whether school authorities would escape 
liability if they used a taxi company on a regular basis 
in place of a school bus. Under~ Schools Act (Trans-
portation££ Pupils) Regulations, 1975, a school board · will 
not be subsidised by the Newfoundland government to 
provide a bus for less than twelve students. If a school 
1 23 W. W. R. 97 • \ 
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board, in such circumstances, contracted with a taxi 
company to transport a small group o~ students on a 
regular basis, would there really be any dif~erence 
between the roles of the taxi driver and a bus driver? 
Probably, the taxi driver would have to follow a schedule 
and a route. He would, in effect, lose the discretionary 
power normally associated with an independent contractor. 
The situation is unclear. It is suggested that school 
boards, in such circumstances, should seek further legal 
advice. 
3. Private Cars 
Teachers and parents are frequently called upon 
to transport students to sports and other school events. 
If the students are gratuitous passengers and do not 
-
contribute in any way towards the cost of the journey, 
the driver i-1-l.- be-.-J..i-able on -~-r injur-ies suff"ered as 
a result of his 'gross'- negligence. Gross negligence can 
be defined as negligence of an extreme kind over and above 
ordinary negligence. It results from a breach of the law, 
----::--::---=-----::::--:--:-:------
such as speeding or drunken driving. If the car, ~ while 
being driven carefully and within the speed limit, suddenly 
skidded, causing an injury, the driver would not be 
liable. Such an accident would not be foreseeable. 
If the students are fare-paying passengers, then 
the driver is in the same position as a taxi driver, and 
he will be liable for any injuries sur:rered, regardless 
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of the degree of his negligence. The students, by becoming 
fare-paying passengers, assume the legal status of 
contractees, and have the right to expect not to be 
injured. It is accidents in this latter situation that 
can cause problems. 
The conditions of the insurance policies or· most 
private cars do not allow for fare-paying passengers. If 
a student is injured while being a fare-paying passenger, 
the driver will have to meet personally any charges for 
damages made against him. He can, however, purchase an 
endorsement clause to his policy allowing him to carry 
fare-paying passengers regularly or for specific journeya. 
Unless an endorsement has been purchased, the normal 
terms of the insurance coverage will apply. There is a 
statutory exception, however. The Standard Automobile 
Policy Owners Form (1969) - Canada, under General Provisions 
Number 8, states that a vehicle will not be deemed to 
be used as a taxi or for compensation or hire when: 
(c)(v) The occasional or infrequent use 
by the insured of his automobile for the 
transportation of children to and from 
school or school activities conducted 
within the educational programme. 
If a parent or teacher, therefore, helps with the 
transporting of students once or twice a year, he will be 
able to charge the students if he so wishes. If he takes 
a fare-paying student to schoo~ in his car everyday, 
----however, he will not be covered oy his insurance policy. 
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When there is uncertainty whether the journey will ~all 
within the provisions or the statutory exception, car 
owners are advised to seek. the advice or their insurance 
companies. 
V. DEFENCES TO A CHARGE OF NEGLIGENCE 
Ir a person is sued in tort ~or negligence, there 
are certain de~ences open to him. He may be able to show 
that there was no legal duty imposed upon him, or, ir 
there was a legal duty, that he was not in breach o~ that 
duty. He may be able to show that the injured per'son 
rreely participated in the action which caused the injury, 
so that the injury was his om1 rault. He may be able to 
claim that he had statutory protection and was, thererore, 
immune rrom liability. He may be able to show that his 
own liability should be diminished since the injured 
person contributed to the accident by his own negligence. 
Each of these defences will be examined. 
1. No Legal Duty ~ 
School personnel have a legal duty towards those 
who are under their care. Students are deemed to be under 
the care or their teachers during .normal school hours 
and during school sponsored events outside of school hours. 
Educational personnel are also vicariously responsible 
ror students travelling on school buses. 
Educators, therefore, can claim that they owe no 
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legal duty to students outside o~ school hours, unless 
they are participating in school sponsored activities. It 
has been seen that no duty is owed to students on school 
premises before school opens,1 or o~f school premises,2 
unless the accident is a direct result o~ the negligence 
of a teacher.3 
Normally no duty is owed to trespassers other than 
to warn them or known dangers.4 If trespassers are 
tolerated, however, they assume the legal status o~ 
licensees and a duty of care is owed.5 
School boards will not be liable if their employees 
flagrantly or maliciously abuse their powers and act 
outside the scope of their authority.6 
Although school boards have a legal duty towards 
students on school buses, it would appear that they owe 
no duty or care towards those who travel by taxi.7 
2. No Breach of Legal Duty 
A care~ul examination of the cases cited in this 
and the preceeding chapter will show that, in the majority 
1 Scoffield v. Public School Board of North York (1942), 
supra, p.1)0. 
2 Ritchie v. Gale & Vancouver Board of School Trustees (1934), 
supra, p.139. 
3 Barnes v. ·Hampshire C.C. (1969), supra, p.132. 
4 Storms v. Winnipeg School District #1 (1963), supra,p.158. 
5 Lynch v. Brewers' Warehousing Co. (1974), supra, p.158. 
6 Beauparlant v. Board of Appleby (1955), supra, p.95. 
7 Finbow v. Domino (1957-8), supra, p.169. 
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or cases in which school personnel have escaped liability, 
the courts have been satisried that the personnel respon-
sible ror the sarety or the students have not been in 
bre.ach or their legal duty. In this de.fence it must be 
shown that the care has been exercised which the law 
requires. 
Ir school personnel can show that they have acted 
as 'reasonable and prudent parents' they may avoid liability. 
It has been shown that a reasonable parent would not 
rorbid his child to partake in a team game; 1 neither 
would a reasonable parent be able to prevent occasional 
horse-play in the playground. 2 
Portelance v. Board o.f Trustees Roman Catholic 
Separate School o.f Grantham (Ont.) (1962):3 
Two twelve-year old boys, while playing a game 
at school, ran into a dense bush area adjoining 
the grounds and were blinded by sharp thorns. 
It was held by the trial judge that the school 
board was liable as it had railed to protect 
the pupils .from the d~~ger and to supervise 
their activities. On appeal, it was held that 
the school board was not liable. The Court or 
Appeal .found that the pupils were in the same 
position as invitees. The duty to them was to 
1 Gard v. Duncan Board or School Trustees (1946), sunra,p.60. 
2 Newton v. Mayor and Corporation o.f West Ham (1963), 
supra, p.66; ·. Clarke v. Monmouthshire County 
Council (1954), supra,p.67. 
3 O.R. 365; 32 D.L.R. (2d) 337, (C. o:f A.). 
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take reasonable care to prevent damage :from 
any unusual danger which was or ought to have 
been known. Thorn bushes were not unusual ~~d 
the area was known to the boys. They had been 
instructed to stay clear of the area. The 
supervision was found to be adequate. The 
duty was to provide only as much supervision 
as a reasonable and careful parent who would 
not have prevented the boys playing in the -
area. 
If school personnel can sho•..w that their method o:f 
supervision has been ef:fective for some time, they may 
escape liability. In Higgs and Higgs v. J.C.Hunt and 
Toronto Board of Education (1960), 1 the Supreme Court 
of Canada was satisfied that :four teachers were adequate 
for playground supervision, since, inter alia, this was 
the method which had been used successfully :for many 
years. In Adams v. Board of School Commissioners :for 
Halifax (N.S.) (1951), 2 the court dismissed an action 
brought because a boy had - been hit by a stone at recess. 
The learned judge said: 
There was no duty o:f continuous super-
vision over the pupils in the school-
yard. A basis for the Board's liability 
could be found only in the negligence 
of the principal when the system of 
supervision provided by him had been 
sufficient over many years and was that 
in use in other schools. 
1 Supra, p. 72. 
2 2 D.L.R. 816. 
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Two cases that went to the British Court o~ Appeal 
~urther illustrate this principle. 
Jones v. London County Council (U.K.) (1932): 1 
A student was injured while playing a game 
in the gymnasium. It was held that when a 
game has been played without serious accident 
~or many years, it is not, by reason o~ its 
dangers, negligent to order a boy to play it. 
Wright v. Cheshire County Council (U.K.) (1952): 2 
A~ter learning to vault a 'buck' with the 
teacher as catcher, students were then 
allowed and encouraged to catch each 
other. The practice was recommended by 
the Ministry o~ Education. \Vhen a boy 
was injured, the case against the school 
authorities was dismissed. It was held that 
what is reasonable in ordinary everyday 
a~~airs may well be ans1-..rered by experience 
arising ~rom practices adopted generally 
and rollowed successrully ror many years. 
rr school personnel can show that they have adequately 
warned students o~ potential dangers ·they may be held 
to have rulrilled their duty.3 
Provided reasonable care has been taken against all 
known and ~oreseeable dangers, and provided the students 
have not been allowed to partake in inherently dangerous 
activities, the de~ence or no breach o~ a legal duty _is 
1 96 J.P. 371. 
2 2 All E.R. 789. 
3 Schade v. Winnipeg School District #1 (1959)~ supra, p.69. 
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ac c eptable. Charlesworth has written: 
It is no part of the duty or a 
schoolmaster to foresee every act 
of stupidity that might take place, 
but at the same time it is necessary 
to strike a proper balance between 
too strict a supervision or children 
at every waking moment of their 
school life and the desirable object 
or encouraging the sturdy independence 
or children whilst they grow up, which, 
arter all, is an important facet or 
their education.1 
\1hen he exonerated tha defendant ~rom blame for 
striking a fourteen-year old boy with a clod or earth 
while ragging about, Lord Goddard, in Camkin v. Bishop(1941) 
said: 2 · 
If every master is to take precautions 
to see that there is never ragging 
or horseplay among his pupils, his 
school l>Tould indeed be too awful a 
place to contemplate. 
). Voluntary Assumption of Risk 
T~maxim vol~nti ~on £i1 iniuria - harm is 
willing person - applies when the plaintiff 
was a willing participant and he knew or ought to have 
lmown of the risk involved. 
Students who partake in team sports are generally 
classed as voluntary particip~~ts in that they recognise 
that they risk injury. rr a student was compelled, however, 
1 Charlesworth, op.cit., p.195. 
2 2 All E.R. 713, at p.716. 
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to represent his school in a team sport, and he was injured 
because or the negligence or a teacher, it is doubtr~l 
if the plea or volenti ~fit iniuria would be acceptable . 
The courts have recognised that the plea can 
sometimes apply to school activities in gymnasiums. In 
Butterworth v. Collegiate Institute Board of Ottawa (1940), 1 
it was held, inter alia, that the injured pupil was sciens 
,U volens - knowing and willing - ~-rhen he injured his 
elbow while being supervised by tllo senior students. 
To successfully use this defence, educational 
personnel will usually have to show that the injured 
student was well ·aware or the danger and that he had been 
warned of the risk. 
Smerkinich v .• Newport Corporation (U.K.) (1912): 2 
A student asked permission to use a machine · 
that had no guard. 5e was told to be careful. 
His thumb had to be amputated as a result 
or the accident. Valenti ~ £i1 iniuria 
was held to apply. 
4. Irnmuni ty 
Statutory immunity can either be absolute or governed 
by limitations of actions . 
(a) Absolute immunity 
In British Columbia no action for negligence m9.y be 
1 Supra,p.71. 
2 76 J.P. 454. 
-179-
brough t against educational personnel ~or any injury 
sustained 'out o~ the operation of school patrols'. 1 
In Saskatchewan, no teacher will be liable for pers-
anal injury suffered by pupils, if the activity is 
approved or sponsored by the . school board, the principal 
or the teacher. 2 
No such immunity exists in Newfoundland. In ~act, 
section 32 of~ Schools A£i (R.S.N.) 1970, states, 
"(1) Every School Board is a corporation. (2) Any School 
Board may sue or be sued in the name o~ the School Board.n 
(b) Limitation o~ actions 
The legislation often states a time limit within 
which actions must be brought before the courts. In 
British Columbia, no action may be brought against a 
school board twelve months 'a~ter the date upon which 
a cause o~ action arises'.3 
In Newfoundland, ~Limitation of Actions (Personal) 
~Guarantees Act (R.S.N.) 1974, states in section 2: 
•.• all actions ~or penalties, damages or 
sums o~ money given to the party grieved 
by any statute now or herea~ter to be in 
~orce, s h all be commenced and sued ••• 
within two years after the caus e of such 
action ••• 
1 R.S.B.C. 1960, section 105. 
2 The School Act 1966, section 24 2. 
- -
3 R.S.B.C. 1960, section 104(1). 
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Section 4 reads: 
I.f any person who is or shall be 
entitled to any such action or suit 
is, or shall be at the time o.f any 
such cause o.f action accrued, within 
the age o.f twenty-one years ••• then 
such person may bring the same action, 
so as such person commences the same 
within such time a.fter coming to or 
being o.f full age ••• 
In New.foundland, there.fore, all actions .for damages 
must ~thin two years o.f the accident, except 
that persons under twenty-one years of age may bring the 
action within two years of attaining their majority. 
5. Contributory Negligence 
Until 1930, i.f it could be shown that the injured 
person had contributed to his injury through his own 
lack o.f reasonable care, his action .for damages would .fail. 
Since the introduction o.f contributory negligence acts, 
however, actions are not dismissed, but the damages are 
awarded in relationship to the degree o.f negligence o.f 
the various parties to the action. Contributory negligence, 
therefore, is not a de.fence as such, but it does, if 
proven, save the defendants financially. Salmond wrote, 
"Contributory negligence is not a complete bar to recovery, 
but the loss is apportioned between the parties according 
to their respective degrees of fault."1 
1 Salmond, op.cit., p.55. 
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Section 2 of The Contributory Negligence Act (Nrld.) 
1952, reads: 
~mere by the fault or two or more 
persons damage or loss is caused to 
one or more of them, the liability 
to make good the damage or loss shall 
be in proportion to the degree in 
which each person was at rault. 
\fuen an eighteen-year old deaf' mute in the Alberta 
School ror the Dear injured his hand on a power saw which 
he had been sho14n how to use, he was held to have contrib-
uted forty per cent (40%) or the negligence. 1 The award 
he received, thererore, was forty per cent less than he 
would have received had he not contributed to the accident. 
Contributory negligence is not an easy thing to 
prove. Although Phipson writes, " ••• in civil actions 
the evidential burden may be satisfied by any species or 
evidence sufficient to raise a prima f'acie case,"2 usually 
the onus is on the defendant to prove that the injured 
person had contributed to his own hurt. In The Thornton 
Case,3 it was held that it was the defendants' duty to 
show contributory negligence, but that they had failed to 
do so. 
It is especially difficult to prove the contributory 
negligence of' young children. \ihile writing on this topic, 
1 Dziwenka v. The Queen and Happlebeck (1972), supra,p.5. 
2 Phipson on Evidence, (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 11th ed., 
1 9 7 0 ) , par. 1 0 3, p • 1 01 • 
3 Suora, p.5. 
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Salmond quotes at length1 ~rom the judgement of O'Byrne 
J., in Fleming v. Kerry County Council (Eire) (1959): 2 
In the case of a child of tender years 
there must be some age up to which the 
child cannot be guilty of contributory 
negligence. In other words, there is some 
age up to which a child cannot be expected 
to take ~~Y precautions for his own safety. 
In cases where contributory negligence is 
alleged against a child, it is the duty of 
the trial judge to rule, in each particular 
case, whether the plaintiff, having regard 
to his age and mental development, may 
properly be expected to take some 
precautions for his own safety and consequ-
ently be capable of being guilty of contrib-
utory negligence. Having ruled in the 
affirmative, it becomes a question of fact 
for the jury, on the evidence, to determine 
Hhether he has .fallen short o.f the standard 
which might reasonably be expected from 
him having regard to his. age a..Yld develop-
ment. In the case of an ordinary adult 
person the standard is what should be 
expected rrom a reasonable person. In 
the case of a child, the standard is 
what may reasonably be expected , having 
regard to the age and mental development 
of the child and the other circumstances 
of the case. 
This principle is illustrated by Yachuk v. Oliver 
Blais Co. (U.K.) (194-9):3 
A nine-year old boy obtained gasoline from 
the defendants by untruly stating the purpose 
for which he wanted it. It was held that the 
plea of contributory negligence had to rail 
as there was no evidence to show that he was 
aware or the peculiarly dangerous quality 
of gasoline. 
1 Salmond, op.cit.~ pp. 340-341. 
2 Ir. Jur. Rep. 71, at p. 72. 
3 A.C. 386. 
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VI. PROTECTORY HEASURES 
There are measures that school boards and school 
personnel can take to protect themselves against litig-
ation. Such measures are attempts to prevent accidents~ 
or, in the case o~ accidents, to orrer protection against 
a charge or negligence. These measures take the rorm 
or rules, regulations and guidelines. 
There are also measures that educators can take 
to insure themselves against any monetary charges ror 
damages in the event that negligence is proven. These 
measures involve insurance policies and indemnity clauses. 
1. Rules and Regulations 
It has been shown that the duties imposed upon 
educators by statutes are rarely speciric. Usually, the 
statutes do little more than inrorm the personnel that 
they have a duty. The terminology used is orten vague and 
dirruse. In Newroundland, ror example, a school board has 
to arrange ror 'proper' supervision, 1 and a principal has 
to arrange ror 'regular' supervision. 2 The statute states 
what the duty is, but gives no suggestion or how it should 
be carried out. This is quite understandable, £or what is 
'proper' and 'regular' must be relative to the individual 
school board and individual school. But~ in view or the 
1 The Schools Act (R.S.N.) 1970, section 12(t). 
2 Ibid.~ section 80(2)(r). 
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rulings in many cases, especially Brost v. Tilley (1955) 1 
and Beaumont v. Surrey County Council (1968), 2 it would 
be tempting rate ror school boards and individual schools 
not to expand on the statutory duties. These two cases 
helped to derine the measure o~ the 'adequacy' or super-
vision and showed that it has to be on a planned, organ-
ised basis and suggested that the ratio or supervisors 
to students must be such that all students can be over-
viewed at regular intervals. 
School boards have a duty to see that school premises 
are kept in 'good order and condition'.3 The statute, how-
ever, does not tell the school boards how thick the glass 
in schools should be, nor does it tell them how to keep 
the premises in a state or repair. The practicalities 
are lert to the individual school boards. This is only 
right and proper, but the courts would look ror proor that 
the school boards had made provisions to protect the sa~ety 
or their students. 
Accordingly, school boards and school principals 
are urged to construct rules and regulations designed to 
protect their students rrom injury. Accidents might happen, 
but by constructing such regulations, not only should 
educators be able to keep the accidents to a minimum, but 
1 Supra,p.65. 
2 Supra, p.78. 
3 ~ S~hools · !£1 (R.S.N.) i970, section 12(a). 
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also they will be able to show that they have attempted 
to construct a regulatory system so as to exercise a 
standard or care towards their students as would reasonable 
and prudent parents. 
It might be argued that school personnel are 
intelligent people with a sense or responsibility, and 
that the construction of specific regulations would be 
an insult to their intelligence. Su£fice it to say that 
accidents do happen at school, that school personnel have 
been held to be negligent and that, in many cases~ the 
regulations in force appeared at race value to be per-
fectly adequate. However !ntelligent the individual, he 
should not reject guidance when the safety of children 
is involved. 
2. Insurance and Indemnity 
It has been shown that the legislation occasionally 
authorises school boards to indemnify teachers for any 
financial sums placed upon them by the courts.1 The bus 
contract recommended by the Department of Education in 
Newfoundland has a clause which indemnifies school boards 
from claims arising out of accidents on school buses. 
Article 1 of the recommended contract reads: 
The Contractor covenants with the Board 
••. (j) to indemnify and keep indemnified 
the Board from and against all claims and 
demands, actions, suits, and proceedings 
1 R.S.B.C. 1960, section 104(5), supra, p.104. 
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by any person. £irm. company or other 
legal entity ~or or in respect o£ any 
injuries to persons or property arising 
out o£ the operation o£ any bus used in 
the transportation service ••• 
Clauses o£ indemnity only come into e££ect a£ter 
the court proceedings have been completed. An educator, 
who must be indemnified, must first be found liable for 
negligence. After an award has been made against him. he 
can seek to recover the sum £rom the person or persona 
who have contracted to indemnify him. 
Such a contract might be disputed. If a school 
board in Newfoundland ordered a driver to take his bus 
over a dangerous road intreacherous weather, the 
insurance company representing the bus contractor would 
undoubtedly dispute the indemnity clause if an accident 
resulted. 
Those who do contract such clauses are recommended 
to insist that the person covenanting the clause purchases 
an insurance policy which will assume the liability 
contracted. Such a policy is usually known as a 
Contractual Liability Policy. Under this policy the 
indemnity will be met. 
Insurance policies will not protect educators from 
liability if negligence is proven, but they will meet all 
financial charges up to and including the extent of the 
coverage. It has already been shown that some policies 
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can be tailor-made to meet the peculiar needs or the 
insuror. Such is the policy currently held by the N.T.A. 
on behalf o£ its members. 1 
Since an insurance policy is protection against 
rinancial charges that might be incurred, it is most 
advisable that policy holders, to ensure the £ullest 
protection, should understand £ully the conditions or 
each policy. 
3. Protection in Newroundland 
(a) Rules and regulations. 
A survey or school boards and school principals 
in New£oundland suggests that much still needs to be 
done to construct adequate protectory measures. 
Twenty-eight school boards replied to a questionnaire 
which asked whether they had speciric regulations £or 
the supervision or students (Appendix A). Sixty-eight per 
cent (68%) of these either had no regulations or merely 
re-iterated the duties expressed in statute. Most or the 
remainder were more speci£ic in some areas~ but probably 
not adequate overall. Since it is impossible to measure 
precisely the adequacy or such regulations~ the criticism 
levelled can be no more than a subjective judgement at 
this juncture. As a guideline. the writer considered the 
1 Sunra, p.103. 
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cases reviewed in this and the prece~ding chapter, and 
considere~ the terminology expres9ed in the by~laws exam-
ined. \ihat appeared to be noticeably absent were specific 
~- instructions to principals and the lack of procedures f'or 
maintaining school buildings and premises. 
Seventy-three per cent (73%) o:r the school principals 
Hho were surveyed replied to a questionnaire which asked 
whether their schools had speci:fic regulations :for the 
supervision o:r students (Appendix E). Of these, sixty-
t!wee per cent (63%) stated that their school boards did 
not have sp~ci:fic regulations, but sixty-nine pe~ cent (69%) 
stated that their schools did. or these, seventy per cent 
(70%) enclosed copies of' their regulations. These 
regulations which, because or the low number of schools 
approached, cannot be taken as significant of' the whole 
province, were illuminating neverthelesse Half of' th~ 
regulations receiv~d could be considered as 'printed' 
material; the other half were handwritt~n regulations 
or copies of supervisory schedules. A third were con-
cerned with discipline only~ while the rPMainder were 
very general in natur~. Examples read,. "Teachers '"'ill 
supervise at recess", "Teachers will supervise the t:!orr-
idors11. The regulations neither specified what teachers 
were to de Hhile on supervision nor referred to any 
danger areas uro~~d the school. 
Th e purpose of the questionnaires was not to show 
the inadeq1acies or any individual school board or 
school, but rath~r it was ~~ attempt to determine whether 
educators generally were aware or their legal duties and 
whether they had taken any steps which would indicate 
such an awareness. Undoubtedly, many . are aware~ and 
presumably instructions are given inrormally in many 
schools~ but it is questionable ir the steps taken would 
demonstrate to the satisraction or the courts that adequate 
precautions had been taken to protect students from 
reasonably .foreseeable accidents. 
(b) Insurance and indemnity. 
All the school boards in Newfo~~dland, who replied 
to a questionnair~ regarding bus contracts~ indicated 
that they include an indemnity clause in all their bus 
contracts1 (Appendix F). 
In Newfoundland, a mandatory du~y is imposed upon 
school boards by statute to insure all buildings and 
equipment. 2 All twenty-six school boards who replied to 
a questionnaire on this point indicated that they carried 
such insurance (Appendix F). 
A mandatory duty is also imposed on school boards 
to effect insur~~ce incemnirying them 'against liability 
in respect of nny claim for damages or personal injury•.3 
1 Supra, pp.185-186. 
2 ~ Sc~ool3 !£1 (R.S.N.) 1970, section 12(k). 
Ibid.$ section 12(1). 
-190-
Two of the school boards indicated that they are in breach 
of this statutory duty. (This might be due to the fact 
that the duty was a discretionary one until 1974.) The 
insurance coverage carried by school boards varied from 
one hundred thousand dollars ($100,000) to two million 
dollars ($2,000,000) (Appendix F). 
Nineteen of the school boards indicated that they 
carried general accident insurance. This is a useful 
type of insurance as it usually meets medical expenses 
when no negligence is involved (Appendix F). 
There is no duty on schools to insure their students 
or to urge the students to insure themselves. Fifty-nine 
per cent (59%) of the principals questioned~ however, 
indicated that insurance plans of this nature operated 
in their schools (Appendix E). In fifty per cent (50%) 
of the cases the students paid their own contributions; 
in the other instances, the school or the school board met 
the contributions. 
VII. SUMMARY 
An educator will be liable for any injury su£fered 
as a result of his ·railure to exercise care towards his 
students as 'a reasonable and prudent parent'. 
School boards have a statutory duty to see that 
supervision is provided and have the statutory authority 
to make by-laws and regulations to assist them in 
-191-
fulfilling t h eir duty. 
School principals have the statutory responsibility 
of organising the supervision of s~udents in their schools 
and on school related activities. They must organise the 
supervision in such a way that it is considered adequate 
in the eyes of the law. They must delegate duties on a 
planned, organised basis with instructions of what must 
be done by a teacher while on supervisory duty. They 
must also ensure that the ratio of teachers to students 
is such that all students may be overviewed at regular 
intervals. 
A distinction has been made between the disciplinary 
and the protective roles or teachers. The legal duty o~ 
teachers is to protect their students from dangers o~ 
which they know or which they ought to reasonably foresee. 
\ihen a teacher enters the employ of a school board he is 
contractually bound not only to carry out his statutory 
duties, but also those placed upon him by the regulations 
o~ his school board or his own school. When appointed 
to teach a class, the teacher is responsible for the 
safety of the students. The duty owed by teachers with 
special skill or training is probably higher than the 
ordinary if their skill or training enables them to 
instruct in potentially dangerous areas or to use 
potentially d angerous material. 
School pe r sonnel a r e re sponsib le for t h e safety 
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or their students during the hours in which they have 
a duty to provide supervision. The hours are those 
stated in statute or as extended by local regulations. 
This duty is absolute. Any injury suffered orr school 
premises but during school hours will place liability 
on school personnel if the injury. is a direct result 
of their negligence. 
The duty owed to students on school excursions 
is high. Parental notes permitting the students to take 
part on excursions will not free school personnel from 
liability. 
No duty is owed to pupils before or after school 
hours or at the completion of educational activities 
which take place outside the normal school hours, 
except that students must be warned of known dangers 
or hazards on school premises. 
Educators have a duty to see that the premises, 
the facilities and the equipment in their schools are 
safe for the use of students and any others who might 
use them in the lawful execution of their educational 
roles. 
Court cases examined indicate that bus contractors 
are employees of school boards. School boards, therefore, 
will be vicariously liable for any injuries suffered 
by students on school buses due to the negligence of 
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bus drivers. This liability will apply whether the 
school boards are rulrilling a mandatory duty to provide 
transportation or exercising their discretionary power 
to do so. 
Taxi drivers are normally considered as independent 
contractors and school boards will escape liability ror 
injuries sustained as a result or a taxi driver's 
negligence. 
The owner or a private car who uses it to transport 
students inrrequently or occasionally will be indemniried · 
by his insurance company ror any rinancial charges made 
as a result or injuries surrered due to his negligence, 
whether his passengers are rare-paying or not. But ir 
he uses his car regularly to transport rare-paying 
students then he must purchase an endorsement to his · 
insurance policy to cover such a use or his car. 
A derendant, charged with negligence, will escape 
liability ir he can show that he owes no legal duty to 
the injured person. He will also escape liability ir he 
can show that he is not in breach or a legal duty. This 
can be done by illustrating that reasonable care has 
been exercised or that a similar standard or care has 
prevented accidents in the past or that adequate 
warning has been given to the students or the potential 
dangers. A defendant will escape liability i~ it can be 
shown that the injured person voluntarily and lmowingly 
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participated in the event that caused the accident. 
The damages that a derendant might have to pay may be 
diminished ir it cru1 be shown that the plaintirr, by 
his O\~ negligence, has contributed towards the injury. 
In some provinces and under certain circumstances 
school personnel are granted statutory immunity ~rom 
liability. Derendants can also escape liability ir 
actions are not brought to law within a statutory time 
limit. Occasionally, school personnel are indemniried 
ror any charges laid against t h em. Liability insurance 
protection will meet charges made on educators up to 
and including the amount or the policy. 
Educators can do much to prevent accidents by 
constructing protectory measures governing the 
supervision or their students and the sarety or their 
schools. Such measures are also means or indicating 






Teacher tenure is a contentious issue . which tends 
to polarise the thinking o~ those involved in education. 
The advocates or teacher tenure consider that it 
improves the pro~essional status of teachers and protects 
competent teachers from arbitrary dismissal. It is claimed 
that the resulting security leads to the ultimate benefit 
or the students. It is seen, therefore, as a means or 
improving education generally. 
The critics of teacher tenure maintain that it 
strengthens teacher militancy and protects incompetent 
teachers and administrators, to the general detriment o~ 
education. It is ~requently alleged that academic and 
moral standards in schools are declining and that an 
unsatisfactory return is received for the financial 
input to education. The blame is placed on the schools, 
and it is believed that there will be no improvement 
in the situation while the educators responsible can 
hide behind the cloak or tenure. But, Lang claims that 
" ••• to eliminate tenure as a reaction to the thrust 
~or school accountability is to make scapegoats of 
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teachers. "1 
Te acher tenure can indeed produce the results that 
both its advocates and its . critics roresee, but the outcome 
depends upon the er~ectiveness or its procedures. 'Pro-
cedure' is the operative word. Ir the procedure is adequate 
and is errected correctly, competent teachers will be pro-
tected while the incompetent will be removed. It is when 
the procedure is misunderstood and erfected badly that the 
incompetent may be protected. The procedure, and all that 
it encompa.sses, is :round in tenure laws. William A. Hazard 
has written: 
Tenure laws set :rorth the terms and 
conditions by which the status is 
acquired, the causes :ror dismissal, 
the procedures required by the school 
board to dismiss or demote those 
teachers covered by the statutes,_ and 
the teachers' procedural rights.~ 
In this chapter, an examination will be made o:r 
the principles or law that govern teacher tenure. Re:rerence 
will be made to statutes and to ~ Collective Agreement 
(Nf'ld.) 1975. Decisions of the courts and or boards or 
rererence and arbitration that have interpreted the enacted 
legislation will also be examined. The format o:r the 
chapter will be that suggested by Hazard's statement. How 
1 Theodore H. Lang, "Teacher Tenure As A Management Problem," 
Phi Delta ~appan, Vol LVI, No.7, March, 1975, p.460. 
2 William A. Hazard, "Tenure Laws in Theory and Practice," 
Phi Delta Kapnan, Vol LVI, No.7, March, 1975, p.451. 
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tenure status is acquired, the causes ror dismissal~ the 
procedures ror dismissal and the rights or teachers 
threatened with dismissal~ will be reviewed. At the out-
set, however, it is necessary to derine teacher tenure. 
II • . WHAT IS TEACHER TENURE? 
Teacher tenure has been derined as: 
••• a set or rights, conveyed and 
protected by law, whereby a teacher 
cannot be dismissed · rrom his position 
except under procedures laid down by 
statute. 'Tenure :· teacher' means one 
who lawrully enjoys such rights, one 
who thererore can be said to possess 
'tenure statuat.1 
A tenure 1 aw has been derined as:-
••• one which (a) provides ror 
continuing employment or teachers, 
who under its terms have acquired 
permanent, tenure, or continuing 
contract status; and (b) requires 
boards to comply with prescribed 
procedural provisions or notice, 
statement or charges, and right 
to a hearing berore a tenure teacher 
can be dismissed, or before nonrenewal 
or the teacher's contract or 
employment can be efrective.2 
Two points in these derinitions need emphasising. 
First, tenure is the result or a legal enactment which 
not only creates it, but also protects it. Second, the 
derinitions make no reference to the causes ror dismissal, 
only to the procedures as laid down by law. 'l'here may 
1 J.F. Swan as cited by McCurdy, supra, p.35. 
2 N.E.A. Research Bulletin, Vol.38, 1960, p.81. 
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be a su££icient ground £or dismissing a teacher, but the 
correct procedure must be £ollowed if the dismissal is 
to be supported at law. The enactment or tenure laws 
does not prohibit school boards £rom dismissing ine£ficient 
teachers, but rather, through a statement of the procedures, 
it a£fords to employers th~ means by which they can 
law£ully dismiss teachers. Tenure laws, consequently, 
specify the reasons for dismissal and the method of 
ma~ing dismissal effective. Garber sums up the position 
well when he writes: 
(The purpose of tenure is) ••• to 
protect competent and qualified 
teachers in the security of their 
positions during good behaviour, and 
to protect them, after they have 
undergone a probationary period, 
against removal £or unfounded, flimsy, 
or political reasons.1 
Tenure, therefore, can be defined as a position of 
permanent employment which cannot be terminated .without 
following the procedures laid down by law. 
III. THE ACQUISITION OF TENURE 
An important distinction, made by Garber, is that 
tenure rights accrue to teachers 'after they have undergone 
a probationary period 1 • 2 The probationary period is 
stated in the relevant statutes or agreements and until 
a teacher has completed this period he does not enjoy 




The period o~ probation varies in time, usually 
rrom one to three years. In Britai~, the period or 
probationary service or a teacher is one year ir he has 
completed a course o~ teacher training, and two years ir 
he has not completed the training. 1 In Saskatchewan, the 
period is two complete and consecutive academic years, 
or rour complete and consecutive terms, or a period in 
which the teacher has received the ~quivalent or two years' 
salary.2 Teachers in Prince Edward Island have recently 
attained tenure status for the first time. 
All teachers in P.E.I. are presently 
concluding a third consecutive 
n~ohA~ion~~v VAA~ wi+.h r.he FivA r -- - - - - -- .., ., - -- - - . 
Regional Administrative Boards. As 
or April 31st. 1975 teachers who are 
recommended will receive a P.E.I. 
Contract B. This contract is a tenure 
contract.) 
In Newfoundland, The Schools !£1 (R.S.N.) 1970, reads:4 
Section 77(a) ••• the contract or 
employment o~ a teacher who has 
previously taught for more than one 
year may be terminated ••• during 
his first year or employment with 
that School Board, by ••• 
(b) ••• the contract or 
employment o~ a teacher whose 
1 Schools Regulation 1959 (incorporating 1968 amendments}, 
schedule 11.2(a). 
2 The Teacher Tenure Act (R.S.S.} 1965, section 3(1)(a)(b){c). 
3 Letter rrom General Secretary, Prince Edward Island 
Teachers' Federation, February 11, 1975. 
4 Sections 75-78 or The Schools Act (R.S.N.) 1970 were 
repealed May 21, 19?4 (Act No.2ET. 
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employment with the School Board 
as a teacher is his rirst employ-
ment as a teacher may be terminated 
••• during his rirst two years ••• 
The present position in Newroundland is governed 
by Article 7 or~ Collective Agreement 1975, entitled~ 
Probationary· Period and Tenure: 
7.01 Subject to .02 and .03, teachers who have 
no previous teaching experience in the 
province or teachers who have never been 
tenured with a School Board will be hired 
on a probationary contract until they 
have completed two years' service with 
the same School Board. 
7.02 A teacher who previously was a tenured 
teacher with a School Board and who 
subsequently is hired by another School 
Board may be required by the new Board 
to enter into a probationary period or 
one year or may have the probationary 
period waived by that Board. 
7.03 Subject to .05~ a teacher who successrully 
completes his probationary period and then 
enters into continuous employment with the 
same School Board shall be deemed to have 
a continuing contract and tenure as a 
teacher with that Board. 
7.04 A teacher who has entered into a continuing 
contract with a School Board but who 
subsequently leaves the teaching proression 
ror a period in excess or rive years and 
does not work in a proressional rield 
related to education, may, ir he returns 
to the proression, be required by the 
Board to enter into a probationary period 
or one year or may have the probationary 
period waived by the Board. 
1.05 Subject to .06, a Board shall not enter 
into a Contract other ·than a probationary 
contract with a teacher who does not hold 
a certiricate or grade. 
7.06 The provisions or Clause .05 or this Article 
do not apply to any teacher whose licence 
was issued prior to April 1, 1975, and who 
was under contract as or that date. 
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It will be noticed that the terms of ~ Collective 
Agreement, 1975, do not diminish - or increase . the period of 
probation from that stated in~ Schools !£1 (R.S.N.) 1970. 
Since this section of The Schools Act has now been repealed~ 
future collective agreements could create new time periods. 
However• . in . jurisdicti:ons where the terms of collective 
agreements or other forms of contracts conflict with 
statutory dicta, it would appear that the statutory 
regulations prevail. 
Cormier v. Board of School Trustees District 19, 
(N.B.)(1974): 1 
The collective agreement provided for a two-
year probationary period. It was held by the 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal that the three-
year statutory period could not be waived or 
varied by the collective agreement because the 
probationary period was for the benefit of the 
school children and the public educational 
system. 
Basically the courts have held that tenure accrues 
to a person who has the status of being under a permanent 
contract. Conversely, a person who does not have a perm~ent 
contract does not enjoy tenure rights. This point is well 
illustrated in the case o£ MacLeod v. Dominion (Town) 
. 
School Commissioners (N.S.)(1958): 2 
MacLeod was appointed by letter on a one 
year's trial basis. There was no contract 
1 8 N.B.R. (2d.) 330, (C. of A.). 
2 16 D.L.R. (2d.) 587. 
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between her and the school board. In 
February, she received a stencilled letter 
that had been sent to all the teachers in 
the district asking them to advise the school 
board i~ they intended to resign at the end 
of the school year. She replied, in writing, 
indicating her desire to continue in the 
school board's employ. In May, she was 
advised that her services would not be 
required after the end o~ the term. Under 
the Nova Scotia Education !£1, notice had 
to be given by March 31st to those under 
contract. MacLeod sued for unlawful 
dismissal. The court held that she had 
no claim as she had no contract. The judge 
said: 
The question is as to the right of 
the plaintir~ to recover damages ~or 
breach of a contract that was not 
made, and I must hold that the 
plaintirf has no such right. 
The courts have held, however, that the length of 
the service rendered by the teacher can imply 
tenure even i~ no contract exists. 
Commissionaires d'Ecole d'Outremont v. Chicoine (Que.): 1 
Chicoine had a certificate issued by the 
Superintendent o~ Public Education for the 
Province of Quebec. He served in a school as 
the physical education teacher from 1928 ·-
1936. During the period 1936 - 1948 the subject 
was discontinued. In ·1948 he was re-engaged by 
letter. In September 1949, when he reported for 
work, he was told that another person had been 
1 (1954) R.L. 376. 
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engaged. He sued ror his salary in lieu of 
notice. The Commission claimed that he was 
not a certiried teacher and that there was 
no contract of employment. The Quebec Court 
or Appeal found for the teacher both on the 
question of certification and of tenure. 
Article 68 of~ Education~ (R.S.Q.) 1941, 
recognised diplomas obtained 'in virtue of 
some provision of this Act•. There was a 
provision for the Superintendent of Public 
Instruction to issue certificates. The court 
held that the exchange of letters was 
equivalent to a contract, and, in any case, 
it was the duty of the Commission to provide 
a written contract and,if it had not done so, 
it could not blame the teacher. Chicoine, 
therefore- had tenure and was entitled to 
recover his salary. 
The courts have also held that statutes can have 
a retroactive effect, if that clearly was the intention 
of the statute. 
re Walker and West Hants Municipal School Board 
(N.S.){1974): 1 
Walker, who did not have a written contract, 
received a letter from his school board on 
March 22nd. 1972, which stated that, " ••• it 
has been decided to terminate your contract 
No reason was given apart from the need for 
" ••• some changes (to) take place in the 
arranging for teaching personnel." Walker 
. . . 
had taught for the school board for five years. 
1 42 D.L.R. (3d.) 105. 
" 
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On May 15th. 1972 revisions to the Education 
Act received royal assent. The revisions 
stated that 'permanent contract' applied~ 
inter alia, to those who had been employed 
by a school board for two or more years and 
that the termination o~ a permanent contract 
had to be for 'just cause•. _ The Appeal 
(Arbitration) Board ~ound that the provisions 
did not apply to Walker as his services had 
been terminated prior to the act receiving 
royal assent. The Supreme Court o~ Nova 
Scotia granted a writ of certiorari to 
quash the decision of the appeal board, 
finding that Walker did have a permanent 
contract and that he could onl~ be dismissed -
for just cause. The Appeal Division of The 
Supreme Court concurred. Cooper, J.A. said: 
It was submitted that so to inter-
pret s-s (16) and (18) would result 
in giving the legislation retro-
active effect. Whilst the general 
rule is that statutes are to be 
construed as having prospective 
operation only, if the words used 
clearly indicate a retroactive 
operation they will be given 
effect to as expressing the intention 
o~ the legislature. 
The status of being in permanent employment, therefore, 
can be expressly stated in · a contract or letter of 
appointment, or expressly understood as a result o:f 
enacted legislation, or stated in the provisions of 
collective agreements, or implied through regular and 
continuous employment. It is not the duty of a teacher 
to insist upon a written contract. 
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IV. CAUSES FOR DISMISSAL 
The statutes and/or collective agreements state 
specific reasons for dismissals or terminations of 
.contracts. In addition they often include an 'open' 
clause, which can be distinguished by such phrases as 
'adequate reason', 'such other cause', and 'any similar 
j~st cause'. 
1. Speciric Reasons 
Examples of the causes for dismissal from Saskatchewan~ 
British Columbia and Newfoundland will illustrate that 
there is little dif£erence in the specific reasons 
between the various jurisdictions. 
~Teacher Tenure ~(R.S.S.) 1965, reads: 
Section 4. (1) A notice or termination of 
contract given by a school board to a 
teacher shall be in form A and shall state 
the reasons for the board's action which may 
include professional incompetency, neglect 
o£ duty, unprofessional conduct, immorality, 
physical or mental disability · and such other 
cause as in the opinion o£ the school board 
renders the teacher unsuitable £or teaching 
service in the position then held by him. 
The Public _s_c_h_o_o_l_s A£1 (R.S.B.C.) 1974, reads: 
Section 130 (1) A Board may at any time 
suspend a teacher from the performance o£ his 
duties (a) £or misconduct, neglect of duty, 
or refusal or neglect to obey a lawful order 
o£ the Board; or (b) where the teacher has 
been charged with a criminal offence and, 
in the opinion o£ the Board, the circum-
stances thereby created render it inadvisable 
for him to continue his duties. 
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Terminations o£ teachers' contracts in New£oundland 
are governed solely by~ Collective Agreement 1975. 
Article 12.01 A contract of employment made 
between a School Board and a teacher may 
be terminated: ••• 
(c) with thirty days' notice in writing ••• 
that the teacher is ipcompetent; 
(d) without notice ••• when the certi£icate 
or grade or licence ••• has been suspended 
or cancelled; 
(e) without notice •· •• when there is gross 
misconduct, insubordination or neglect or 
duty on the part of the teacher, or any 
similar just cause; 
(f) without notice ••• when the teacher 
refuses to undergo a medical examination ••• 
Article 9.01 For the purpose of this 
Agreement "lay-off" means the termination 
of a teacher's contract because his 
position has become redundant ••• 
9.02 No teacher shall be laid o£f 
until the School Board has determined that 
the teacher cannot be accommodated else-
where . within its jurisdiction. 
Unless the legislation or agreement contains such 
phrases as 'any similar just cause' or 'an adequate 
reason', the courts have held that a teacher cannot be 
dismissed for a cause not covered in the legislation. An 
excellent illustration is the case of Price v. Sunderland 
Corporation (U.K.)(1956): 1 
The local association of the National 
Association of Schoolmasters decided that 
its members should no longer collect meal 
money, which they had previously done 
voluntarily. Section 49 of the Education 
1 3 All E.R. 153, (Q.B.D.). 
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~ 1944. empowered the Ministry o~ Education 
to make regulations for the provision o~ 
meals " ••• so. however. that such regulations 
shall not impose upon teachers ••• duties in 
respect of meals other than the supervision 
of pupils ••• "The Sunderland Borough Council 
said that collection of money was a term of 
the employment o~ teachers. Five teachers 
were dismissed for refusing to collect monies. · 
It was held that the action of the Corporation 
was ultra vires - beyond its statutory power -
and the teachers were reinstated. 
The judgement of Mr. Justice Barry in this case 
indicates clearly the respective roles and limitations 
of the courts and statutory ·bodies. He said: 
It has long been held that the courts 
will not inquire into or inter~ere 
with the decisions and actions of 
local authorities and other statutory 
bodies so long as their decisions are 
reached bona fide and within their 
statutory powers ••• A local 
authority or any statutory body 
cannot either employ or dismiss 
servants except under statutory 
authority: their powers are derived 
from the statute or statutes under 
which they are created. And it is 
a very well-known principle o~ law 
that statutory powe~ can only be 
exercised for the purpose for which 
they are granted ••• The burden rests 
on those who call into question any 
decision of a local authority1 and 
it is a heavy burden ••• It cannot 
be within the powers of the local 
authority to resolve to take an 
action which the Act of Parliament 
under which their powers are derived 
clearly prohibits. 
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Article 12.01(e) of~ Collective Agreement 1975, 
allows for the termination of a teacher's contract, 
without notice, for 'insubordination or neglect or 
duty'. ~ .P~r_i~e_e_ Case1 demonstrates that teachers 
cannot be ordered to perform duties that are outside 
the authority of their employers, or their agents, to 
give. School boards and principals, therefore, have to 
be certain that any orders they give are within the scope 
of their authority, although, as Mr. Justice Barry 
stated, the burden of proving the illegality of. any 
order will fall on the complain~ng teacher. 
A teacher, however, has little or no recourse 
if he refuses to perform duties that fall within the 
terms of his employment. Batt has written: 
The first duty of the servant is to 
obey those orders which the master 
is justified in giving under the 
terms of the agreement; all orders 
concerning the work which the servant 
is to do and the time, manner, end 
place of performing it are presumably, 
and in the absence of special circum-
stances~ within the control of the 
master.~ 
Halsbury wrote: 
Wilful disobedience to the lawful 
and reasonable order of the master 
justifies summary dismissal.3 
1 Supra, p. 206. 
2 Batt, Law of Master and Servant, 4th.ed., 1950, p.154. 
-- -
3 25 Halsbury, )rd. ed., p.485, para. 933. 
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One British and two Canadian cases illustrate 
that the in~luence or outside agencies~ such as 
teachers' associations or unions~ cannot supercede 
the legitimate orders of school authorities. 
Gorse v. Durham County Council {U.K.)(1971):1 
On the orders o~ his union~ The National 
Union of Teachers~ a British teacher 
refused to supervise school meals during 
the collective bargaining process. The 
County Council warned all teachers that 
this duty £ormed part o~ their contract. 
The Council deducted the pay of teachers 
who refused the duty. Gorse claimed that~ 
as he had not been dismissed~ the loss 
of earnings only constituted suspension. 
As all duties had been resumed after 
three and a half days and he had been 
paid thereafter~ he had accordingly the 
status of a reinstated teacher. His 
contract specifically stated that if a 
teacher was reinstated following 
suspension~ he was entitled to recover 
all salary lost during the suspension. 
Gorse was~therefore. suing for the salary 
deducted by the Council. It was held that 
(i) the County Council had the authority 
to require teachers to supervise meals 
and therefore any refusal amounted to a 
direct repudiation of the c~~act which 
the County Council could accept if they 
so wished~ (ii) as they had paid the 
1 All E.R. Vol.2 666, (Q.B.D.). 
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teacher his normal salary after the 
duties were resumed, they had only 
suspended him, {iii) the plaintiff 
was entitled to his salary. 
The important point to note in this case is that, 
if they had so wished, the Council could have dismissed 
the teacher. 
In Winnipeg School Division No 1 v. Winnipeg Teachers' 
Association No 1 of Manitoba Teachers' Society and Manitob~ 
Teachers' So~iety (Man.)(1973), 1 it was held that, since 
the teachers had withdrawn their supervisory duties at 
the noon-hour, which were both statutory and contractual 
duties, they were liable to meet the cost or hiring 
additional supervisory personnel to do their work. 
Broadview School Board v. Saskatchewan Teachers' 
Federation (Sask.){1973):2 
It was held that teacher representatives 
were justified in counselling and induc-
ing other teachers to withdraw their 
services during an orricial strike. The 
teachers did not induce others to break 
their contracts, as the teachers had 
already decided on strike action. The 
strike was lawful and was motivated 
solely by a desire to forward their 
position. 
The implication of this case is that, if the strike 
1 For the full facts of this case see supra, p.119. 
2 1 w.w.R. 152. 
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had not been law~ul, the withdrawal o~ services could 
have amounted to a breach o~ contract. 
A long and involved serie~ o~ Saskatchewan cases, 
which began in 1971 and ended in 1973, rurther illustrate 
the protection that the courts give to teachers when 
they are dismissed ror causes not stated in statute. 
Placsko v. Board or Humboldt School Unit No 47 
of Saskatchewan (1971): 1 
!h! Teacher Tenure~ 1965, Section 4(1), 2 
states the reasons whereby a teacher's 
contract can be terminated. There is no 
mention of redundancy. ~ School ~ 
(R.s.s.), section 237(1), on Dismissal 
of Teachers, begins, •Subject to The 
Teacher Tenure Act ••• 1 In this case, 
Mrs. Placsko, who had tenure, was given 
notic~under section 237(1), that her 
contract was being terminated due to the 
necessity of reducing the number or 
teachers in the school board's employ 
as the result of a government order. 
She sued ror reinstatement or damages 
since her termination was outside the 
scope of section 4(1) of The Teacher 
Tenure Act. The Saskatchewan Court or 
Queen's Bench found that her contract 
had been unjustly terminated without 
cause. As there was no statutory 
provision, the termination was null 
and void and she was still in the 
1 22 D.L.R. (3d) 66). 
2 Supra, p.20S. 
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employ of the school board and entitled 
to her salary. The Court o~ Appeal 
con~irmed this £inding and awarded her 
six months' salary. The school board~ 
at first~ refused to pay, but a further 
order of the Court of Appeal in 1972 
ensured that ~~s. Placsko received her 
compensation. 
During the same period, nine other teachers, laid -
off at the same time as Mrs. Placsko as a result or the 
government order, were reinstated by the courts with rull 
salary entitlement, less salary earned ~rom employment 
during the period in question. 
As a result o~ her reinstatement Mrs. 
Placsko was employed by the school board 
~or a short time. Her contract was then 
terminated under section 237(2) o~ The 
School Act~ which read: 
A board may termin$te its agreement 
with a teacher ••• by giving the 
teacher not less than thirty days' 
notice in writing with its intention 
to do so; but in such case the 
reason ror the board's action shall 
be set rorth in the notice. 
It will be noticed that this section does 
not begin, 'Subject to The Teacher Tenure 
Act ••• • The school board gave redundancy 
as the reason; the court accepted this 
reason and upheld the termination. The 
Court of Appeal concurred with this 
rinding.1 
1 (1973) C.C.L. 572. 
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As a result of the original case and those o~ the 
other nine teachers, section 237(2A) was added to ~ 
School~ (R.S.S.) 1965. It reads: 
Notwithstanding anything in The Teacher 
Tenure Act, where a teacher to whom The 
Teacher Tenure Act applies occupies a 
teaching position that is no longer 
n·ecessary for the teaching requirements 
or programs in a district, the board may 
terminate its agreement with the teacher 
2. Other Reasons 
. . . 
Legislation often provides for dismissals on grounds 
other than those specifically mentioned, but such dismissals 
must state 'adequate' reasons. Such a provision is stated 
in~ Collective Agreement 1975: 
Article 12·. 01 A contract of employment ••• 
may be terminated: 
(a) by giving three months' notice in writing 
by the School Board (or pay in lieu of notice), 
if the contract is to be terminated during the 
school year and two months' notice in writing 
(or pay in lieu of notice), if it is to be 
terminated at the end of the school year, 
provided an adequate reason for termination 
is stated by the School Board in writing, and 
the contract is a continuous one; 
Two cases illustrate the importance of giving reasons 
that are adequate. 
Belanger v. Commissaires d 1 Ecoles pour Municipalite 
Scolaire de St. Gervais (Que.)(1970):1 
A Quebec teacher was dismissed without reason. 
A 1963 Quebec statute states that if a teacher 
has served two years with a board, he is 
1 S • C • R • 948 • 
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entitled- arter he has sent a written personal 
request, to a reason ror his dismissal. Belanger 
asked ror a reason ror her dismissal, was un-
satisried with it, and took her case to arbit-
tration. The Board or Arbitration ruled in her 
ravour. The Supreme Court or Canada supported 
the ruling and held that the action or the 
school board, being without due cause, was 
null and void. The teacher was, thererore, still 
in · its employ and entitled to her salary. 
Mahoney v. Newcastle Board or School Trustees (N.B.) 1 
/ Mahoney, who had been teaching ror nine year~, 
being pregnant, arranged ror a supply teacher, 
who was rully licenced and qualiried, to take 
her place. She advised the school board or her 
actions. The school board requested her to 
apply ror sick leave and said that it would 
engage a supply teacher. It then round out 
that she had accumulated sick leave entitle-
ments in excess or the amount required and 
rerused her application ror sick leave. It 
also advised her that she would be replaced. 
After her confinement, she reported for work 
but was refused. The trial judge held that 
her dismissal was unlawrul as no reason had 
been given. Section 63A (7) of the Schools 
!£!was imperative. It read, " ••• shall not 
terminate the contract except in accordance 
with this Act and the School Trustees' ~d 
Teachers' Board of Reference Act." He held 
that she was entitled to an action ror damages 
only, since the dismissal, being on terms not 
1 (1967) 61 D.L.R. (2d.) 77. 
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provided £or in the contract, e££ectively 
terminated the contract. West, J.A. of The 
Appeal Division of The Supreme Court o£ New 
Brunswick, however, said• on appeal: 
I take it to be a question of law 
that where a board acts improperly 
but within its jurisdiction, the 
notice or decision is voidable only, 
but where it acts without jurisdiction, 
its action is void. In my opinion, the 
board• in giving the so-called notice 
of termination in this case. acted 
wholly without jurisdiction. and also 
in a manner which orfended the rules 
· of natural justice, as well as arbitr-
arily ••• The board is a creature of 
statute and one must look to the 
statute or statutes for the authority 
of the board. 
He ordered that the teacher was to be paid 
full remuneration. (If she had not already 
resigned from the board and found another 
post, she would probably have been reinstated 
also.) 
An interesting problem is presented when teachers 
are expelled or suspended from their teachers' associations. 
Would such an action constitute an adequate reason for 
the termination of a contract? There is no consistent 
ruling throughout the provinces. British Columbia 
considers that it would be a sufficient cause and makes 
it a speci£ic reason for termination in its legislation. 
Saskatchewan considers unprofessional conduct suf£icient 
cause to legislate for it speci£ically. Newfoundland is 
not specific in this area. 
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Public Schools !£1 (R.S.B.C.) 1960: 
Section 144 (1)(b) ••• a teacher shall be, or 
immediately become, a member o~ the British 
Columbia Teachers' Federation, and it shall be 
a condition or his employment that he be and 
continue to be a member. 
Section 146 (1) The executive committee or the 
British Columbia Teachers' Federation may 
suspend or expel a teacher rrom membership in 
the British Columbia Teachers' Federation. and 
no person so suspended or expelled sha~l be 
employed as a teacher in any public school 
until he has been reinstated as a member ••• 
_ (4) Where the Board so determines, 
a suspension or expulsion shall not have the 
effect or terminating employment in a school 
berore a date to be fixed by the Board; but 
the date shall not be later than the end of 
the current school year. 
~ Teacher Tenure !£i(Saskatchewan) 1965: 
Section 4(1) A notice of termination ••• may 
include ••• unproressional conduct. 
Although~ Collective Agreement 1975. does not 
specifically cover this topic. ~Newfoundland Teachers' 
Association!£! 1974, provides for the establishment of a 
Disciplinary Committee under section 16{1). The section 
continues: 
Section 16{9) Upon receiving a written complaint 
that any active or. other member of the Association 
is guilty of unprofessional conduct, negligence 
or misconduct or has been convicted of a criminal 
offence by a court of a competent jurisdiction ••• 
{13) If a complaint referred to in 
sub-section (9) ••• is proven to its satisfaction 
the Disciplinary Committee may, ••• recommend in 
writing to the Executive that the member be 
{a) reprimanded, 
(b) censured, 
(c) suspended from membership, or 
(d) expelled from membership, and 
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the Executive may, ••• take any one or more 
of the actions recommended by the Disciplinary 
Committee. 
A member of the N.T.A., therefore, may be expelled 
from membership, but this does not necessitate his losing 
his job. Section 16(23) of~ N.T.A •. ~ 1974, states: 
A reprimand, censure, suspension or expulsion 
made under this section does not, of itself, 
affect the competency of the person affected 
by such reprimand, censure, suspension or 
expulsion to continue or resume his employ-
ment as a teacher. 
A school board, however, might consider that the 
causes leading up to the disciplining of a teacher would 
constitute an adequate reason for termination of contract. 
Furthermore, it might be hypothesised that a school 
board would be acting unethically if it continued in 
its employ, or engaged, a teacher su~pended or expelled 
from his own association. As it is doubtful if the N.T.A. 
would so punish a teacher unless the action which warranted 
the punishment was directly related to his job suitability 
or to his association membership, the courts would 
probably support any dismissal by a school board as being 
within the - terms of Article 10.01 of~ Collective 
Agreement 1975, which states, " ••• no teacher shall be 
suspended, dismissed or otherwise disciplined except for 
just cause." 
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3. Transrer and Demotion 
It is necessary at this stage to consider the 
position of those who are transrer~ed or demoted. When 
a person is engaged as a teacher in school X, does a 
transfer to school Y constitute termination of his 
original contract? When a person is engaged by a school 
board as a principal, is his contract terminated if he 
is demoted to a teaching position? 
The position or the courts seems to be that, since 
a contr-act is between the school board and the teacher, 
what the school board does with the teacher is its own 
concern. The teacher does not have tenure as a principal 
or with a particular school. The tenure is with the school 
board, and it is as a teacher. McCurdy found that, under 
the Alberta legislation, while termination of a teacher's 
contract also terminated his designation, termination of 
h~s designation did not terminate his contract as a 
teacher. Furthermore, he round that in both Alberta and 
British Columbia, termination of designation was not 
subject to appeal to a board of reference.1 
Two cases illustrate that teachers do not lose 
their status as teachers on being appointed to adminis-
trative positions. 
1 Me Curdy, op . cit. , p. 1 59. 
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Reilly v. Protestant School Commissioners or 
Lachine (Que.)(1930): 1 
It was held that a school teacher who had 
been promoted to the principalship or a 
high school and then to the position or 
Superintendent or Schools had not ceased 
to be a school teacher merely because he 
had ceased to . have classes. 
re Clarke and The Board or Education or Toronto (1947):2 
Clarke~ who had been teaching ror the board £or 
thirty-three years~ was demoted rrom the post or 
principal. The Board or Rererence round that his 
demotion did not constitute dismissal and 
thererore the provisions or the Teachers' Board 
or Rererence Act had not been contravened. The 
Ontario Court o~ Appeal .conrirmed the decision. 
Clarke had argued that~ as he did no teaching, 
he was not only demoted but dismissed unjustly 
£rom the job he held. or interest is the comment 
o£ the judge who stated that, i£ Clarke was not 
a teacher because he did no teaching, then the 
Board o£ Rererence Act did not apply to him as 
it dealt only with teachers. 
There is no distinction made in New£oundland between 
the designation of' teachers and that or school adminis-
trators either in ~ Schools !£1 or in ~ Collective 
Agreement · 1975~ ~Schools~ (R.S.N.) 1970, derines 
teacher as: 
Section 2(f'f') "teacher" means a person 
holding a certiricate of' grade as 
1 3 Q.P.R. 265. 
2 O.W.N. 878~ (C.A.). 
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defined by paragraph (f) of this Section 
2 and is deemed to include emergency 
supply but does not include a Superintendent 
or an Assistant District Superintendent. 
Section 2(f) "certificate of grade" includes 
a licence to teach issued under ••• authority. 
All principale, vice-principals and department heads~ 
therefore, are teachers within the definition of the Act. 
School administrators,accordingly, have no legal 
status as such, and their positions are not protected 
by statute. The question that has to be resolved is 
whether they are protected by other means or whether 
school boards can demote or transfer their employees 
arbitrarily. 
Gill v. Leyton Corporation (U.K.) (1933): 1 
Gill, who was headmaster or a school, was 
charged in court and found guilty of 
administering excessive corporal punishment. 
On appeal, his conviction was quashed and he 
was awarded all his costs. 
The local education authority first suspended 
him and then offered him a subordinate position. 
When he appealed, it was held that, as the 
education authority had not acted in bad faith 
or maliciously, the courts would not interfere 
with the authority's ruling. 
The important aspect o£ this case is that, although 
Gill was innocent in the eyes of the law, the education 
authority had the power to discipline him, provided it 
1 "Education," April 14th. 1933, (K.B.D.). 
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acted in good faith and without malice. The education 
authority had shown that his demotion was in the best 
interests of the school. His competency, therefore, was 
measured in relation to his administrative role. A decision 
of the courts or the United States illustrates this 
principle further. 
Rathe v. Jefferson Parish School Board (U.S.)(1944): 1 
The Louisiana Supreme Court held that a 
principal can be demoted to the position 
o£ classroom teacher i£ it can be shown 
that he is lacking in qualifications to 
perform the administrative and executive 
work. His incompetency as a leader, 
however, must be shown. 
T~e courts, therefore, will protect educators 
against malicious or unreasonable acts or their employers. 
The provisions of collective agreements can offer further · 
protection. 
vfuereas section 77(k)2 or The Schools Act (R.S.N.) 
- -
1970, permitted school boards to transfer teachers 
arbitrarily within their districts, from one position to 
another, and such transfers could not be interpreted as 
terminations o£ contracts, ~ Collective Agreement 1975, 
limits the power or school boards in this area. 
Article 13.01 A teacher may be transferred 
to a comparable position within the same 
1 206, La., 317; 19 So., 2d. 153. 
2 Repealed,May 1974s 
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community when it is deemed necessary 
but shall not be transferred from one 
community to another without his consent. 
The transfer must be within the same community. The 
Board of Arbitration in ~ Violet Case 1975, found that 
a trans£er outside a community in which a teacher lived 
and worked to another community some miles away, but 
in the same school district, was in breach o£ this Article. 
The transfer must also be a lateral one, 'to a 
comparable position'. This provision, there£ore, prohibits 
demotion. The courts have held that a transfer is 
acceptable provided it is not in breach of: any statutory 
or contractual provision and provided there is no element 
of removal or lowering o£ pro£essional standing or any 
reduction of salary. In brief, there must be no suggestion 
of a 'blot' on the character of: the teacher. But, does 
not a demotion constitute a lowering of the teacher's 
professional standing, even if there is no reduction in 
salary? 
Taylor v. Kent County Council (U.K.)(1969): 1 
Taylor had for ten years been headmaster of a 
Secondary School Tor Boys when the education 
authority decided that it should be amalgamated 
with the Girls' School. The Boys' School as 
such ceased to exist and Taylor's appointment 
was terminated. He was not chosen as head-
master of the new school, but was offered.in 
1 67 L.G.R. 483, (Q.B.D.). 
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writing,a post 1 at a safeguarded headmaster's 
salary, in the mobile pool o~ teachers, which 
he re~used. As a teacher in the mobile pool 
he would be required to serve in schools in 
the County for short periods, and to under-
take duties assigned to him by the head-
masters o~ the schools to which he was 
sent. It was held that this was not 
suitable alternative employment and that 
Taylor's age, qualifications and experience 
negated the suitability o~ the o~~er, even 
at the same salary as be~ore, as it required 
him to go to any place in the County and 
to undertake any duties assigned to him. 
In the words of the Lord Chie~ Justice 
of England: 
This man was being asked to do 
something utterly different: as 
I have said, just as if a director 
.under a service agreement was being 
asked to do a workman's job albeit 
at the same salary. 
A teacher, therefore, cannot be transferred or 
demoted arbitrarily. In both instances adequate reasons 
must be given, and, in Newfoundland, under Article 1-0.01 
of. ~ Collective Agreement 1975, 'just cause' must be 
shown for any dismissal, termination or other disciplinary 
action. If a teacher feels that his new position is not 
comparable to his old or that the school board has acted 
maliciously or that any other clause o~ The Collective 
Agreement has been violated, he can grieve the action. 
The fact that he has not been dismissed by the school 
board is not, in itself, a bar to grievance. Article 33.01 
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o~ ~ Collective Agreement 1975, states: 
A grievance means a dispute over the inter-
pretation, application~ administration or 
alleged violation o~ any Article or clause 
in this Collective Agreement. 
Due to the paucity of Canadian cases~ another 
decision from the courts of the United States is cited 
to ill~trate the principle. 
Blair et al. v. Mayo et al {U.S.)(1970): 1 
Mayo~ who had served for nine years as a 
teacher and for three years as a principal~ 
was demoted to the position of classroom 
teacher. Harris~ who had served for eighteen 
years as a teacher and for two years as the 
assistant principal~ was demoted to the post 
of basketball coach. The Supreme Court of 
Tennessee found for the teachers. As both 
had been ~ummarily demoted without any · 
reasons given, the demotions constituted 
dismissals · from their existing positions 
and violated their rights under the 
Tennessee Teachers' Tenure Act. 
A Board of Reference case in Newfoundland needs 
examination. It has been named ~ Orange Case 1974. 
The grievant contested the decision of his 
school board to trans~er him,after- three years 
employment,from the . position of subject director 
with the board and part-time teacher in the 
subject, to a position as full-time teacher 
with a school. He contested that the •transfer', 
given under section 77(k) of The Schools Act, 2 
1 450 s.w. 2d. 582. 
2 Supra, p.221. 
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was not a trans~er but a termination o~ 
contract with an option o~ accepting an 
in~erior position. He claimed that the 
school board's action was illegal and 
that, ir justi~iable, it should have come 
under section 77(~) o£ The Schools Act, 
which provided £or 'any case not specirically 
provided £or 1 • The school board claimed that 
it was acting in the best interests o~ all 
concerned and was trans£erring the teacher 
because of the redundancy or his £ormer 
position as subject director. This position 
it had created itselr and funded over and 
above any supervisory salary units provided 
by the Department of Education. There was 
evidence to indicate dissatisfaction with 
the grievant's work as subject director, 
but not with his work as a teacher. 
The Board or Rererence held (1) that the 
school board had the right to declare a 
position redundant which it had seen fit 
to create itself when such a position was 
no longer warranted, and (2) that the school 
board would have been justiried in termin-
ating the grievant's position because of 
his unsatisractory performance as a subject 
director. 
The Board of Reference also found (3) that 
the school board was at fault in attempting 
to 'transfer' the teacher under section 77(k). 
It held that transfer involves a lateral 
movement in an organisation and not a vertical 
one. In this case the grievant was being 
moved vertically. 
Despite the fact that the school board had 
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evoked the ~rong section or the Act, because 
or the £irst two £indings, and because the 
school board's action was well-rounded and 
could not be perceived as'a ~apricious act', 
the Board o£ Rererence ruled that the 
grievant's services as subject director 
were justly terminated. 
This 1974 decision raises some pertinent and 
important questions as it appears to contradict the prin-
ciple enunciated in The Placsko Case (1971):1 
1. Can a school board declare a position 
it finances redundant, when it reels 
so justiried? 
2. I£ so, do the laws of tenure have no 
application to teachers £illing such 
positions? 
3. Should school boards be allowed to 
invoke any clause or the legislation, 
without penalty, i£ they can show that 
they have not acted maliciously or 
capriciously? 
This writer would contend that the answers to all 
three questions should be 'No•. Tenure cannot be denied 
to teachers merely because they £ill positions t~at are 
the creations of local employers. The contract is with the 
school board not with the government that f'fnances the 
position. The Placsko Case illustrates that, without 
statutory provision, school boards cannot claim as a 
derence that the government has arbitrarily declared 
positions redundant. No more so, should school boards be 
1 Suura, pp.211-212. 
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allowed to arbitrarily declare as redundant positions 
that they have created. In · such situations, a clear 
understanding should exist between the employer and the 
employee. Special contracts, with terms covering the 
eventuality o£ redundancy, might be the solution. Un£ort-
unately, in the case referred to, · there is no indication 
that such was the procedure. 
The law creates procedures to enable citizens to 
discover more lucidly their duties and their rights. It 
is for this reason that appeals £rom boards of reference 
and boards o£ arbitration are allowed to the courts on 
points o£ law. Points of la~ include actions taken under 
the wrong sections of t~e legislation. In ~ Orange Case, 
the wrong section of The Schools Act, that is, the wrong 
law, was invoked by the school board. The Board .of 
Reference overlooked the legal inaccuracy as the act 
o£ the school board was not 'capricious'. While the 
re£usal of boards o£ reference to be hampered by 'red 
tape' is to be applauded, especially if such refusal 
ensures that justice is done, the haphazard and indiscrim-
inate use o£ legal enactments should be strongly opposed. 
I£ such uses were allowed, it would be simpler for school 
boards, when dismissing their employees, to state, nyou 
are dismissed under some provision or other of the law." 
This, however, would be completely contrary to the spirit 
of tenure legislation. Fortunately, greater exactness is 
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demanded, as will be indicated in the next section. 
V. THE PROCEDURES FOR DISMISSAL 
Article 10.01 of~ Collective Agreement {Nrld.)1975, 
states: 
Subject to 12.01(b), no teacher shall 
be suspended, dismissed or otherwise 
disciplined except for just cause. 
Article 10.02 states: 
Any teacher who is suspended or dismissed 
shall be provided written notification 
within five days of any oral notification. 
Such written notification shall state the 
precise reason{s) for the suspension or 
dismissal and no reasons other than those 
stated in that notice may subsequently be 
advanced against the teacher in that 
particular disciplinary action. 
Article 12.01(b) states that no reason has to be 
given when the contract of a probationary teacher is 
terminated. But, it does not say that a probationary 
teacher can be dismissed without just cause, and it does 
allow the teacher the opportunity to discuss the reason 
for his dismissal with his superintendent. He can, 
therefore, discover whether the cause is a just one. 
Under Article 12.01(b), a probationary teacher is denied 
relief . through the grievance or arbitration process. 
These Articles illustrate that 'just cause' must 
be sho\¥n for any dismissal or termination o£ contract, 
and that the employer must be exact in his reasons. These 
two procedural prerequisites will be examined. 
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1 • Just Cause 
\f.hether a teacher is dismissed under a clause 
sp&ci~ically stated in the legislation or under the more 
open 'adequate reason' clause 1 the reason put ~orward 
£or the dismissal must be a just one. }~. Justice Hart, 
in the Nova Scotia Supreme Court (Trial Division), in 
the case re Walker and West Rants Municipal School Board 
( 1974) said: 1 
The expression "just cause" and· many other 
similar phrases have been the subject of 
much judicial interpretation over the years 
••• it is recognised that each case must ba 
considered in the light o~ its own £acts. 
The type o£ thing that has been found to 
amount to "just cause" for dismissal or 
termination o£ employment in the past 
usually comes within the following type 
o£ classi~ication: misconduct, conduct 
incompatible with duty, drunkenness, 
insolence, disobedience, immorality, 
incompetency, disloyalty, dishonesty o~ 
prolonged absence or sickness ••• it is 
apparent that the determination o£ njust 
cause" ••• is partly a question o£ law 
and partly a question of £act. A board o~ 
appeal would have to look at the statutory 
and the contractual obligations placed on 
the teacners ••• and assess whether or not 
the applicant was carrying out his duties 
and responsibilities. They would also have 
to consider any complaints about the 
activities o£ the applicant that had been 
communicated to him and determine whether 
or not the School Board had any substantial 
reason £or terminating the employment. They 
must look at all the circumstances before 
reaching their conclusion. 
A just termination o~ contract, there£ore, must be 
one for which statutory or contractual provision is 
1 Suora, p. 203. 
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provided and must also be relative to the way in which 
the teacher per~orms his job. 
This principle applies even to those who have lost 
their tenure. 
Michaels and Finn v •. Red Deer College (Alta.) ( 1974): 1 
Tenured teachers were summarily dismissed 
without cause. The Contractual Agreement between 
the college and the teachers expired on June 
30th. 1972. The teachers were given notice, with 
one month's salary, on July 31st. 1972, that is, 
one month after the expiry o~ the Agreement 
which granted them tenure. The Alberta Supreme 
Court held that as the Agreement had expired, 
the ordinary rule in cases or wrong~ul dismissal 
must apply. They were awarded one year's salary 
by way · or damages and costs. Tenure formed part 
o~ the Agreement which had expired, but 
paragraph 7.2.2. of the Agreement had stipulated 
that a tenured teacher whose services were being 
terminated would be given a full year's prior 
notice in writing. The fact that the teachers 
lost their tenure should not deprive them of 
the rights they would have enjoyed ordinarily. 
-
It would also appear that, despite Article 12.01(b) 
of ~ Collective Agreement 1975, 2 this principle applies 
to probationary teachers. 
Harkey v. Port .Weller Dry Docks Ltd.(Ont.){1974):3 
In supporting the discharge of a probationary 
1 2 W.\v.R. 416. 
2 Supra, p. 228. 
3 47 D.L.R. ()d.) 7. 
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employee without notice or reason~ Mr. 
Justice Scott, an Ontario County Court 
judge~ said: 
The plaintiff was a probationary 
employee and the defendant during 
such period of probation was 
entitled to discharge him without 
notice or reason. So long as the 
defendant was satisfied (that) the 
plaintiff~ in its opinion, was 
unlikely to meet the company's 
standards in all respects and in 
addition its rights to ascertain 
his suitability as a permanent · 
employee, the decision was the · 
company's alone as to whether or 
not to terminate his services. This 
is the very essence of having a 
probationary period. On this issue, 
if I thought for a moment the 
plaintiff was discharged for 
alleged union activities, the 
result could quite conceivably be · 
entirely different. 
This judgement, although it found against the 
probationary employee, intimated that, if he had been 
discharged for activities which were not directly related 
to his efficiency at his work, the judgement might 
have been different. The worker's competency was judged 
in relation to his job, and his dismissal was justifiable 
because of the way he performed his job. 
Halsbury wrote: 
\ihen a skilled servant is engaged, 
there is on his part an implied 
warranty that he is reasonably 
competent for the work which he is 
employed to undertake, and if he 
proves to be incompetent the 
employer is not bound to continue 
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him in his service for the term 
ror which he was engaged.1 
The greatest difficulty arises when incompetency 
has to be proven. One digest's definition of incompetency 
is:2 
A relative term without technical meaning, 
but having a common and approved usage. 
The term may include something more than 
physical and mental attributes; it may 
include want of qualifications generally, 
such as habitual carelessness, indisposition 
and temperament; and may be defined or 
employed as meaning disqualification; 
inability; incapacity; general lack of 
capacity or fitness; or lack of special 
qualities required for a particular 
purpose ••. the want of ability or 
fitness as a matter of fact, as 
distinguished from eligibility or status 
as a matter of law ••• 
When used to describe an ' employee, therefore, 
'incompetent•, in the view of Robbins, always refers 
to the kind of work for which he is engaged, that is, 
relative to job fitness.3 In an unreported case, heard 
before an Industrial Tribunal in May 1975, in Britain, 
a local education authority was held to have been 
perfectly justified in dismissing a teacher who spoke 
•utter pornography' to pupils and used obscene language 
in the classroom.4 
1 25 Halsbury, )rd. ed., p.486, para.9)6. 
2 42 C.J.S. 539 -40, cited by Jerry H. Robbins, Teacher 
Dismissal for Incompetency (1973, ERIC ED 084 634). 
3 Idem. 
4 The Daily Telegraph (London), May 22, 1975. 
-233-
The teacher, Manuel l1oreno, 'shouted 
obscenities at his pupils, told the head-
master to ignore a case of a fourteen-year 
old boy sleeping with a twelve-year old girl, 
permitted four•letter words to be scra~led 
on the blackboard and a tailor's dummy to 
be covered in obscene gra£fiti.' He 
discussed the sex act with his pupils and 
left lying on a shelf a document which he 
had written describing his own love affairs . 
and his sexual performances. The Chairman 
of the Tribunal said: 
••• he (Moreno) taught in a way 
unacceptable to the local authority 
••• \Yho knows in a number of years 
his views might gain more support, 
but he was disillusioned with 
institutionalised education. He was 
a square peg in a round hole and 
showed a lack of judgement incon-
sistent with his role as a teacher. 
Moreno might have been a perfectly competent and 
capable classroom teacher, but he was dismissed because 
the way he conducted his classes indicated a lack o£ 
those qualities required :for the position. 
Although not directly relevant to this study, 
two decisions :from the United .States exemplify the 
principle of relativity to job :fitness. 
State ex rel. Wasilewski v. Board o:f School Directors 
of the City of Milwaukee (U.S.)(1961):1 
A tenure teacher was discharged on the grounds o:f 
1 111 N • W. ( 2d) 1 98 • 
iMmorality for conducting a discussion in 
his high school class on the price r~~ge 
of p~ostitutes. Although there was no express 
statute permitting dismissal on these 
grounds, the court upheld his discharge as 
it related to his job ~itness. 
Beilan v. Board of' Public Education (U.S .. )(1958):1 
A teacher was dismissed ~~der the Pennsylvania 
Public School Code for statutory 'incompetence' 
based on his refusal to answer a question 
regarding past Communist Party activity put 
to him by his superintendent and later by 
a congressional committee. The Supreme Court 
of the United States upheld the dismissal. 
It said that, although it had ruled in an 
earlier case that job holders, ~rotected 
by statutory rights of tenure, were not subject 
to arbitrary dismissal, if a dismissal is to 
be based on a refusal to answer, the question 
must be relevant to job ~itness in a general 
sense. Membership of the Communist Party and 
job fitness were relative. 
In a 1971 Board of R9ference case in Newfoundland~ 
to be called ~ Brown Case, a very inter9ating minority 
report was submitted by one of the Board members. 
A teacher~ prior to The Collective Agreement 1973 6 
was dismissed under section 77(f) or The Schools Act . 
- -(R.SeN.) 1970. The notice was validly given. Under 
this section no reason had to be given ror the 
1 357 u.s. 399. 
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termination o£ contract. The majority held 
that the notice was valid and served within 
the time limit prescribed. The dissenting 
member, however, maintained that the Board 
o~ Re~erence had been appointed by the 
Minister under section 78(2 and 3) or The 
Schools Act to hear parties on the 'matter 
in dispute•. The teacher was grieving her 
dismissal, and the 'matter in dispute' was 
the dismissal. The dissenting member wrote 
in the report: 
••• I also consider that Section 78(2) 
of The Schools Act provides the avenue 
through which the teacher, who feels 
that the decision to terminate the . 
contract was unjusti£ied, can seek 
justice by appealing £or a Board 
of Re~erence. I consider that the 
Board o~ Reference was set up to 
weigh the evidence ·as to whether the 
••• School Board was justified in 
giving (the grievant) notice ••• and 
that since the Board of Reference has 
not given both parties a reasonable 
opportunity to be heard, ••• the 
Board of Rererence has not completed 
its work and has prevented (the 
grievant) from obtaining justice. 
The secrecy which surrounds hearings before boards 
of reference and the principle that no precedent is 
established by such boards is well illustrated by this 
case. The arguments put ~orward in this minority report 
were the very arguments adopted by the entire Board o£ 
Reference in a case heard only six months earlier. In this 
latter case, re~erred to as~ Amber Case(1971), the 
grievant was dismissed under section 77(a) o£ The Schools 
Act 1970, without reason. The grievance was based on the 
-
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premise that he had been given no 1 satis~actory explanation' 
~or his termination, 'or, at least, an evaluation or 
his performance'. Although the School Board protested any 
inquiry into the causes for the dismissal, as under 
section 77(a) no reason had to be given, the Board or 
Reference agreed to hear the arguments on the very grounds 
that the minority report outlined in~ Brown Case.1 
Subsequent boards of re·:ference have examined the 
adequacy o:f the reason :for dismissal or termination of 
contract, and~ as has been seen, ~ Collective Agreement 
1975, now demands a statement of the precise reason for 
dismissal. 2 
2. Exact Reasons 
In order to dispel any fears that employers might 
have that they might be liable for defamation i:f they 
state all the reasons for an employee's dismissal, it can 
be stated at the outset that any action for libel or 
slander will :fail, provided no malice is indicated. A 
leading decision o:f The Supreme Court o~ Canada illustrates 
this point. 
Lacarte v. Board o~ Education of Toronto (Ont.)(1959):3 
Lacarte, . after eight years of teaching, was 
dismissed on the recommendation o~ an Advisory 
Committee for 'lack of co-operation with the 
1 Suora, p.234· 
2 Supra, p. 228. 
3 s.c.R. 465. 
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principal and certain members o£ the star£.' 
He sued ~or libel. ~ Board 2! Rererence ~, 
1964, required all notices of termination to 
be in writing, indicating the reasons for 
such dismissal. The trial judg~ and jury held 
that the publication had qualified privilege 
(which is a defence to a charge of defamation) 
and did not indicate malice on the part of 
the Board of Education. The Ontario Court of 
Appeal and The Supreme Court of Canada 
affirmed the original decision. 
Not only must employers state the precise -reasons 
for the suspension or dismissal of teachers, 1 but, as 
part of these precise reasons, they must indicate - the 
clause(s) under which a teacher is being disciplL~ed. 
Prior to~ Collective Agreement 1973, disputes, 
such as ~ Orange __ Case, 2 indicated that boards of 
reference in Newfoundland accepted the principle that 
actions need not necessarily :fail because of a legal 
technical error. It can be argued that, if the intent o£ 
the school board is clear, then the teacher, who might be 
incompetent, should not be allowed to hide behind the 
skirts or the law. But neither should school boards be· 
allowed this privilege. The wrong section of~ School 
A£1 {R.S.N.) 1970 was given, not only in The Orange Case, 
but also in~ Green Case (1972) and~ Lemon Case {1973). 
1 Article 10.02 o£ ~Collective Agreement, 1975. 
2 Supra, p. 224. 
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A more detailed examination or these cases is needed. 
~ _G_r_e_en_ Case {1972): 
A £irst-year teacher was advised in writing on 
April 27th 1972 that his services were being 
terminated. but the letter or termination 
did not speci£y any particular section o£ 
The Schools Act 1970. The letter did. however, 
contain the words• " ••• but we .feel it is in 
the best interests of' all concerned." 
(Section 77(c) of' ~ Schools !£1 stated that a teacher 
could be dismissed if the school board was satisfied• 
' 
. . . that a teacher is incompetent or that his continued 
employment ••• would be detrimental to the best interests 
of' the school. concerned. (Underlining mine.) An aggrieved 
teacher -could only appeal from this section to the 
Ninister and the Hinister's decision was binding. There 
w~s, therefore, no provision £or a Board of' Ref'erence to 
review any action taken under section 77(c).) 
The N.T.A. sought f'rom the school board an. 
indication o.f which section o.f the Act it 
was invoking. On May 25th •• the superintendent 
indicated, in writing, to the N.T.A. that 
the teacher's contract was terminated under 
section 77(b). But, this section stated that 
notice had to be given by April 30th. The 
school board contended, be£ore the Board of' 
Reference, that incompetence was not the 
issue, but rather teaching effectiveness and 
classroom control (maintenance o£ discipline) 
were the major points o~ concern. The Board 
of Re£erence, in the rationale .for its 
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decision and award, stated, inter alia: 
••• It was difficult for this Board 
to accept the idea that a teacher's 
inability to control his class is 
apart ~rom competence. Seemingly, 
being able to lead, direct, motivate, 
and control the behaviour of people 
are components o~ competence. In 
further reviewing the testimony and 
letters in evidence, it becomes 
apparent that the question of 
competency is a factor in this case. 
The school board ~ailed to substantiate its 
charges against the teacher because it had 
insufficient documentary evidence and had 
failed to adequately supervise the new 
teacher. In ~inding for the teacher, the 
Board of Reference ordered his record to 
be cleared of any suggestions of incomp-
etency. 
Because the teacher was not dismissed under section 
77(c), the question of competency should not have arisen. 
Once it did become an issue, it might be hypothesised that 
the Board of Reference should have ruled that the issue 
was beyond its jurisdiction and returned the case to 
the Minister in accordance with section 78(1) of~ 
Schools !£i {R.S.N.) 1970. 
Incompetency is a difficult thing to prove which 
would probably explain why school boards did not resort 
to section 77(c) of the Act. But, if incompetency really 
was the issue , were not school boards, by using the other 
sections or provisions of the legislation, doing education 
generally a disservice, since teachers who might have 
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been dismissed by one school board, could continue 
teaching with another school board who would have no 
indication ~rom their records that they were, in errect, 
incompetent. 
~Lemon Case (1973): 
·The grievant was originally given notice on 
April 30th, under section 12{b) and 77(a) o~ 
The Schools Act 1970. When he pointed out 
- -that section 12{b) had to do with 'land and 
property' and that section 77(a) applied to 
~irst-year teachers, while he had been with 
the school board ror ~our and a hal~ years, 
a subsequent letter of May 28th quoted sections 
12(c) and 77(~). As notice had to be given by 
April 30th, if the contract was to be termin-
ated at the end of the school year, this 
second letter stated that his contract would 
be terminated on October 2nd. The grievant 
argued that his contract was to be terminated 
during the year when prospects of employment 
were slight, and that he was forbidden to 
accept another position in September. Also 
no adequate reason had been given. 
The school board stated that his position had 
become redundant, but that the real issue was 
a lack of sel~-control on the part or the 
grievant. It contended that it had acted 'in 
the best interests o~ all concerned.' 
The Board of Reference stated, inter alia, in 
its rationale for ~inding ~or the grievant: 
It is dirficult for the Board to 
accept the idea that self-control 
is not a part of competence. After 
reviewing the testimony and letters 
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in evidence, it is the view of this 
Board that the question o~ competency 
is a factor in this case. 
Again, there~ore, we have a suggestion of incompet-
ency and 'even the best interests o~ all concerned', the 
two causes ~or the use of section 77(c). 1 \ihy, there~ore, 
did the school board not invoke this section? 
In~ Brown Case (1971), 2 the correct section was 
adhered to and notice was given in sufficient time. By 
the majority report of the Board o~ Reference, therefore, 
the termination was held valid. 
The provisions or the collective agreements in 1973 
and 1975 have overcome these inadequacies. Articles 
covering Lay-Offs, Disciplinary Action, Termination of 
Contracts, Transfer of Teachers, Grievance Procedure and 
Arbitration, have established procedures to be followed. 
A case heard subsequent to The Collective Agreement 1973, 
illustrates the point. 
~ !!.!_c! ..... c.... a .... s ... e ( 1 9 7 4): 
A grievant, a school principal with tenure, 
was advised, in writing, on April 11th. that 
his position was being eliminated due to re-
organisation in the school district. He was 
advised that he had been assigned the position 
of Department Head. A further letter o~ April 
18th. confirmed the "o:r.fer" o:r this position 
and ~equested an acknowledgement of his 
1 Supra, p. 238. 
2 Supra, p. 234. 
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acceptance. He submitted a grievance claiming 
that the actions o~ the school board were in 
contravention of Articles 8 and .11 or The 
.......... 
Collective Agreement 1973. In finding ~or the 
grievant, the Board of Arbitration ruled that 
i~ the termination resulted from 'transfer' 
it should have been governed by Article 11, 
which called for a 'comparable position'. If 
the termination resulted from redundancy it 
should have been governed by Article 8.05, 
which called for notice in writing by 
February 15th. Also Article 8.06 stated that, 
'When a teacher is notified of a lay-off after 
the fi~teenth day of February of his contract 
·year, the lay-off shall not become effective 
until the end of the subsequent contract year~' · 
Accordingly, the Board or Arbitration ruled 
that the grievant be paid the bonus and salary 
he would have received had he remained in the 
position of principal. 
To substantiate dismissals, demotions or terminations, 
therefore, just cause must be shown, the cause must be 
relative to the job fitness, the precise reasons for the 
dismissal must be stated, the correct clauses or the 
legislation or contract must be cited, and actions muat 
be taken within the time limits specified. It will be 
shown, in the next section, that the cause must be 
substantiated by adequate and reasonable documentary 
evidence. 
-243-
VI. THE TEACHERS' PROCEDURAL RIGHTS 
In addition to his right to be shown 'just cause' 
ror his dismissal, a teacher has the right (1) to be 
given an opportunity to improve, when his competency is 
in question, (2) to be given a hearing prior to his 
dismissal becoming er£ective, and (3) to appeal the 
decision i£ he is aggrieved. These procedural rights 
will be examined~ 
1. The Right to Supervision and Guidance 
H.C. Hudgins, writing on "The Law and Teacher 
Dismissals: Ten Commandments You Better Not Break," 
stated:1 
Generally speaking, incompetency assumes 
a recurring or continuous inability to 
do the job. And to make that inability 
stick as a cause £or dismissal, admin-
istrators must prove an e££ort was made 
to help the teacher overcome the problem. 
It has been shown that a teacher threatened with 
dismissal or termination o£ his contract has a right to 
be in£ormed o£ a 'just cause' why he should be so treated. 
But, during his employment, prior to receiving his notice 
or dismissal or termination, he has a similar right to 
just treatment. I£ a teacher receives notice that his 
services are to be discontinued because he is not a good 
and er£icient teacher, which, in errect, means that he 
1 Nation's Schools, March 1974, p.42. 
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lacks competency, he has a prior right to have received 
some indication or his inadequacy. Lang puts the position 
thus: 1 
A discharge may be reversed because or 
railure or school or~icials to evaluate 
the teacher constructively, to alert 
him when improvements are considered 
essential to satisractory service, and 
to train and counsel him in order ror 
him to have a rair opportunity to improve 
his teaching perrorrnance. In a sense, this 
is a rorrn or notice essential to rairness. 
Thus a teacher who perrorms poorly in the 
judgement or the principal, but never is 
inrormed or it, naturally assumes that 
his performance has been at least 
adequate. How, then, can he be expected 
to improve himselr? And how should he 
know what would be considered an improve-
ment? 
The decision or two boards or rererence in Newround-
land indicate that the board members considered that a 
special duty or supervision and assistance was owed to 
both probationary and experienced teachers. 
~Green Case (1972): 
A rirst-year teacher's contract was terminated 
at the end or the school year. The school 
board stated that .he lacked errectiveness and 
classroom control. It was shown that the 
principal had visited the teacher's classroom 
three times during the course or the year, 
two or the visits being on the same day. He 
had also had three ~ £2£ discussions with 
the teacher. The school board supervisor had 
1 Lang, op.cit., p.461. 
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visited the teacher's classroom three times 
and held one discussion session when he kept 
no notes and offered no criticisms. In finding 
for the teacher~ the Board or Rererence~ in its 
rationale~ stated~ inter alia: 
It appeared to this Board that School 
Districts (sic) Boards or Education have 
a responsibility ror improving instruction. 
Part or this responsibility lies in 
working with new inexperienced teachers. 
It was apparent to this Board or Rererence 
that {the grievant) did not receive 
adequate assistance rrom the supervisory 
team to improve his instructional ability. 
~Lemon Case (1973): 
The contract or a teacher~ who had been with 
the school board ror four and a halr years, 
was terminated on the grounds or redundancy. 
The school board later stated that the real 
reason was the teacher's 'lack or selr-
control'. It was shown that no rormal super-
vision or evaluation had taken place nor had 
any warning been given to the teacher that 
improvement was needed. In rinding for the 
teacher, the Board or Rererence~ in its 
rationale~ stated, inter alia: 
4 ... Surely the supervisory starr 
or the Central orrice could have been 
mobilized to help identiry the real 
problem, ir one existed, and to orrer 
suggestions ror its solution through 
their supervisory activities. 
5. It appeared to this Board or 
Rererence, that school boards through 
their administrative teams have a 
responsibility ror the improvement 
or instruction. Part or this respon-
sibility lies in working with exper-
ienced and inexperienced teachers. It 
became apparent to this Board or 
Reference that (the grievant) did not 
receive adequate assistance from the 
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supervisory team to improve his 
instructional abilities. 
6. This Board o~ Reference took 
cognizance or the ~act that the 
grievant had not been warned to the 
ef~ect that his contract would be 
terminated should his perrormance not 
improve. To this Board, it seemed only 
reasonable that the grievant ought to 
have been given a chance to improve 
his perrormance. 
Newfoundland has no statutory legislation imposing 
upon school boards the duty to supervise experienced 
or inexperienced teachers. The boards of reference 
evidently considered this duty ·so obvious that a failure 
to perform it showed negligence ··on the part or the school 
boards. It is interesting to note some specific legis-
lation which could provide sources for those without 
such regulations. 
Britain. Extr·act ~rom the Schools Regulation 1959. 
incorporating 1968 amendments: 
Schedule 11. 2(b) During his probationary 
period a teacher shall be employed in such 
school and under such supervision and 
conditions or work as shall be suitable 
for a teacher on probation. 
Ontario. School Administration !£1 (R.S.O.) 1970: 
Section 14.9(d) ••• a secondary school 
principal · shall • • • ( ii) recommend to 
the board the demotion or dismissal of 
a teacher whose work or attitude is 
unsatisfactory. but only arter warning 
the teacher, in writing, giving him 
assistance and allowing him a reason-
able time to improve. 
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The London Board of Education (secondary) 1972-73 
Collective Agreement (Ontario): 
Section 2.22.2. Before recommending the 
demotion or dismissal of a teacher, the 
principal shall carry out the ~allowing 
procedures: 
Section 2.22.2.1. See the probationary 
teacher in action during the ~irst few 
weeks after school begins in September. 
I~ the teacher is on permanent contract, 
he should begin documentation whenever 
he notes unsatisfactory work or attitude. 
Section 2.22.2.2. Make recommendations 
in writing to the teacher to help him 
overcome the di~~iculties he may be 
experiencing. He should file such 
recommendations and - supply the teacher 
with a copy or them. 
Section 2.22.2.3. Request the department 
head to help the teacher, and ask him to 
list the times he saw the teacher and the 
recommendations he made on each visit. This 
procedure does not constitute an adverse 
report but is a form of in-service training. 
Section 2.22.2.4. Within a reasonable time, 
visit the teacher again to see i~ hia 
previous recommendations are being rollowed. 
He should again give the teacher a written. 
copy or his report and £ile the original. 
Section 2.22.2.5. Should the teacher's 
unsatisfactory work or attitude continue, 
in£orm him o£ the seriousness in a letter 
which presents a clearly detailed analysis 
of the areas of unsatisfactory performance, 
lays down a specific interval after which 
he will make a final re-assessment, and 
indicates that a recommendation to the 
Board for termination or contract is a 
possibility. He should retain a copy of 
this letter in the teacher's £ile. 
Section 2.22.2.6. If, after a reasonable 
interval, the teacher's performance is 
still unsatis£actory, notify him in writing 
that he will recommend his demotion or 
dismissal to the Board, which may con~irm 
the recommendation by 30 November, to take 
e£fe ct on 31 December immediately following; 
or by 31 May to take errect on 31 August 
immediately rollowing. 
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The Roman Catholic School Board f"or St. John's, 
Newfoundland, Princioals _Manual: 
Section 5.04 Unsatisfactory Teacher Performance. 
1. The principal or the school will notiry 
the teacher in writing not later than the 
end or December or any school year· stating 
the reasons ror dissatisraction ••• It is 
assumed, of" course, that unsatisf"actory 
perf"ormance would have b~en obvious ror 
some considerable time prior to December 
31st. and that the appropriate supervisor 
had been called in f"or consultation with 
the principal and the teacher. 
2. The teacher may be given a three-month 
probationary period to improve his work 
with the aid o~ rrequent assistance f"rom 
the principal and Board Supervisor. 
S. The teacher is to be given every 
reasonable opportunity to improve himsel~ 
with the frequent helpful assistance, advice 
and encouragement or his principal and 
supervis-or. This, of' course, is especially 
important to beginning teachers who frequently 
encounter dirficulties in the f"irst months 
or teaching. 
A greater onus on school boards and principals in 
Newf"oundland to assist teachers in handling their problems 
can be inf"erred f'rom more recent legislation. The Teacher 
(Certif'ication) Regulations, 1972, indicate that beginning 
teachers are initially awarded interim certiricates. These 
become permanent af"ter two years' satisfactory teaching 
experience, on the recommendation of a superintendent or 
school board supervisor. Since the signing of' The Collective 
Agreement 1973, more school boards have constructed 
regulations f"or teacher evaluation. 
I~ such evaluation is not carried out , any teacher, 
who is dismissed or demoted, might be able to claim, in 
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his defence, that he received inadequate supervision, 
guidance or assistance. 
Finally, it is apparent that a thorough system o~ 
teacher evaluation will not only make teacher tenure 
more relevant, but will also answer the critics who 
maintain that tenure protects the incompetent. Standards, 
however, have to be developed in order to measure the 
effectiveness of a teacher's per~ormance. Lang has written, 
"In the absence of' standards, there is great di:f~iculty 
in proving 'just cause•."1 The standards must be of' 
such a nature that the measurement of' the performance 
can be documented. Article 10.03 o~ ~ Collective 
Agreement 1975, states in part: 
No occurrence or event, which is not 
documented in the teacher's personal 
~ile, except a culminating occurrence 
or event, shall be used against the 
teacher in any case of' suspension, 
dismissal or other disciplinary action. 
2. The Right To A Hearing 
The courts have ruled overwhelmingly that a teacher 
has a right to be heard. The law o~ natural justice 
demands audi alteram partem - hear the other part. 2 This 
fundamental right is incorporated into the Canadian Bill 
££Rights 1960. Section 2 states that no law of' Canada 
shall be construed or applied so as to: 
1 Lang, op.cit. p.460. 
2 The phrase 'natural justice' is termed 'due process' 
in The United States of America. 
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•.• (e) deprive a person of the right to 
a fair hearing in accordance with the 
principles of fundamental justice for 
the determination of his rights and 
obligations. 
Richards v. Athabasca School Trustees {Alta.)(1931): 1 
The Alberta School Act stated that, in cases 
or termination of contract, thirty days' notice 
had to be given by either party, but a teacher 
had to be given the privilege of attending a 
Board meeting 'to hear and discuss reasons for 
proposing to terminate the agreement'. In this 
case, this provision was not observed. The 
Supreme Court of Canada held that the school 
board was liable and that the teacher could 
recover damages for wrongful dismissal. 
A leading United States case illustrates the principle 
in relation to non-tenured staff. 
Board of Regents of State Colleges et al. v. 
Roth (U.S.)(1972):2 
An assistant professor, who did not have tenure, 
sued the board when he was in:formed that he was 
not to be rehired. He claimed that his rights 
under the 14th Amendment were being infringed. 
The 14th Amendment protects a person 'where 
his good name, reputation, honour or integrity 
are at stake and gives him a right to a 
hearing first•. The District Court and The 
Court of Appeal found for the professor. The 
Supreme Court o:r The United States reversed 
their finding on the grounds that he had no 
1 s.c.R. 161. 
2 92 s.ct. 2701. 
tenure, and, as he was as £ree as he was 
be£ore to seek another job, and, as there 
was no malice or bad mark against him, the 
14th Amendment had not been infringed. 
Although this non-tenured teacher was not granted 
a hearing first, the ruling or The Supreme Court suggests 
that, if his dismissal had warranted a bad mark against 
him, he would have been entitled to a hearing. 
Article 12.01(b) of~ Collective Agreement 1975, 
states that a probationary teacher may not make use · 
of the grievance or arbitration procedures ir his contract 
is terminated. The same Article, however, does grant the 
teacher the right to a hearing. 
When a School Board terminates the contract 
of a teacher who is on a probationary 
contract, the teacher shall be given an 
opportunity to discuss the reason with 
the Superintendent. 
The recommendations of a joint conference of 
related committees, corporations, associations and teacher 
unions in Britain, on Conditions 2£ Tenure ££ Teachers, 
1946, included: 
It is generally recognised that it should 
be a condition of service or every teacher 
in the maintained schools that before any 
decision relating to dismissal is taken 
he should have the right to be heard and 
to be represented before the local 
education authority in whose service the 
teacher is employed or whose consent is 
required to the dismissal or the teacher. 
This recommendation was adopted in _1968 and included 
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in the document entitled, "Teachers' Conditions of Service 
(1968)." Malloch -v. Aberdeen Corporation (U.K.)(1971), 1 
is illustrative: 
A teacher who was dismissed by the Corporation 
a~ter rerusing to register with the General 
Teaching Council £or Scotland, a new body 
which, inter alia, compiled lists o£ 
registered teachers, · contended 
that he had a right to present his case 
to the Corporation. On appeal to The House 
o£ Lords, it was held that he did have the 
right and there~ore his dismissal was 
unjust and was ordered to be overruled. 
The Teacher Tenure · Act (Saskatchewan) 1965, states 
- -
in section 4(1) t .hat notice o:f termination shall be in 
form A. 2 Section 5(1) o:f the Act reads: 
~~ere a school board gives notice 
o:f termination o:f contract to a 
teacher the school board shall 
within ri:fteen days :from the date 
o:f the notice provide an opportunity 
:for the teacher to be present at a 
regular or special meeting o:f the 
board and to give reasons why his 
contract ought not to be terminated. 
Form A, referred to in section 4(1), takes a 
statutory :form. It is detailed in ~ !£1 12 Amend !h2 
Teacher Tenure ~ 1972, in section 3~ Form A is to be 
1 All E.R. Vol.2. 1278. 
2 Supra, p.205. 
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recommended. It is speci.f'ic, it details the reasons .!'or 
the termination of' contract, and it states a time .!'or a 
hearing. It also ensures, through its signatory, that 
the school board is aware of' the dismissal and that it 
is not an arbitrary act of' the superintendent. 
Figure 6.1. 
Form A. Notice of' Termination of' Contract. 
Saskatchewan Legislation 
I have been instructed to in.f'orm you that by resolution 
of' the Board of' the School Unit (or School District) 
Number adopted at a special (or regular) meeting 
held on the day of' , 19 , your contract with 
the board as teacher in the School District 
Number will terminate on the day , 19 
The reasons .!'or the termination of your contract are: 
In the opinion of the Board of' the School Unit (or 
School District) Number you are ror reasons above 
stated unsuitable .!'or teaching service in the 
School District Number • 
In accordance with section 5 of' The Teacher Tenure ~, 
this is to notiry you that you may attend a meeting or 
the board to be held at (description or place) on the 
day or , 19 , at the hour of' o'clock in 
the noon, and give reasons why your contract ought 
n·ot to be terminated. 
Secretary 
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A hearing need not take place prior to termination 
o~ contract or dismissal. Provided an opportunity exists 
~or a hearing and that the hearing takes place as soon 
as possible, the courts will be satis~ied that justice 
has been done. This is well illustrated by a New Zealand 
case that was decided~ on appeal, by the Privy Council 
in London. 
Furnell v. Whangarei High Schools Board (N.Z. -)(1973): 1 
A teacher was told that there were complaints 
against him and that he was temporarily 
suspended pending an investigation. He asked 
ror and was s~nt a complete list o~ the 
complaints against him, to which he replied. 
He was told the date o~ the investigation 
and that he could either present his own 
case or be represented. Be~ore the invest-
igation began, he brought legal proceedings. 
He claimed an injunction to the board to 
reinstate him and to remove the suspension, 
a writ o£ prohibition to stop the hearing 
and a writ or certiorari to quash the 
decision o£ the school board. He claimed 
that he had been denied natural justice in 
that he had not been allowed to present his 
side of the case berore the suspension. 
The Privy Council held that the school 
board had done everything correctly in 
the procedure it had adopted. The principle 
laid down by natural justice that a man 
be given a ~air opportunity or correcting 
1 1 A.E.R. 400. 
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or contradicting the charges had not 
been violated. 
The report or the dissenting member o~ the Board 
or Re~erence in~ Brown Case (1971) is quoted once 
again: 1 
••• and that since the Board o~ 
Rererence has not given both parties 
a reasonable opportunity to be heard, 
••• the Board o£ Re£erence has not 
completed its work and has prevented 
(the grievant) £rom obtaining justice. 
Finally, the writer re£ers to a statement o~ 
Pro£essor D.J. Mullan: 2 
Our courts seem to hold that dismissal 
o£ tenured sta££ brings with it the 
obligation to £ollow the rules o£ 
natural justice ••• The lesson to be 
learnt is to ••• concentrate on internal 
procedures and ensure that a hearing 
committee is appointed. 
3. The Right To Aopeal 
The right o£ appeal is so £undamental to the legal 
process . that, even ira teacher appears by his conduct 
to accept the school board's decision and takes steps to 
acquire alternative employment, he may still appeal when 
he discovers that he has such a right. 
Knight v. Board o~ Yorkton School Unit No.36 
(Sask.) {1973) :3 
A teacher's contract was terminated with no 
reasons given. The termination was thererore 
1 Supra, p. 235. 
2 Supra, p .1 0. 
3 34 D.L.R. (3d) 592. 
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defective as it was contrary to section 4(1) 
or The Teacher Tenure Act (Saskatchewan).1 
- -
The teacher sought employment with her own 
board and with other school Loards. Later 
she found out that she could challenge the 
termination of her contract. The Court of 
Appeal held that she was entitled to her 
£ull salary, less anything she had earned 
in the meantime, as the termination was 
invalid. By her conduct she did not waive 
her rights. The court said: · 
Waiver requires both a knowledge or 
the existence o£ a right and a clear 
intention o£ £oregoing the exercise 
o£ the right. 
She had challenged the termination as soon 
as she knew she could. 
It would appear, thererore, that the principle 
ignorantia · iuris ~ excusat - ignorance of the law 
is no excuse - does not apply in civil cases if it 
denies justice to the individual. The onus, however, 
is upon the grievant to prove that he did not know o~ 
the right and that he had not waived the right. 
The right to appeal a decision of a school board 
is governed by statute or by collective agreements. The 
provisions vary in di££erent jurisdictions. For the 
purpose or this study, the principle will be illustrated 
by an examination o~ the procedures that are applicable 
to New~oundland. 
1 Supra, p. 205. 
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Prior to ~ Collective Agreement 1973, the teacher's 
rights were governed by~ Schools~ (R.S.N.) 1970. 
Within the provisions or the Act, appeals could be made 
to the Minister o~ Education, within thirty days or receipt 
or the notice 0~ termination, against dismissal under 
section 77(c) (for incompetency) · or section 77(d) (.ror 
gross misconduct, neglect o.r duty, insubordination or 
mental incapacity). No board of re.:ference could be 
appointed .:for dismissal on these grounds and the decision 
o.:f the Minister was binding, except that, ir the dismissal 
was under section 77(d), an appeal could be lodged to 
The Supreme Court o.:f New.:foundland on a point o.:f law only. 
Cases o.:f incompetency, there.:fore, were decided by the 
Minister, and his decision was binding. 
I.:f a teacher was dismissed .:for any other reason, the 
Minister was under a mandatory duty to establish a board 
o.:f re.:ference, i.:f the teacher requested one. 1 Tha teacher 
had the right to a hearing be.:fore the board o.:f rererence, 2 
and to appeal its decision, on points of law, to The 
Supreme Court o.:f New.:foundland.3 
Since April 1973, the teacher's right to a hearing 
has been guaranteed, .:first by ~ Collective Agreement 
1973, and latterly by~ Collective Agreement 1975. Both 
1 The Schools Act (R.S.N.) 1970, section 78(2). 
2 ~d., section 78(5). 
3 Ibid., section 78(6). 
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Agreements provide ~or grievance procedures. Article 33.01 
o~ ~Collective Agreement 1975, states: 
A grievance means a dispute over 
the interpretation, application, 
administration or alleged violation 
o~ any Article or clause in this 
Collective Agreement. 
Accordingly, when a teacher wishes to contest a 
transfer, a demotion, a lay-o~r or a dismissal, he may 
appeal - the ruling of his employer. The appeal process 
grants to him a series o~ avenues in which to present 
his case. In some instances he may present his case 
personally; in others, he must appeal in writing. This 
appeal process is in three stages. 
(a) The first stage 
A teacher, who is aggrieved, must appeal within 
.ten days o~ being advised o~ the occurrence which causes 
the dispute, to his superintendent, if ·the grievance is 
with the school board, 1 or to the Divisional Head in 
the Department or Education, if the grievance is with 
the Department of Education. 2 
When the appeal is to ' the superintendent, he must 
meet with the aggrieved teacher within ten days o~ 
receiving the grievance,3 and, within ~ive days or the 
meeting, he must transmit, in writing, his decision to 
1 ~ Collective Agreement 1975, Article 33.03. 
2 Ibid., Article 33.09. 
3 Ibid., Article 33.04. 
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1 the teacher, with a copy to the N.T.A. 
I~ the appeal is to the Divisional Head, he need 
not meet with the teacher, but, within ten days o~ 
receiving the grievance, he must report, in writing, his 
decision on the grievance to the teacher, with a copy 
2 to the N.T.A. 
Since the signing of the first Collective Agreement 
in April 1973, over one-hundred disputes have been satis-
factorily resolved at this stage of the grievance procedure.3 
This rep~ents approximately eighty-five per cent (85%) 
of the disputes grieved. The high proportion o~ success- -
ful settlements reached at this stage of the appeal process 
is indicative that The Collective Agreements have laid 
down a workable procedural process. In no small measure, 
the attitude of the participant~who worked within that 
process,contributed to the high proportion of success-
ful settlements.4 It might also be hypothesised that 
educators are becoming more aware of the legal irnplic-
ations of teacher tenure and of the importance of the 
procedural process. 
(b) The second stage 
When the decision of the superintendent or the 
1 ~Collective Agreement 1975, Article 33.05. 
2 Ibid., Article 33.10. 
3 Interview with William O'Driscoll, Executive Secretary, 
N.T.A., May 1975. 
4 Idem. 
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Divisional Head does not result in settlement or the 
grievance, the teacher, within ten days o~ receiving the 
decision, may submit his grievance, in writing, to the 
Chairman o~ the School Board, if his grievance is with 
the school board, 1 or to the Deputy Minister of Education, 
if his grievance is with the Department o£ Education. 2 
These gentlemen have a ~urther ten days to submit their 
decision, in writing, to the teacher, with a copy to the 
3 N.T.A. 
Since the signing of the first Collective Agreement 
in April 1973, approximately fifteen disputes have been 
settled at this stage o~ the grievance procedure.4 
(c) The third stage 
I£ the decision of the Chairman of the School Board 
or o£ the Deputy Minister of Education fails to settle 
the grievance, the teacher, within seven days, with the 
written consent of the N.T.A., may submit the grievance 
to arbitration.5 
An arbitration board consists of three members, one 
appointed by the employer, one by the teacher, usually 
with the advice and on the recommendation of the N.T.A., 
and a third member appointed, within ten days of their own 
1 ~ Collective Agreement 1975, Article 33.06. 




Ibid., Articles 33.07, 33.12. 
Interview with William O'Driscoll, N.T.A., May 1975. 
~Collective Agreement 1975, Articles 33.08, 33.13. 
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appointment, by the other two arbitrators. The third 
appointee becomes the Chairman of" the Arbitration Board. 
Within £ifteen days of" being constituted, the Board must 
hold the hearing and render its decision. Within a 
£urther ten days it must communicate its decision to the 
parties concerned. 1 
Since April 1973, three disputes have been settled 
at this stage of" the appeal process. 2 
Article 34.05 of"~ Collective Agreement 1975, 
grants to both parties in the dispute the right to 
present evidence. It reads: 
Both parties to a grievance shall be-
a££orded the opportunity of" presenting 
evidence and argument thereon and may 
employ counsel or any other person £or 
this purpose. 
· In allowing the presentation o£ evidence, boards 
or arbitration must conduct hearings justly and not 
permit any bias or undue inf."luence to interf."ere with the 
proceedings. 
re Thompson and Lambton Board of" Education (Ont.):3 
Under the Ontario School Administration Act 
a board of" reference was appointed to inquire 
ill camera into the dismissal of" a teacher. The 
secretary of" the board of education and the 
1 The Collective Agreement 1975, Article 34.07. 
2 Interview with William O'Driscoll, Executive Secretary. 
N.T.A., May 1975. 
3 (1973) 32 D.L.R. (3d) 339. 
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director of' education were allowed to 
remain in the room while other teachers 
were giving evidence. The Ontario High 
Court ruled that the rindings of' the 
board of' ref'erence had to be set aside 
as it had !'ailed to deal openly and 
justly with the matter so that natural 
justice had not been !'allowed. The 
teachers, who were witnesses, had not 
been able to openly and rreely give 
evidence in the presence or their 
employers. 
At the same time, any decision or the arbitration 
board will be set aside ir it is shown that the 
arbitrators themselves are partial or biased. Hr. Justice 
Pigeon commented on this issue in The Supreme Court of' 
Canada when he said in Blanchett~ v. C.I.S. Ltd. (1973): 1 
In my view, the principle to be 
applied is t~e s~me f'or Judges 
as !'or arbitrators. A reasonable 
apprehension that the Judge might 
not act in an entirely impartial 
manner is gr~und ror disqualification. 
This quotation and the ruling in re Tbomoson2 indicat-e 
that there is a rourth stage of appeal outside the 
provisions or the arbitration process. This stage is an 
appeal to a court of' law. 
1 S.C.R. 8~3. 
2 Supra, p. 261 • 
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4. The Courts 
An appeal to a court of" law may result from a 
decision of a board or arbitration or it may be a direct 
process by-passing all or part of the grievance procedure. 
Both avenues need to be examined. 
(a) Appeals rrom a board of arbitration 
Occasionally statutes specify that appeals can be 
made to courts of' law. Prior to the repeal or section 78 
of' The Schools Act (R.S.U.) 1970, in Hay 1974, appeals 
- -
could be made to The Supreme Court or Newfoundland or a 
judge or the Court from certain decisions o£ the ~linister 
of Education or from decisions or boards of reference. 1 
Appeals or this nature can only be on points of law~ 
not on questions of" fact. The reasoning £or this distinc-
tion is that the individuals concerned, whether they be 
ministers of" state or member·s of" boards of" ref'erence or 
arbitration, since they are not trained in the law, might 
misinterpret the meaning of' a legal enactment or principle. 
They might, for example, misinterpret the intent o~ a 
clause of" the legislation, _such as the meaning o£ 
'permanent' or of' 'just cause 1 • 2 They might be at fault 
in their procedure, as in re Thompson,3 a fault that can 
1 Supra, p. 257. 
2 re Walker and West Hants Municipal School Board, sunra~p.20). 
3 Supra, p. 261. 
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lead to a denial or natural justice. 
The powers of boards of arbitration are defined 
in the statutes or collective agreements that create them. 
I~ the boards exceed their powers, an appeal can be made 
to a court of law, since the interpretation o~ the scope 
o~ their powers is a legal, as compared to ~actual, 
question. 
The power of boards o~ arbitration in New~oundland 
is stated in Article 34.12 o~ ~Collective Agreement 
1975: 
In any case, including, cases ar~s1ng 
out o~ suspension, dismissal or other 
discipline, or the loss or any remun-
eration, bene~its or privilege, the 
Board o~ Arbitration shall have rull 
power to direct payment o£ compensation, 
vary the penalty, or to direct reinstate-
ment of a bene~it or privilege, or to 
af~irm the taking away of such benefit 
or privilege as the Board may determine 
appropriate to settle the issues between 
the parties, and may give retroactive· 
e~~ect to its decision. 
This Article gives wide powers to a board o~ 
arbitration. It l-rould appear, however, ·rrom the following 
case, that any order made by a board of arbitration must 
be related to and arising out of the contractual relation-
ship that previously existed between the parties. 
Board of Lloydminster School Unit No.60 of 
Saskatchewan v. Graham et al.(Sask.)(1973): 1 
Section 238(10) of ~Schools !£1 (Saskatchewan) 
states: 
1 6 W. W .R. 883. 
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The board or rererence may confirm the 
termination or the agreement or order 
the reinstatement of' the teacher or 
make such other order as, in its 
opinion, the circumstances warrant. 
The Board o:r Reference, hearing the grievance 
of a teacher whose contract had been termin-
ated, made run order :for reinstatement subject 
to a number of' specific conditions or terms. 
The teacher was redundant, and within the 
terms of' The Tenure Act, the dismissal was 
in order. The Board of' Reference, however, 
had the :following conditions: 
••• a period of' leave of absence 
without pay :followed by a :full rest-
oration of' salary, subject to possible 
substitute teaching duties :for a period 
o:r time ~hich might be extensive, and 
taking into consideration her then place 
of' residence, :follow~d by a requirement 
to place her in a classroom in the Unit 
up to and including Grade 8 level in 
which a vacancy occurs. 
Maguire, J.A. of' the Saskatchewan Court of' Appeal, 
held that the Board of Reference had acted beyond 
its jurisdiction as the imposition on both 
parties of the conditions was, in effect, a new 
contract embodying new terms. The order of the 
Board of Reference was, accordingly, quashed. 
Although~ Collective Agreement 1975 does not 
mention an appeal to The Supreme Court on a point of' 
law, it is an accepted principle of the law that the 
existence of' a board of arbitration does not take away a 
teacher's right to a remedy through the courts if- such 
an appeal is justified. If', however, boards of' arbitration 
have not exceeded their powers, misinterpreted any other 
points of law. or denied justice to either or the 
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contending parties, then their decisions are binding. 
The courts do not interfere with interpretations o~ 
fact. 
Jennings v. Caddo Parish School Board (U.S.)(1973): 1 
The Louisiana Court of Appeal held that it 
would not substitute its judgement for that · 
of a board or arbitration, nor interfere 
with the board's bona fide exercise of 
discretion. Only points of law could be 
appealed to the court. 
Article 34.09 of The Collective Agreement 1975, 
states: 
All parties bound by this Agreement 
••• shall comply with the decisions 
or an arbitration board appointed 
••• and do or, as the case may be, 
abstain from doing anything required 
by that decision. 
A leading case on this subject is Belanger v. 
Commissaires d'Ecoles pour Municipalite Scolaire de 
St. Gervais {Que.)(1970): 2 
After a board of arbitration ruled in favour 
of the teacher and ordered her reinstated, 
the school board refused to re-engage her. 
The Quebec Court of Appeal held that a 
school board cannot be forced to re-engage 
a teacher it deemed unsuitable. There was 
no legislation forcing it to do so. The 
1 276 So. 2d. 386. 
2 Supra, p.213. 
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Supreme Court o:f Canada~ however,. over-
ruled the Quebec court and held that the. 
action of the school board, i:f supported~ 
would negate any bene:fit the legislature 
intended to confer on teachers to protect 
their rights. 
(b) Appeals outside the grievance procedure 
A teacher might not be able to make use of the 
grievance procedure because o:f a procedural error on 
his part. The error may be deliberate or accidental. No 
clear principle seems to have been established to deter-
mine whether such an error will deprive a teacher of 
his right to sue :for unlawful dismissal. 
Murray v. Ponaka School District (Alta-.)(1929): 1 
The Alberta Court o:f Appeal dismissed an 
action by a teacher :for damages :ror wrongful 
dismissal as he had :failed to appeal to the 
Minister and thus exhaust the · administrative 
remedy open to him. 
This 1929 decision is at variance with a more 
recent decision. 
Wagsta:f:fe v. Public School Board o:f Section 8 
o:f Raglan (Ont.)(1948):2 
The Ontario Court o:r Appeal held that the 
Teachers' Board o:r Reference Act did not take 
1 D.L.R. 425. 
2 0. \'1/. N. 1 20, (C. o:f A. ) • 
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away the right or a teacher to sue through 
the courts in case of dismissal. The school 
board argued that the Act obligated a teacher 
to take his case to the Minister rather than 
sue through the courts. The court held~ how-
ever, that the section or the Act did not 
deny such a remedy. Also a reason ror dis-
missal had to be given berore an appeal 
could be made to the Minister. In this 
case the teacher had not been given a 
reason by the school board. 
This case suggests that where an appeal is denied 
to the Minister, it can be taken to the courts, and even 
ir an appeal is possible to the Minister~ the appellant 
can still sue through the courts. 
Many of the clauses in Articles 33 and 34 of ~ 
·Collective Agreement 1975, covering Grievance Procedure 
and Arbitration, specify time limits within which 
proceedings must be taken. Although Articles · 33.18 and 
34.11 speciry that the time limits may be extended by 
the mutual agreement o~ all the parties concerned, if no 
such agreement is reached, Article 33.17 will prevail. 
It states: 
Ir advantage or the provisions o£ this 
Article has not been taken within the 
time limits specified herein, the 
alleged grievance shall be deemed to 
be abandoned and cannot be reopened. 
The grievance procedure is terminated by such a 
technical breach, but does it deny a hearing before the 
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courts? It could be argued that no man should be denied 
justice because o~ a procedural technicality. The decision 
in Knight v. Board o~ Yorkton School Unit No.36 (1973), 1 
suggests that a teacher will not be denied justice berore 
the courts i~ he can show that he did not know or his 
legal rights. He will not be able to use the law india-
criminately, however. 
Kowalchuk v. Rolling River School Division, No. 
J2 (Man.)(1975):2 
A teacher, who had eight years service with 
the school board, was given notice on March 
23rd. 1972 that his services were to be 
terminated due to decreasing enrolment. On 
April 5th.1972 he replied that . the reason 
given was unacceptable and requested a 
board of arbitration. Section 281{3) or 
the Public School~ (R.S.M.) 1970, stated 
that such a challenge had to be made within 
seven days o~ receiving notice o£ termination. 
The Manitoba Court or Queen's Bench rejected 
his appeal. Dewar, C.J.Q.B., said: 
Failure to ••• take advantage or the 
statutory provisions does not permit 
plainti~f the alternative of question-
ing the reason for termination in this 
Court in this action, when the sole 
issue is whether or not the contract 
was lawfully terminated in accordance 
with the terms permitting termination. 
I .find it . was. 
1 Supra, p. 255 
2 48 D.L.R. (3d) 254, (Q.B.D.). 
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The implication o~ this judgement is clear. The 
court was prepared to hear appeals on po·ints of law but 
not to act as a determinant o~ fact. A procedural device 
existed, namely a board o~ arbitration, by which the 
teacher could question the validity or his termination, 
which was a question or ~act. The school board had 
rollowed the correct legal- procedure; . there was, there-
rare, nothing ror the court to consider rurther. It is 
probable that, ir the school board had not rollowed the 
correct procedure, the court would have heard the action. 
The overall position is not clear. Teachers, 
principals and school boards, accordingly, are urged 
to ramiliarise themselves with the procedures to be 
rollowed in all cases or demotion, suspension, termination 
or contract or dismissal. 
VII. SUMMARY 
In the absence of a statutory provision to the 
co-ntrary, the power to employ teachers and other school 
of'f'icials presupposes the power of dismissal. The right 
to dismiss is statutory and absolute. It cannot be 
bargained away or limited by contract. It is, however, 
subject to constitutional limitations. This chapter has 
been an attempt to examine those limitations. 
Tenure laws grant continuity of employment to 
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those who enjoy tenure status. The status can be acquired 
on the completion of a satis~actory period o~ probation, 
which is usually de~ined in statute or in contractual 
agreements, or it may be implied through length or 
service. A tenured teacher has a permanent contract. 
Tenure laws ensure that no teacher may be dismissed, 
demoted or transferred except for causes specified in 
statute or contractual agreements. The precise reasons 
for the action must be stated and there must be evidence 
or just cause, which must be relative to the job fitness 
o~ the teacher concerned. Employers must indicate the 
clauses of the legislation which are being invoked and 
must operate within the speciried time limits. 
Tenure laws grant certain procedural rights to 
teachers. If a teacher is being disciplined for any 
inadequacy on his part, he must first be given an 
opportunity to correct his weaknesses. Before any action 
against him is finalised, he must be given an opportunity 
to present arguments on his own behalf. If there is a 
dispute over the action taken, the teacher has a right, 
through the grievance procedure, to appeal to his superiors, 
to his employers and, if necessary, to a board of 
arbitration. 
Boards or arbitration must act impartially 1 without 
prejudice or bias, and operate within their stated powers. 
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If they supercede their powers, misinterpret any legal 
enactments or prevent justice being done~ appeals may 
be made to a court of law. The courts will examine points 
of law, not questions of fact.It is probable~ however, 
that, if a teacher by-passes t _he grie-vance procedure 
and appeals directly to a court of law, the court will 
entertain his plea if it is satisfied that the action 
taken by the school board was illegal. If the school 
board has followed the correct procedures, the teacher 
should use the grievance procedures available to him. 
Teacher tenure gives continuity of employment which 
cannot be severed arbitrarily. Only within the provisions 
of the law may the contract of a tenured teacher be 
terminated. The provisions of the law allow for the 
.· 
personal habits and capabilities of the teacher to be 
taken into consideration. The provisions allow for the 
needs of the employers to be taken into consideration. 
Basically, it can be said that if the teacher does his 
work satisfactorily and the school board is not compelled 




SUMMARY, FINDINGS AND IMPLICATIONS 
I. SUMMARY 
This study has attempted to identiry, through an 
examination or relevant legislation and court decisions, 
consistent principles or law relative to proreasional 
educational personnel. Specirically, the study has 
examined the legal responsibilities or educators for the 
sarety and welfare or students, and the legal rights or 
teachers in · the rield or tenure. Although the legislation 
or Newroundland has been examined in greater detail than 
the legislation or other provinces or countries, the 
principles or law identiried apply equally across Canada 
and in Britain. 
The writer has reviewed the sources or the law 
relevant to this study. The written law examined includes 
rederal and provincial legislation, school boards' by-laws 
and regulations, and contractual agreements. In reviewing 
the principles that have evolved rrom unwritten law, the 
writer has perused a wide selection or court cases. The 
roles or the courts and of quasi-judicial bodies have been 
examined to determine their places in the judicial process. 
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The study has examined the legal principles that 
have evolved from the tort or negligence~ including its 
characteristics, the duty of care that is owed to students, 
and the concept of vicarious liability which determines 
the liability or school boards ror the negligent acts or 
their employees. The writer has examined the speciric 
legal duties that are imposed upon school boards, principals, 
and teachers, respectively, with regard to the supervision 
or students on and orr school premises, berore and after 
school hours, ~~d on school excursions. The responsibilities 
of educators ror the sarety or school premises, racilities 
and equipment have been reviewed. The respective duty or 
care owed to students being transported on school buses, 
in taxis or in private cars has been defined. The defences 
to a charge or negligence have been reviewed, as have 
measures that educators can take to protect themselves 
against char~es of negligence or against financial awards 
that may be made against them. Through an examination of 
the by-laws or Newfoundland school boards and the hand-
books or regulations or a selected number or schools, the 
writer has attempted to comment on the adequacy of pre-
vailing supervisory practices at the local level. 
In the field of tenure, the writer has reviewed the 
procedures for acquiring tenure, the causes ror dismissal, 
the procedures for dismissal and the procedural rights that 
accrue to teachers. 
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II. THE FINDINGS 
In this study it has been impossible to dwell only 
on the status of the classroom tea~her since his legal 
role is closely interrelated with that of school boards 
and school principals. Accordingly, the findings apply 
to educational personnel generally. 
1. Legal Background 
The legal status of educators is derived from the 
statutes, from the common law, from subordinate legis-
lation in the form of school board by-laws and regulations, 
from contractual agreements, from the rules of natural 
justice, and from the interpretations given by the courts 
and quasi-judicial bodies to all of the above. 
The statutes state the legal rights and responsibil-
ities o~ educators. So, in Newfoundland, school boards 
have a statutory duty to provide supervision, to ensure 
that school buildings, equipment and all vehicles used 
for transporting students are in a safe condition, to in-
sure all buildings and equipment, and to effect insurance 
indemnity in respect of any claim for damages or personal 
injury. School principals have a statutory duty to arrange 
for the regular supervision of students and to report to 
their school boards the need for repairs to buildings. and 
equipment. Teachers have a statutory duty to ca~e for the 
premises and property of the school and to perform such 
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other duties as are prescribed by the regulations, rules 
or by-laws or ·their school boards. 
The common law duty or educational personnel is to 
care ror their students as would reasonable and prudent 
parents. The common law, thererore, serves a dual purpose. 
In the absence of a statutory duty, it imposes its own 
duty; when a statutory duty exists, it expands upon it 
by stating 'how' the duty is to be performed, that is, 
as a 'reasonable and prudent parent'. 
School boards have statutory authority to make 
regulations, rules and by-laws. The duties imposed upon 
employees by such regulations are as binding as statutory 
duties, unless they are in direct contravention of any 
statutory regulations. They may not contract the scope of 
duties enacted by the legislature, but they may expand 
upon them and may elucidate the duties more specifically. 
Contractual agreements, provided they do not con-
travene existing statutory enactments, are binding on the 
signatories. Such agreements state the rights and 
duties of the parties involved. Teachers under permanent 
contract are protected from arbitrary dismissal or term-
ination of contract upon unreasonable or malicious 
grounds. The causes ror dismissal and the procedures for 
such dismissal are stated. Provisions are made ~or teachers, 
who are grieved by the decisions of their employers, to 
appeal the decisions. The status of probationary teachers 
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and those not under permanent contract are de~ined. 
Be~ore any ~orm o~ action is taken against a teacher 
which might atrect his status as an employee, the rules 
0~ natural justice demand that he be given due notice or 
the action being taken, the reasons for such action, and 
an opportunity or a hearing. 
Courts of' law interpret the statutes and develop 
the common law. As such, the interpretations they make 
and the way in which they develop the common law enable 
them to mete out justice in accordance with the basic 
rules of' equity as they apply to the needs or modern 
society • . As schools have moved. into the technological 
age ·with larger buildings, greater numbers and more 
diversif"ied programmes, so the courts have ruled that 
the duty of' care owed to students must be equal to the 
internal changes and the inherent dangers that accompany 
such developments. The duty of' care owed by educators is 
a high one. Basically students have come to be considered 
as obligatees and, as such, they have a right to expect 
not to be injured. The courts have ruled that, to meet 
this high standard of' care, educators must ef"~ect adeq~ate 
procedures f"or the supervision of' students and ~or the 
upkeep of' school premises, f"acilities and equipment. 
Although the courts do not interrer e with f"indings 
o~ quasi-judicial bodies (such as boards or arbitration), 
or with the rulings of' school boards, they insist that 
-278-
the procedures adopted by such bodies be both legal and 
just. Accordingly~ they exercise a supervisory role to 
correct errors or law and procedure and, when such errors 
exist, they quash the rulings o£ the bodies. I~ the 
ruling so quashed is one from a board or arbitration, the 
courts order the board to hear the dispute again and to 
operate within the ruling that they have handed down. 
Provided the actions o~ school boards and quasi-judicial 
bodies are legal and have rollowed the procedures laid 
down by law, the courts do not interfere. 
2. Summarv or Findings 
A study o~ the various sources ~rom which the 
status or educators is derived has resulted in the 
~allowing conclusions: 
(a) As to liability: 
1. School boards are responsible for ensuring that 
supervision is provided .• 
2. School principals are responsible for arranging 
and organising the supervision. 
3. Teachers are responsible ror carrying out the 
supervision as directed by their principals. 
4. Supervision o~ students should be on a planned, 
organised basis. 
5. Students do not have to be sup.ervised at all 
times. The amount or supervision that should 
be provided will depend upon the age~ the number 
and the maturity or the students, and upon the 
particular circumstances of the event to be 
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supervised. The younger the students~ the 
greater the number or the students, or the · 
more hazardous the event, the greater the 
amount or supervision nee~ed. 
6. The standard or care demanded or teachers with 
special training or skills who operate in 
potentially dangerous areas, such as labor-
atories, gymnasiums and workshops, or with 
potentially dangerous equipment, is probably 
higher than the average. 
1. School personnel are responsible ror the sarety 
or their students during school hours. School 
hours are those stated in statute or as 
extended by local regulations. 
8. School personnel are responsible ror the sarety 
of their students on school-related activities 
outside of normal school hours. 
9. Educational personnel have a duty to see that 
the premises, the facilities and the equipment 
of their schools are safe for the purpose for 
which they are intended. 
10. School boards will be vicariously liable for 
the negligent acts of their employees, if such 
are perrormed in the furtherance of the 
employees' duties. 
11. Bus contractors are considered employees or 
school boards. 
12. Taxi owners are usually considered as indep-
endent contractors. 
13. Drivers of private cars will be indemniried 
by their normal automobile insurance policies 
ror injuries surfered by fare-paying students, 
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provided such excursions are inrrequent or 
occasional and are on school or school-
related business. 
14. Parental notes granting permission ror students 
to take part on school excursions do not 
release educators from liability ror injuries 
sustained due to their negligence. Parents 
cannot sign away their children's rights to 
the legal process. 
15. Ir a student is injured due to the negligent 
exercise or the duty of care owed by educators~ 
those found negligent may be liable for 
damages to compensate the injured person. 
16. Liability will only ensue if the injury is 
a direct result or the negligence. 
17. School board employees may be liable to 
indemnify their school boards for any 
financial charges made on the boards because 
of the negligence of the employees. 
18. If the injured person knows of the danger and . 
voluntarily assumes the risk~ he may rail to 
recover damages. 
19. I£ the injured person contributes to his hurt 
by his own negligence. the award of damages 
may be decreased in proportion to the degree 
of his negligence. 
(b) As to tenure: 
1 . Probationary periods are defined in statute or 
in contractual agreements or may be implied 
through length or service. 
2. A tenured teacher has a permanent contract. 
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3. No teacher may be dismissed, demoted or trans-
rerred except ror causes speci~ied in statute 
or contractual agreements. 
4. Precise reasons must be stated £or actions 
taken against teachers. 
S. Just cause must be shown ror such actions. 
6. Teachers must be given an opportunity to 
correct their weaknesses prior to dismissal. 
1. Teachers must be given a hearing prior to or 
within a reasonable time o£ any actions being 
taken against them. 
8. Employers and teachers· should :follow the 
procedures speci£ied in the statutes or 
contractual agreements. Failure to :follow the 
stated procedures might cause any action 
taken to be declared void. 
9. All hearings in the grievance procedure must 
be just and impartial. 
10. Tribunals, boards o:f re:ference and boards of' 
arbitration must not exceed their stated powers. 
III. IMPLICATIONS 
It was stated in chapter III in the section headed 
'Signi:ficance o:f the Study', that a 'knowledge o:f the law 
would enhance the pro:fessional stature o:f pro:fessional 
personnel' and that 'pro:fessional personnel should become 
better quali£ied to avoid litigation•. 1 This study has 
illustr ated that, in many, i:f not the majority, o:f cases, 
1 Suora, p .45. 
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educational personnel have found themselves before the 
courts or before quasi-judicial bodies because of their 
ignorance of school law. The word 'ignorance' is not used 
in a derogatory sense. but in its literal meaning of 
'lacking knowledge'. The most important implication of 
this study is that, until educators acquire knowledge of 
their legal rights and responsibilities, they might 
continue to appear unnecessarily in expensive and time-
consuming legal disputes. They might also continue to 
care for their students irresponsibly and to conduct 
their relationships among themselves in an unprofessional 
manner. Disputes will occur and accidents will happen 
but, i£ educators were made more conversant with school 
law, much needless litigation could be avoided. 
Universities and teacher training colleges have a 
role to play in this area. It is recommended. that steps 
should be taken to ensure that no new teachers are 
granted certificates until they have studied a basic 
course on school law. This need not be an in-depth study. 
It should, however, examine the legislation of the 
province in which the teacher resides; it should examine 
any contractual agreements which might be in force; and 
it should cover the basic principles of law regarding. at 
least, liability and tenure. 
Once teachers move into the schools they should 
be kept informed of prevailing trends and new legislation. 
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Much can be done in this area by provincial teachers' 
associations. The Law and Tenure Department of the National 
Union of Teachers in Britain employs two full-time 
solicitors. One of the duties performed by these persons 
is to send to the members of the union not only extra~ts 
of new legislation but also circulars explaining in 
straightforward terms the legal rights and duties of 
educators. Recent circulars include Conditions of Tenure,. 
Employment of Teachers, Appointment and Dismissal of Head 
Master, Supervision Duty at Recess, Supervision of Pupils 
on School Premises Before and After School Hours, Super-
vision of Pupils Awaiting Transportation, School Crossing 
Patrols - The Taacher's Responsibilities, School Journeys 
and Excursions, Memorandum on Swi~~ing, Legal Responsibility 
of. Teachers in Physical Education, and Playground Super-
vision. ·The NewfoUndland Teachers' Association has made 
a start in this area; much still needs to be done. 
Communication is also essential at the local level. 
How many teachers have read or even seen the by-laws or 
their school boards? How many teachers know the rules 
and regulations of their own schools? How frequently are 
teachers informed of new legislation or amendments to 
existing legislation? 
There is a danger of educators relying on good 
fortune and on protectory measures such as indemnity 
clauses and insurance policies. Litigation, however, can 
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do much harm to the proressional image or teachers 
generally. Thererore, local rules and regulations must 
be consistently re-examined and upgraded · to ensure that 
the greatest possible protection is arrorded to students 
and to the proressional stature or educators. 
It cannot be emphasised too strongly that a basic 
understanding or the law and a knowledge or legal rights 
and responsibilities are essential ir educators are to 
become surriciently proressional to answer the demands 
or accountability that increasingly are being made upon 
them. 
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APPENDIX A 
NJIJ.X OF ~CEOOL BOA.s.'m: 
NUMBER OF SCHOOLS IN DISTRICT: 
lllThrnER OF STUDENTS IN DIST~.ICT: 
NUMBER OF TEACHERS, INCLUDING PRINCIPALS, 
IH DISTRICT: 
The Board has specific regulations regarding the supervision of 
students. YES/NO. 
I enclose a copy of the Board Ry-La"t.:rs. YES/NO. 
I enclose extracts of the By-Laws only. YES/NO. 
Would you like a resume of my findings? YF.S/NO. 
COMHEllTS: 
Please return to: Hike Parry 
Department of Educational Administration 
MetTlorial University of Net·lfoundland 
St. John's, Nfld. 
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MEMORIAL UNIVERSITY OF NEWFOUNDLAND 
St. John's, Newfoundland, Canada A lC 5S 7 
:1e~artmen t of I:ducationAl r'\CIP.inj.s t:r,qt ion 
January 23 9 197:J 
TI1e AG~inistrative ~ecreta~r 
De:.:-,r Sir ~ 
I ar.1 readj_ng for my Haster; s Deeree in ~~<!ucational Ac.~rninis tration 
at this University. !iy proposet:.1 thesis is ~ 
~ 1The LepP.l StCttun of the I:ei::founlU.anc Teacher t-rith 
_partj_cular reference to his ~iRhts in Field of 
Tenure ard to his :->.esponsit ili ties for the 
Supervision of St,Jclents.; 
Unfortunately no case involvin~ either of these a.reas has ever 
a1?peare~ l:-ef0rP. th~; courts of l7mifoundlc:m<{. To internret the legislation 
t!.-lerefore, I have to loo1- to decisions of the ~upre~c Court of Canada 
t..rhich t·:rould 1-·e "hincl:J.n~ in the ;·:r e-.:-7£o-:..ul.c1lan2. Courts, c:mrl to decisions of 
rrovincial ~unre!"'.e r.ourts ullich could have an influence on r·lel-.rfoundland Courts. 
The C. T.v. hnr-: 1:-n.en unabl~ to .?.Gr-ist F-~ in FY r~search. Fould you be 
able to s~ni! rn0. the na~es, le;al r0ferences ~ resume of facts E~.nd decisions 
of P.ny cases r•.?.levant to rr-.y r c se."".rch that have :lpp~A-rcn "':--l"'fore th~ courts 
of your Provine~ sincG 1?01. I :,3v2 re-8-d the t.Jod--.s of :-kCurdy, !'~r~cn 
Rn~ ~nns for th~ leBal status 0f t~e ~~nadinn Teacher~ Pupil a~rl 8chool 
Foard resp2ctiv~ly. I P<lrticulflr]_y see.!'. infori',ation on cases subsequent 
to the puhlication of McCurdyts "!:.ook. 
PleaDe excus e this (1unl:l.cr-tt""~ ~ lett2r ~ but it is bein?- sent to 
all Provincial Te~chcr ~ss0ciations. 
Yours sincer•~ly ~ 
D.M. PArry, Ll.B. 
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January 24, 1975 
I am a British subject, obtained my Honours Law Degree 
~rom tne University College o~ \vales, Aberystwyth in 1960, and 
am currently reading for my Master's Degree in Educational 
Administration at this University. My proposed thesis is: 
The Legal Status o~ t h e New~oundland Teacher, 
with Particular Reference to his Responsibilities 
in the Field of Pupil Supervision and his Rights 
in tre Field of Tenure. 
Unrortunately, no cases in either rield have ever 
appear~d be~ore the Newroundland courts. A rew cases from 
other Canadian provinces ~ave reached the Supreme Court of 
Canada, and t h ese are binding on Newfoundland courts. British 
cases, although no longer binding, are still influential in 
our courts. 
I am trying to find relevant British cases in my two 
areas and am writing in the hope that you might be able to 
assist me. Would you be able to send me the names, legal 
references, an outline o~ t r. e facts and the judgement or, 
what you consider, the most relevant cases? 
If you could also send me transcripts of the most 
relevant sections from enacted legislation, I would be most 
grate~ul. 
I still operate an account at Lloyds Bank, Milford Haven 
and would be pleased to pay for any charges that this research 
might entail. 
. Yours sincerely, 
-.)VI-
/ 
3 KENMOUNT ROAD, ST. JOHN'S, NFLD. A I B I WI 
PHONE 726-3223 <AREA CODE 7091 
~ewfoundland \ r \. Teachers' Association 
Mr. D. M. Parry, 
Department of Education, 
Memorial University, 
St. John's, Nfld. 
Dear Mike: 
Narch 20, 1975. 
This is to confirm that I have now heard from all the 
teachers who had cases decided by Boards of Reference prior 
to the Collective Agreement 1973. All the teachers have 
given permission for you to use the facts of their cases 





Type o:f School: 
Primary, Elementary, Junior High, Senior High, Central 
High, All-grade, or Regional High. 
Number o:f Students: 
Number o:f Sta:f:f, including Principal: 
1. Does you school board have speci:fic regulations :for 
the supervision o:f students? 
Yes or No 
2. Does your ·school have speci:fic regulations :for the 
supervision o:f students? 
Yes or No 
). I:f the school does have speci:fic regulations, please 
enclose either the regulations in toto, or relevant 
extracts. 
I enclose regulations in toto: 
Yes or No 
I enclose extracts only: 
Yes or No 
4. Does the school contribute to any insurance plan :for 
the coverage o:f the students? 
Yes or No 
I:f Yes, does the school pay the contributions? 
or, do the students pay the contributions? 
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Name of School Board: 
1. Are all your buildings and equipment insured? 
2. Does the School Board carry general accident 
insurance? 
Yes or No 
Yes or No 
3. Does the School Board carry comprehensive 
liability insurance? 
Yes or No 
If Yes, what is the extent of the coverage? 
4. If the School Board operates buses, in its agreem~nt 
with the bus contractors, does it use the contract 
recommended by the Department of Education; 
Yes or No 
5. If No: (i) does your contract include a clause 
indemnifying the School Board from and against all 
claims and demands, actions and suits, for and in 
respect of any injuries to persons or property 
arising out of the operations of any bus? (Section 
1 (j) of the recommended contract). 
Yes or No 
(ii) does your contract have a clause imposing -
on the bus contractor the responsibility for the 
safety of passengers, entering, alighting from and 
being transported in any bus? (Section 1 (n) of the 
recommended contract). 
Yes or No 



